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Abstract 
Background: Dispensing medication is a chain of multiple stages, and any error during 
the dispensing process may cause potential or actual risk for the patient. Few research 
studies have investigated the nature and contributory factors associated with 
dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies. 
Aim: To determine the nature and severity of dispensing errors reported in the 
hospital pharmacies at King Saud Medical City (KSMC) hospital in Saudi Arabia, and at 
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital (L&D) NHS Foundation Trust in the UK; and to 
explore the pharmacy staff perceptions of contributory factors to dispensing errors 
and strategies to reduce these errors. 
Materials and Methods: A mixed method approach was used and encompassed two 
phases. Phase I: A retrospective review of dispensing error reports for an 18-month 
period at the two hospitals. The potential clinical significance of unprevented 
dispensing errors was assessed. Data was analysed using descriptive statistics in SPSS 
and A Fisher’s test was used to compare the findings. Phase II: Self-administered 
qualitative questionnaires (open-ended questions) were distributed to the dispensary 
teams in KSMC and L&D hospitals. Content analysis was applied to the qualitative data 
using NVivo qualitative analysis software. 
Result: Dispensing the wrong medicine or the incorrect strength were the most 
common dispensing error types in both hospitals. Labelling errors were also common 
at the L&D pharmacy dispensary. The majority of the unprevented dispensing errors 
were assessed to have minor or moderate potential harm to patients. Look-
alike/sound-alike medicines, high workload, lack of staff experience, fatigue and loss of 
concentration during work, hurrying through tasks and distraction in the dispensary 
were the most common contributory factors suggested. Ambiguity of the prescriptions 
was a specified factor in the L&D pharmacy, while poor pharmacy design and 
unstructured dispensing process were specified contributory factors in the KSMC 
pharmacy.  
Conclusions: Decreasing distractions and enhancing the pharmacy design and the 
dispensing workflow are necessary to reduce dispensing errors. Furthermore, 
monitoring and reporting errors and educating the dispensary team about these errors 
is also needed. Automation and e-prescribing systems may improve dispensing 
efficiency and safety. The findings of this study reemphasise the fact that dispensing 
errors are prevalent in hospital pharmacies. Efficient interventions need to be 
implemented to mitigate these errors. 
 
2 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Patient safety  
Currently, one of the main goals of all healthcare institutions and healthcare providers 
is to improve patient safety. The simplest definition of patient safety is "the prevention 
of errors and adverse effects to patients associated with health care" (WHO, 2015).   In 
some countries, patient safety incidents have been receiving greater attention from 
healthcare providers and institutions, and they are becoming recognised as a global 
problem. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that 1 out of 10 
patients is harmed while receiving healthcare in hospitals in developed countries 
(WHO, 2014). The National Patient Safety Agency recorded over 1.3 million patient 
safety incidents in England and Wales for the period between October 2010 and 
September 2012, and these incidents cost the NHS around £2 billion a year 
(Government-Knowledge, 2012). About 1.5 million patient safety incidents that 
occurred annually in United States of America (USA) can be prevented (Aspden et al., 
2006). 
Patient safety as a concept has been recognised since the time of Greek healers in the 
fourth century BC. They drafted the Hippocratic Oath, “I will do no harm", which 
recognised the potential for injuries that arise from the well-intentioned actions of 
healers (Adhikari, 2010, Tyson, 2001, Ehrmeyer and Laessig, 2008). The first medical 
initiative to champion patient safety as a specific focus was the Anesthesia Patient 
Safety Foundation (APSF) in the USA, which was established in 1985 to reduce the 
mortality and morbidity rate associated with anaesthesia; there was a common 
impression that anaesthesia care itself caused significant mortality (APSF, 2010).  
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a report called “To Err Is Human: 
Building a Safer Health System”. The report estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 
people in the USA die annually as a result of patient safety incidents that can be 
prevented, and these incidents cost between $17 billion and $29 billion (Kohn et al., 
1999, Brennan et al., 1991, Thomas et al., 2000). However, patient safety gained more 
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attention after the publication of the IOM report, which became a landmark 
publication in patient safety (Ulrich and Kear, 2014, Clancy, 2009, Wischet and 
Schusterschitz, 2009, Knaus, 2002, Han et al., 2005). 
In the UK, the Department of Health launched “An Organisation with a Memory” 
report which mirrored the approach of “To Err is Human” (Department of Health, 
2000). In this report, the Chief Medical Officer reported that patient safety incidents 
occurred in around 10% of National Health Service (NHS) hospital patients (850,000) 
every year, costing the NHS around £2 billion. The report pointed out that the practice 
of reporting and learning from the errors was not developed enough in the UK 
(Department of Health, 2000). The “An Organisation with a Memory” report led to the 
initiation of studies to quantify the incidence of harm and qualitative research to 
identify the failure mechanisms that result in patient harm (Fisher et al., 2015). Since 
"An Organisation with a Memory" was published, important and necessary steps have 
been taken on the journey to improve patient safety across the NHS. Building a safer 
NHS for patients was launched on 2001 and describes the work being undertaken, and 
planned, to implement the recommendations contained in An Organisation with a 
Memory (Carruthers and Philip, 2006). One recommendation was to encourage local 
and national reporting systems for adverse events and errors, which would be 
implemented and operated by a new independent body, the National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA), which was  subsequently established in same year (Department of 
Health, 2001). The NPSA has the responsibility of improving the patient safety and 
improve the quality of healthcare through reporting, analysing, and disseminating the 
lessons of adverse events and ‘near misses’ involving NHS patients (Smith, 2004). 
In recent times, health care institutions and global organisations have taken the 
concept of patient safety very seriously, resulting in special centres for patient safety 
being established across the world. Examples of this initiative are the World Alliance 
for Patient Safety (WHO, 2009b), the National Patient Safety Foundation in the USA 
(NPSF, 2015) and the Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI, 2015). The main function 
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of these organisations is to reduce medical errors by understanding the causes of 
errors, and then finding solutions to them (NPSF, 2015, WHO, 2009b). 
These patient safety centres have contributed to improving patient safety. For 
instance, the World Alliance for Patient Safety, which run by the WHO, contributed to 
improving patient safety in several countries, through projects concerned with 
managing concentrated injectable medicines, assuring medication accuracy at 
transitions in care and performance of the correct procedure at the relevant body site 
(WHO, 2013). Also the WHO contributed to improving patient safety in poor countries 
during conducted research about in patient safety incident in these countries and 
assist the countries to identify and reduce national barriers and implement the patient 
safety strategies and programmes (WHO, 2010). In UK, the NPSA contributed to 
improving patient safety through building reporting systems to collect and analyse 
information from staff and patients (Terry et al., 2005). The NPSA has a number of 
tools and resources available to support the NHS organisations to understand and to 
make changes to their working practices and safety culture with the aim of reducing 
the patient safety incident (NHS, 2009). 
Recent research shows that patient safety is still a widespread issue, even in developed 
countries. James et al. (2013) estimated that more than 210,000 patients are killed  
annually in USA hospitals by preventable hospital errors each year. In the UK, more 
than 1.6 million patient safety incidents have been reported to the National Reporting 
and Learning System by NHS organisations in England and Wales in 2014 (NHS, 2015a). 
Baker et al. (2004) conducted a retrospective research study by reviewing patient 
charts in Canadian hospitals. They found that about 7.5% of patients admitted to acute 
care in Canadian hospitals were there because of adverse events. Also, studies 
conducted in Dutch hospitals showed patient safety incidents are high. For instance,  a 
study by Zegers et al. (2009) found that 5.7% of patients were admitted to hospital 
because of patient safety incidents; most of these incidents were preventable. In Saudi 
Arabia, the number of legal cases related to medical errors has increased from 896 
cases in 2005 to 1,356 cases in 2008 (an increase of around 51%) (Alahmadi, 2010). 
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The healthcare service is one of the essential services for daily life, and it is becoming 
more complex, due to new technologies, medicines and treatments strategies. 
Designing an effective healthcare service system will help to improve patient safety 
(Nolan, 2000). Countries use different healthcare service systems, which may lead to 
different types of patient safety incidents. Healthcare services in USA are provided 
mainly by the private sector via health insurance (Rice et al., 2013). In France, the 
healthcare services are provided to legal residents via a public health insurance system 
(Chevreul et al., 2010). According to the WHO ranking of health systems in 2000, 
France has the best healthcare system in the world, while the USA healthcare system 
was ranked 38th out of 191 healthcare systems worldwide (WHO, 2000). The WHO 
rank depends on the overall level and distribution of health in the populations, and the 
responsiveness and financing of health care services.  Patient safety is associated with 
the level of the healthcare system for example, approximately 330,000 deaths every 
year because of failures of the healthcare service, while the death rate in France is 
approximately half of that (Patient Safety America, 2016). This research concerns the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Kingdom (UK), and hence there is a 
need to describe the healthcare systems of both in greater detail.   
  
1.2 Healthcare Systems in the KSA and the UK 
1.2.1 Healthcare System in the KSA 
The healthcare system in the KSA is ranked by the WHO 26th out of 191 healthcare 
systems worldwide (WHO, 2000). Healthcare services in KSA are provided free of 
charge for Saudi citizens, and are managed through the government’s Ministry of 
Health, which is responsible for the formulation of management policies. Additionally, 
other government sectors provide healthcare services for their employees, i.e. the 
Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Guard and the Ministry 
of Education (MOH, 2012). In contrast, the private sector also contributes to providing 
healthcare services in KSA for a fee or through private medical insurance. There are 
three levels of healthcare services: primary care through the primary health centres 
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(general practitioners), secondary care in the general hospitals and tertiary care 
through the specialist hospitals, such as eye hospitals and heart centres (MOH, 2012). 
This healthcare structure is presented in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1: Current structure of the healthcare sectors in KSA (Almalki et al., 2011) 
 
The Ministry of Health accounts for 60% of the healthcare provision in the KSA; this 
includes 251 hospitals with a total capacity of 34,459 beds and 2,109 primary care 
centres (MOH, 2012). These hospitals and primary care centres are distributed 
throughout all of the Kingdom’s provinces; furthermore, all of these institutions are 
under the supervision of 20 regional directorates-general of health affairs in various 
parts of the country (Almalki et al., 2011). Other government agencies cover around 
19% of the healthcare services in the Kingdom, with the total capacity of these 
hospitals/agencies reaching 10,948 beds (MOH, 2012). Finally, a further 130 private 
hospitals, with a total capacity of 13,298 beds, 2,185 private polyclinics and 198 private 
clinics, provide the remaining 21% of the healthcare services in the KSA (MOH, 2012). 
The Ministry of Health remains the ultimate responsible agency for managing and 
formulating the healthcare policies in the KSA, as well as for monitoring the healthcare 
services in the private sector (Al-Yousuf et al., 2002).  
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The Ministry of Health is the central government body responsible for setting and 
managing health policies. The main role of the Ministry is to support the government 
to improve the health of the population. To accomplish this, it sets overall health 
policies and strategies, while also managing legislation and regulations for the private 
sector (Albejaidi, 2010). Recently, the government established the Council of Health 
Services, which is headed by the Minister of Health and includes members from other 
government health sectors and the private sector (Almalki et al., 2011). This Council 
aims to develop coordination and integration among all of the healthcare service 
authorities in the KSA (Almalki et al., 2011).  
Several challenges faced by the Saudi healthcare system include the shortage of local 
healthcare professionals and the lack of unified electronic national health information 
systems (Almalki et al., 2011). Furthermore, the Ministry of Health provides healthcare 
services to millions of visitors and pilgrims from across the world during the Hajj or 
Umrah season (Jannadi et al., 2008). 
The Ministry of Health in the KSA provides medicines, free of charge, through the 
pharmacies in hospitals and in the primary care centres that are distributed 
throughout the Kingdom. The Pharmaceutical Care Department in each region’s 
Department of Health Affairs is responsible for overseeing the pharmacies affiliated 
with the Ministry of Health in their region. Furthermore, the Pharmaceutical Care 
Department in the Ministry of Health is the responsible agency for formulating and 
managing the policies and procedures for all of the Ministry of Health’s pharmacies. 
One of the department’s responsibilities is to enhance patient safety during the 
dispensing of medicines. For instance, the Pharmaceutical Care Department has 
contributed to the implementation of a medication safety programme in some 
hospitals, and has spread information about medication safety to inform dispensary 
teams and other healthcare professionals about medication errors (MOH, 2015).    
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1.2.2 Healthcare system in the UK 
The healthcare system in the UK is one of the most effective healthcare systems in the 
world, and it was ranked, by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2000, in 18th 
place among 191 countries (WHO, 2000). Also, it was ranked by the Commonwealth 
Fund in 2013 as the best healthcare system compared to ten other developed 
countries (The Commonwealth Fund, 2014, Davis et al., 2014). The Commonwealth 
Fund ranked the healthcare systems in 11 developed countries by measures of health 
system quality, efficiency, access to care, equity, and healthy lives.  Figure 1.2 shows 
the ranking for each measure. However, healthcare in the United Kingdom is a 
devolved matter, meaning that England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales each 
have their own healthcare systems as a result of each region having different policies 
and priorities (NHS, 2012a).  The National Health Service (NHS) was established in 
1948. The objective of the NHS was to provide free healthcare for those citizens who 
did not have the means to pay for healthcare themselves (Webster, 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1.2: Healthcare ranking for some healthcare system developed countries 
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Currently, healthcare services are provided free to all residents in England. In contrast, 
about 13% of the population are covered by private medical insurance, which mainly 
provides access to acute elective care in the private sector (Boyle, 2011). The 
Department of Health (DOH) is the central government body responsible for 
formulating and monitoring policies for the NHS (Boyle, 2011, The Commonwealth 
Fund, 2010). The Department of Health used to operate at a regional level through 10 
Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs). The SHAs were established in 2002 to manage the 
local NHS facilities and to provide healthcare services within their local areas (NPSA, 
2012a). However, the SHAs were also responsible for the strategic supervision of all 
NHS Trusts within their geographic area; this included focusing on improving the 
healthcare services in their local area and ensuring that their clients are receiving high-
quality care (NHS, 2012b).  
Each SHA’s area contained a number of NHS Trusts, which are responsible for running 
or commissioning the healthcare services within their local area (Boyle, 2011). 
However, several types of Trusts were supervised by the SHAs, for instance Primacy 
Care Trusts, Care Trusts, Mental Health Trusts, NHS Trusts and Ambulance Trusts 
(White, 2010). However, a new healthcare structure was established in April 2013; all 
NHS trusts are expected to become foundation trusts by 2014 (NHS, 2014a). Some 
organisations, such as Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and SHAs, have been abolished and 
replaced with the new system of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). CCGs have 
taken on many of the functions of SHAs and PCTs, in addition to some other functions 
(NHS, 2014a, NHS, 2013). The Care Quality Commission is responsible for improve the 
patient safety and assessing and making judgments as to the level of safety and quality 
of care provided by providers of health and social care. The main aim of the new 
healthcare structure is to improve quality and healthcare outcomes, which is expected 
to lead to an increase in patient safety. The Figure 1.3 illustrates the structure of the 
new healthcare system in the UK.                     
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Figure 1.3: A new UK healthcare structure (NHS England, 2014) 
 
1.3 Pharmaceutical services in hospital pharmacies in the KSA 
and the UK 
Secondary care refers to health care provided by hospital clinicians who generally do 
not have the first contact with a patient, for instance a neurologist or a cardiologist 
consultant (Multiple Sclerosis Trust, 2015a). Patients are usually referred to secondary 
care by a primary care provider, such as the primary care centre in the KSA or general 
practitioner (GP) in the UK. Tertiary care differs from the secondary care in that 
tertiary care is specialised healthcare provided in specialist centres, usually on referral 
from secondary care or primary care (Multiple Sclerosis Trust, 2015b). The King Khaled 
Eye Specialist Hospital in KSA and the National Hospital for Neurology and 
Neurosurgery in UK are examples of tertiary care centres. Pharmacy department in the 
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hospital provides essential service in hospitals, and it plays an important role in the 
drive to reduce patient safety risks (Schwartz and Kravitz, 2015, Robbins et al., 2013). 
This research is concerned with the King Saud Medical City (SKMC) in the KSA and the 
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (L&D) in the UK, so 
there is a need to describe the pharmaceutical services in both hospitals. 
 
1.3.1 Pharmaceutical services in the KSMC hospital pharmacy 
The pharmacy in the KSMC consists of three main sections: in-patient pharmacy, out-
patient pharmacy and Drug and Poison Information Centre (DPIC). Furthermore, there 
are satellite pharmacies in the intensive care unit, emergency department and kidney 
centre. The in-patient pharmacy operates 24 hours per day, and provides 
pharmaceutical care to hospitalised patients in the wards and intensive care units, and 
to emergency department patients. The pharmaceutical care services in the in-patient 
pharmacy include the unit dose system, dispensing the discharge prescriptions, and 
intravenous admixture preparation units, which prepare some medicines, such as 
antibiotics, total parenteral nutrition and chemotherapy. The out-patient pharmacy 
services patients of the out-patient clinic through dispensing the out-patient 
prescriptions. The DPIC provides information on medicines for the healthcare 
professionals in the hospital and anyone with concerns about poisons or drugs (KSMC, 
2015).  However, the in-patient pharmacy operated 24 hours for 7 days in three shifts; 
morning (8 Am - 4 Pm), evening (4 PM – 12 Am) and night (12Am – 8 Am). While the 
out-patient operated with the out-patient clinics from 8 Am to 4:30 Pm from Sunday to 
Thursday. In the previous the out-patient pharmacy was operated from Saturday to 
Wednesday until June 2013 while the weekend in KSA changed to be Friday and 
Saturday. 
The dispensary team in the Saudi hospital pharmacy usually consists of 54 pharmacists 
and 70 pharmacy technicians. Moreover, there are 20 pharmacists working in the 
hospitals as clinical pharmacists (Al-Zaagi, 2015). The pharmacists should have a 
bachelor’s degree in pharmacy or a pharm-D, while the pharmacy technicians should 
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have a diploma in pharmacy. The clinical pharmacists should have a Pharm-D or a 
clinical pharmacy program diploma (two years long) after the bachelor’s degree. The 
clinical pharmacists can train in advanced clinical pharmacy (three years) to become a 
specialist in one or more healthcare areas, including the following fields: internal 
medicine, nephrology, solid organ transplantation, oncology & haematology, infectious 
diseases, total parenteral nutrition, paediatrics, critical care and internal medicine. 
They need to register with the Saudi Commission for Health Specialties (SCFHS) after 
completing the required training program period (SCFHS, 2014).  
The pharmacists play a role in improving patient safety in the KSMC. For example, a 
senior pharmacist works as a medication safety officer. The main role for the 
medication safety officer is improving the safety of medicines in the hospital through 
monitoring and reporting medication errors, raising the awareness of professionals 
about medication errors and implementing and examining medication safety 
interventions in the hospitals. Moreover, the pharmacist is an important member on 
some committees, such as the procurement committee and the pharmaceutical and 
therapeutic committee, which are responsible for the drug formulary in the hospital 
(Al-Zaagi, 2015). 
Clinical pharmacy services were started in Saudi hospitals in the 1980s, but they were 
limited to some hospitals, such as the King Khalid University Hospital and the King 
Faisal Specialist Hospital (Saddique, 2012). The clinical pharmacists’ numbers are 
limited in the KSMC, and their roles in the hospital are reviewing the prescribed 
medicines in the in-patient chart, counselling the in-patients about their medicines, 
monitoring the pharmacokinetics and therapeutic drug level for narrow therapeutic 
index medicines and determining doses of medicines for renal and liver failure 
patients. The main role of the dispensary team in the hospital is dispensing the 
medicines in the in-patient and out-patient pharmacies (Al-Zaagi, 2015). Dispensing 
medicines in the hospital is carried out in several stages.  
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Supply of medicine is part of multidisciplinary process, stated by writing the 
prescription and ending with the administration of the medication to the patient. 
There are two different pathway for the supply the medicines in KSMC. One for the 
admitted patients and the second for the other patient there, who visit the out-patient 
clinics or emergency department. For the admitted patients, physicians complete the 
prescription through the electronic prescribing programme. The second step consists 
of the pharmacy staff checking the electronic prescription information in the pharmacy 
and matches it with the information in the patient record to avoid prescribing errors 
and transcribing errors. The information includes the patient’s name, route of 
administration, strength, dose, dosage form, frequency and the patient diagnosis. The 
label is then created and printed. It should contain the following information: patient’s 
name and patient number, drug name, route of administration, strength, direction of 
use, quantity, frequency and dosage form. After that, the pharmacy staff prepare the 
medications and put each item in a zip-lock bag; a label is then adhered to the bag for 
the respective patient/medication. The next step is for the medicines to be placed in 
the patient’s drawer in the ward cart. The pharmacist then double checks that the 
medicines and labels match with the patient’s prescription. Nurses are also asked to be 
vigilant and check the medications before they are administered to the patients.  
The medicine supply chain for the patients who came to out-patient clinics or 
emergency department started by complete the prescription by the physicians through 
the electronic out-patient prescription system. The following information is among 
that required: patient name and patient number, date of birth, gender, the patient 
diagnosis, allergies, medicine name and strength, duration, dosage form and route of 
administration. The patient then needs to go to the out-patient pharmacy and hand 
over the printed prescription to the pharmacy staff. The pharmacy staff will then 
prepare the patients’ medications. Firstly, the pharmacy staff will check the 
information in the prescription and then create and print the label. This label should 
include the personal details of the patient, as well as important information about the 
medicine. The next step involves assembling the medicines by using baskets or boxes, 
and then sticking the label onto each set of medicines. The pharmacist then double 
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checks that the medicines and labels match with the patient’s prescription. At the final 
stage, the medicines are handed to the patient and counselling provided by the 
pharmacy staff, as and when necessary.  
Despite the medication use process in the KSMC having been designed to improve 
patient safety, a lot of errors occur during that process. For example, 1,025 medication 
errors were reported in King Saud Medical City during a six month period only (January 
2012 to June  2012); most of these errors were transcribing, prescribing and dispensing 
errors (Al-Zaagi et al., 2013). Aljadhey et al. (2014) conducted a study  to investigate 
some of the challenges to improving medication safety in KSA hospitals. Lack of 
research, lack of patient safety programmes in hospitals, and lack of monitoring and 
reporting of medication errors are barriers reported to hinder the improvement of 
medication safety in the KSA.  
 
1.3.2 Pharmaceutical services in the L&D hospital pharmacy 
The pharmacy staff in L&D hospital consists of 29 pharmacists, 27 pharmacy 
technicians, 13 pharmacy assistants and support staff, such as secretarial staff, 
procurement officers, patient safety officers and storekeepers (Cox, 2014). The 
pharmacists should have a Master of Pharmacy (MPharm) degree and a one-year pre-
registration training accredation in pharmacy practice. The pharmacy technicians 
should have a diploma in pharmaceutical science (or equivalent), whereas the 
pharmacy assistants are required to have a minimum level of pharmacy training to 
work on the dispensary (NVQ). Pharmacists and pharmacy technicians have to be 
registered with the General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) (General Pharmaceutical 
Council, 2015). 
The L&D hospital has one main pharmacy and satellite pharmacies on some wards. The 
pharmacy department in L&D provide multi-services, such as dispensing medicines for 
in-patients and out-patients, preparing total parenteral nutrition and chemotherapy, 
and other services provided through the clinical pharmacists. The clinical pharmacists 
in L&D have several roles, including checking and monitoring prescriptions, 
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assessments of prescription charts, providing advice to medical and nursing staff 
(medicine information pharmacists), monitoring and reporting medication errors and 
adverse drug reactions, taking medication history, educating and counselling the 
patients, and monitoring the pharmacokinetics and therapeutic drug levels.  
Medicines supply in the L&D consists of several steps, triggered by writing the 
prescription manually or my computer for the discharge patient. After receiving a 
prescription, a pharmacist will check the validity of the prescription to check it is 
written correctly and contains all the information needed to dispense the medicine. 
Also, the pharmacist will perform a clinical screen to check dosage and other potential 
issues, such as drug-drug or drug-disease interactions. The next steps are the 
assembling and labelling of the medicines. A dispensary team member will enter the 
prescription in the computer system (JAC system), print the labels and then assemble 
the medicines. Thereafter, he/she will attach the labels on the corresponding 
medicines after double checking that he/she collected the right medicines and created 
the right information in the labels. However, some hospitals have an automation 
system; in that case the majority of the medicine’s assembling is carried out by the 
automation system directly after the printing of the labels. The last step before 
handing over the medicines is the final accuracy check by a qualified person who was 
not usually involved in the assembling or labelling process. For the admitted patient, 
the medicines send to the ward in keep in a cupboard beside the patient bed. Separate 
lockable cupboards should be available in the UK hospitals to keep the internal and 
external medicines (Stephens, 2011). 
1.3.3 Medicines supply chain differences and similarities of the two 
hospitals 
The medicine supply chain nearly same in the both hospital but there are some 
differences, which are; 
 In KSMC, the physicians prescribe the medicines only through the electronic 
prescribing system that available in the hospital. While in L&D usually using the 
handwriting prescription. 
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 Clinical screen is an extra step on the dispensing process in L&D. while, it 
absent in the current dispending process in KSMC related to lack of clinical 
pharmacists in the hospital. 
 The majority of the medicines are assembling by using an automation system in 
L&D. while the assembling the medinces in KSMC done manually. 
 In KSMC, the medicines are supplied to the admitted patients though using 
unit-dose system. While in L&D the medicines for each patients are keep in a 
cupboard beside the patient bed. 
 
1.4 Medicine related problems 
Medicine related problems (MRPs) cause considerable patient morbidity, mortality and 
increased healthcare cost (Ernst and Grizzle, 2001). The published studies estimated 
that about 5–10% of hospital admissions were due to MRPs (Conforti et al., 2012, 
Nivya et al., 2015, Stausberg and Hasford, 2011). Currently, a systematic review 
conducted by Al Hamid et al. (2014) showed that MRPs have a high prevalence, and in 
some studies the rate of MRPs was more than 50%. MRPs are ranked as between the 
4th and 6th leading cause of death in USA, and they are responsible for the admission 
of 700,000 patients to hospitals annually (Budnitz et al., 2006). It is suspected that 
approximately 3% of deaths in the Swedish population are because of MRPs (Wester et 
al., 2008).  
An MRP is defined as "an event or circumstance involving drug therapy that actually or 
potentially interferes with desired health outcomes" (PCNE, 2010). MRPs consists of 
three subgroups: Medication Errors, Adverse Drug Events (ADEs) and Adverse Drug 
Reactions (ADRs) (Al Hamid et al., 2014). The simplest definition of ADEs is “An injury 
or harm resulting from medical intervention related to a drug” (Bates et al., 1995). An 
ADR is defined as “Any response to a drug which is noxious and unintended, and which 
occurs at doses normally used in man for prophylaxis, diagnosis, or therapy of disease, 
or for the modification of physiological function" (WHO, 1999). However, not all 
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medication errors are MRPs: medication errors are not considered to be MRPs if there 
is no potential risk outcomes in the patient (van Mil, 2005). There are interactions 
between these subgroups, and Figure 1.4 shows the relationship between medication 
errors, ADEs and ADRs. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Relationships between MEs, ADE and ADR (Bates et al., 1995). 
 
Patent safety incident types include clinical administration, documentation, health 
care associated infection, clinical process/procedure, medication, blood products, 
nutrition, oxygen/gas supply, medical device, behaviour, patient accidents, 
infrastructure, and organisational/resources management (WHO, 2009a). However, 
MEs are one of the most common patient safety incidents reported in healthcare 
institutions (Cousins et al., 2012, Milch et al., 2006). In the UK, about 15% of the 
patient safety incidents that were reported to the National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS) in 2004 were medication errors (NHS, 2015b). In Canada, up to 50% of 
the patient safety incidents in primary care are related to medication errors (Ospins et 
al., 2010). 
 
Medication 
Errors 
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1.5 Medication errors 
Hospitals and healthcare professionals aim to provide high quality and safe medical 
care to their patients, including the safe and effective use of medications. These 
medications, however, can be compared to a two-edged sword; while useful, they can 
also be harmful as a result of errors associated with their use, as well as from adverse 
events/effects (Naylor, 2002). The definition of a medication error varies widely in the 
literature (Lisby et al., 2012, Salmasi et al., 2015, Alsulami et al., 2013). The most 
common used definition is that given by the National Coordinating Council for 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCCMERP) in the USA, which defines 
medication errors as: 
“Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or 
patient harm while the medication is in the control of the healthcare professional, 
patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to professional practice, 
healthcare products, procedures, and systems, including: prescribing; order 
communication; product labeling, packaging, and nomenclature; compounding; 
dispensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and use." 
(NCCMERP, 2015) 
 
The occurrence of medication errors is a widespread problem in hospitals and 
healthcare organisations, by which potential harm to patients could be caused 
(Knudsen et al., 2007, Hicks et al., 2004, Barker et al., 2002). For example, 78% of 
serious medical errors in intensive care units (ICUs) at urban hospitals in Canada are 
related to medication errors (Rothschild et al., 2005). In England and Wales, 
approximately 80,000 MEs were reported to the National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS) by NHS organisations between 1st October 2013 to 31st March 2014 
(NPSA, 2014). Preventable medication errors could cost more than £750 million 
annually in England (Cousins et al., 2007). Preventable medication errors cost the USA 
about $20 billion each year (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2013). In 
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Australia, about 3% of all hospitalised patients are admitted to hospitals because of 
medication errors (Roughead and Semple, 2009).  
Medication errors can be classified according to contextual categories, such as their 
stage of occurrence. So, in accordance with the medication use process, medication 
errors can be classified as prescribing errors, transcription errors, dispensing errors, 
administration errors, counselling errors or monitoring errors (Knudsen et al., 2007). It 
is important to note that the medication use process is a chain of stages, and any fault 
in one of these stages may lead to harm to the patient.  
 
1.5.1 Stages of the medicines use process in hospitals 
In general, there are six main stages through which medications are processed in 
hospitals (known as the “medication use process”), beginning with the stage in which a 
medicine is prescribed to a patient and continuing throughout the time they are using 
the medicine, as well as while the outcomes of using the medication are monitored 
(see Figure 1.5). The first stage focuses on the time at which a medicine is prescribed 
to the patient.  Often, there are three types of prescription: discharge, out-patient and 
medicine charts (L&D, 2013). Lewis et al. (2009) conducted a study to review 
prescribing errors in hospitals. The median rate of prescribing errors in the reviewed 
studies was 7% of the prescribed medicines. This review shows how the prescribing 
errors are prevalent during the administration stage. However, one of the limitations 
in this review was that, it included studies were the short duration of data collection 
and the use of estimated denominators in some studies and that can effect in the 
errors rate. In England and Wales, 15.7% of the medication errors that were reported 
to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), between January 2005 and June 
2006, were prescribing errors (NPSA, 2007c).  
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Figure 1.5: The medicines use process (Cohen, 2007). 
The second stage concerns the transcribing of the prescription. This step is not always 
necessary, as it depends on the prescribing system in the hospital; for example, some 
hospitals have Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) systems (Cohen, 2007, 
AHRQ, 2014). As such, the transcribing stage is not needed for all cases/hospitals. 
Transcribing of the prescription can be in two different ways, by written the prescribed 
medicine verbally order or by interpreted the handwriting prescription (Cohen, 2007). 
Some studies reported a high rate of transcribing errors; for example, transcribing 
errors made up 53% of the identified medication errors in a Swiss university hospital 
related to the poor handwriting (Hartel et al., 2011). In a Saudi hospital, transcribing 
errors made up 49% of the total reported medication errors because the breakdown 
the communication between the physicians and nurses during the verbal order  (Al-
Dossari et al., 2014).   
The third stage of the medicines use process is the dispensing stage. Often the 
dispensing process is carried out by the dispensary team in a hospital pharmacy. Little 
research has been conducted to investigate dispensing errors in hospital (James et al., 
2009). The research shows high rate of dispensing errors reported in some counties; 
for example, in Brazilian hospitals the rate of dispensing errors was 11.5%–33.5% of 
the total dispensed items (Anacleto et al., 2005, Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, Costa et 
al., 2008). This variation in dispensing error rate might be due to differences in the 
dispensing system, research methods or the dispensing error classification used in the 
Brazilian studies (Rissato and Romano-Lieber, 2013). 
The next stage is counselling the patients about their medicine. This process is one the 
most effective interventions that can enhance patient safety. Researcher have shown 
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that 83% of errors were identified during counselling patients about their medicine 
(Kripalani et al., 2012, Anacleto et al., 2005). 
The fifth stage of the medicines use process is the administration stage. In the hospital, 
the patient medicines are stored in drug trolleys or individual patient lockers. At the 
required time, the nurse administers the medication to the patient and documents 
having done so  the medication chart (Lawson and Hennefer, 2010). A lot of the 
medication errors reported related to errors during administering the medicine to the 
patient. For example, In England and Wales, 59% of the medication errors that were 
reported to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) between January 2005 
and June 2006 were administering errors (NPSA, 2007c).  
The last stage of the medicines use process is the monitoring stage. In particular, those 
who are conducting the monitoring should evaluate their patients to check for toxicity 
and other side-effects from the drugs that are administered. They should also monitor 
the effectiveness of the drug in relation to its prescription. If these activities are not 
carried out in an effective manner, errors may result (Cohen, 2007). Monitoring errors 
are limited and little research has been carried out on errors during the monitoring 
stage. In Saudi hospitals, the percentage of the monitoring errors was only 2% of the 
reported medication errors (Al-Dossari et al., 2014).   
Most published studies indicate that medication errors most commonly occur during 
the prescription, administration and dispensing stages (Alakhali et al., 2014, 
Karthikeyan and Lalitha, 2013, Kirke, 2009, NPSA, 2007c, Lisby et al., 2005).  In England 
and Wales, of the 60,000 medication errors reported to the National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS) between January 2005 and June 2006, around 59% occurred 
during the administration stage, 17.8% occurred during the dispensing stage, and 
15.7% occurred during the prescription stage (NPSA, 2007c). 
Three systematic review studies concerning medication errors (Salmasi et al., 2015, 
Alsulami et al., 2013, Ghaleb et al., 2006) found that most of the previously published 
studies of medication errors had focused on prescription errors and administration 
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errors, with few investigating dispensing errors. This study will consider medication 
errors with a special focus on dispensing errors. 
 
1.6 Dispensing 
Dispensing medication consists of several stages, and dispensing errors can occur at 
any of these stages. 
1.6.1 The Dispensing Process 
Dispensing medication is a complex process that involves more than simply taking 
medicine from a pharmacy shelf, giving it to the patient after putting it in a container, 
and then sticking a label on the pack (Kelly, 2011). The process begins with the receipt 
of the prescription from a patient or their representative (carer or healthcare 
professional), and ends with the distribution of the medicine to the patient or the 
patient's representative (NPSA, 2007a). These stages are outlined below in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: The general dispensing process in community and hospital pharmacies in the UK 
(James et al., 2009, NPSA, 2007a) 
Details  Dispensing stages 
- Validation of patient information 
- Check prescription fulfils legal requirements 
- Place the prescription in the designated area for processing. 
Receiving a prescription 
- Confirm that the prescribed medicines and dosages are 
appropriate for patient.  
- Check the drug-drug interactions and drug-disease interactions. 
Clinical check by the 
pharmacist 
- Prepare and print the labels. 
- Collect all the stock required for the prescriptions in a suitable 
container and check the stock expiry dates. 
- Count or measure the quantity of the medicines. 
- Attach the labels on the corresponding medicine vessels.  
Label and assemble  
- Conduct an accuracy check for each item. A qualified person who 
has not been involved in the assembly or labelling process should 
ideally complete the accuracy check. 
- Check the stock container of the products against the prescription 
to confirm the drug names, dosage forms, strengths, and 
dosages. 
- Check the labels against the prescription to confirm the drug 
names, dosage forms, strengths, and dosages. 
- Check the patient information. 
- Check the expiry date of the items. 
Accuracy check by 
pharmacist or accuracy 
checking technician 
- Ask the patient his or her name. 
- Ask the patient his or her address for confirmation of identity. 
- Supply dispensed medication to appropriate patient 
representative (carer, healthcare professional) following local 
guidelines. 
- Counsel as appropriate   
Handing over the 
medicine to the patient or 
the patient's 
representative 
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The entire dispensary team must understand and follow a standard set of rules and 
operating procedures in order to avoid errors during the dispensing process (Cohen, 
2007).  
 
1.6.2  Dispensing errors 
It is reported that more than 1 billion prescriptions were dispensed in pharmacies in 
England in 2012 (HSCIC, 2013) and about 4 billion prescriptions are dispensed every 
year in the USA (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2014). Dispensing errors are 
one of the most common medication errors incidents reported in hospitals. In the UK, 
19.4% of medication errors in 2013 were the result of dispensing errors that occurred 
in general, acute or community hospitals and it is came after the administration errors 
(42.7%) and prescribing errors (20.7%) (Gerrett, 2015). In the USA, Flynn et al (2003) 
observed four dispensing errors per 250 prescriptions in 50 hospital and community 
pharmacies. The most common errors were dispensing an incorrect medication, 
dosage strength, or dosage form. 
 
1.6.3 Causes of dispensing errors  
Healthcare professionals are human beings, and they are, therefore, fallible. However, 
any error in a healthcare organisation may put the patient's life in danger. 
Understanding why errors occur, as well as how human factors impact those errors, 
can help to decrease the number of errors in the healthcare system. One of the most 
referenced models for evaluating the possible causes of errors and accidents is the 
“Swiss Cheese Model” (see Figure 1.6), first proposed by James Reason. Reason’s 
model hypothesises that any system has many levels of defences, and he compares 
those defence levels to multiple slices of Swiss cheese. Each slice has safeguards that 
can prevent hazards, but there are holes in defences that are caused by active failures 
and latent conditions that can result in errors or accidents (Reason, 2000).  
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Figure 1.6: Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 2000) 
 
Systems have several properties that can make people more susceptible to making 
errors; these are called “latent conditions” (Moyen et al., 2008). Latent conditions are 
factors that can facilitate the occurrence of errors, for instance, during the medication 
dispensing process, which could be a result of work overload or poor staff training 
(Aronson, 2009). People who are in a direct relationship with the patient, on the other 
hand, usually cause active failures. Fatigue, drug and/or alcohol use, stress, and doing 
multiple activities can increase the risk of active failures by diverting attention away 
from the patient (Moyen et al., 2008). Within a healthcare setting, when a latent factor 
and an active failure are combined, all levels of defences are broken, resulting in a 
patient safety incident. 
There are two main types of errors that are due to human factors (active failure): skill-
based errors and mistakes (see Figure 1.7). Skill-based errors are those errors that 
occur during the execution of what is otherwise a correct plan. Skill-based errors, in 
themselves, may be classified according to two types. The first type comprises action-
based errors (also described as slips). An example of a slip is a case in which the 
pharmacy staff intends to take a bottle containing chlorpromazine, but instead picks 
up a bottle containing chlorpropamide. The second type of skill-based error consists of 
memory-based errors (also described as lapses). An example of a lapse is giving 
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penicillin to a patient who is known to have an allergy to penicillin, but forgetting. 
Mistakes, on the other hand, can be defined as errors that originate in the (wrong) 
planning of an action. (Aronson, 2009, Hurwitz and Sheikh, 2009, Williams, 2007). 
Mistakes may be related to knowledge-based errors, for example, giving medication 
without establishing whether the patient is allergic to it in the absence of knowledge 
about the patient’s allergies, or rule-based errors (Williams, 2007). Rule-based errors 
can be further conceptualised as using a bad rule, for example, excessive doses of 
captopril were administered during early use of the drug, or misapplying a good rule, 
for example, injecting a medication into a non-preferred site (Aronson, 2009, Williams, 
2007, Ferner and Aronson, 2006). 
 
Figure 1.7: The classification of active failure based on a psychological principle (Aronson, 2009) 
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1.7  Concerns about dispensing errors (rationale for this study) 
Limited studies have investigated the types and contributory factors of dispensing 
errors, along with their severity. These studies were conducted mostly in the USA, 
European countries, Brazil and Australia. The types and causes of dispensing errors 
may differ from country to country as a result of their respective healthcare systems. 
To illustrate this, the KSA has a different healthcare system than that of European 
counties and the USA. However, to our knowledge, no published study has been 
conducted to investigate dispensing errors in the KSA, or in any of the other Arab 
counties.  
Despite the limited number of studies of dispensing errors, some studies have focused 
on the rates and types of dispensing errors, rather than addressing the reasons for 
dispensing errors and how to reduce them (Bohand et al., 2009a, Bohand et al., 2009b, 
Franklin and O'Grady, 2007). For instance, Anacleto et al. (2007) focused only on the 
frequency of errors, but failed to place much focus on the reasons behind these errors. 
Furthermore, an important suggestion for preventing dispensing errors involves not 
only reporting the errors, but also talking openly about the issues pharmacy staff 
experience, in order to raise awareness of the errors and help their prevention. Teinila 
et al. (2009) conducted a study of 500 Finnish pharmacies (by analysing the structured 
responses of the pharmacies), and found that pharmacists believe that it is important 
to discuss errors among pharmacy staff in order to make changes in normal work 
routines; this helped ensure that certain errors that were based on specific factors 
were prevented. 
The above evidence, therefore, justifies the need for research in hospital pharmacies in 
order to investigate the types and causes of dispensing errors, and how to prevent 
these errors in the KSA. It would also be beneficial if an investigation of the types and 
causes of dispensing errors in advanced healthcare systems, such as those observed in 
UK hospitals, is carried out to compare with the findings from the KSA, in order to 
formulate appropriate recommendations to reduce dispensing errors. 
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This research was conducted in the King Saud Medical City (KSMC) and the Luton and 
Dunstable University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (L&D). It has been decided to 
carry out this research at the KSMC for several reasons. Firstly, the hospital is the 
oldest and largest hospital in the KSA. Furthermore, the campaign for improving 
medication safety and patient safety in the KSMC was formally started in Jan 2012 (Al-
Dossari et al., 2014). It included reporting medication errors in order to improve 
patient safety in the hospital. Also, it has been decided to carry out this research at the 
L&D, as it treats participating in such programmes, either nationally or internationally, 
as a priority, since focusing on patient care requires improving the safety of patients in 
the hospital and reducing the risk of adverse events. These programmes include: 
'Pursuing Perfection: Raising the Bar for Health Care Performance'. This programme 
was started in 2001 by 13 participants from Europe and the United States to improve 
patient outcomes by pursuing perfection in their major healthcare processes. In 
addition, L&D took part in the 'Safer Patients Initiative', a national programme 
established by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), intended to make 
United Kingdom hospitals safer for patients. Accordingly, since this project focuses on 
patients’ safety via reducing dispensing errors that occur in hospitals, the L&D was one 
of the most appropriate sites based on their reputation and work on the patient 
agenda to undertake this study. 
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1.8 Research Questions 
1.8.1 Primary question 
 What is the nature and severity of dispensing errors reported in pharmacies at 
the King Saud Medical City (KSMC) Hospital in the KSA, and at the Luton and 
Dunstable Hospital (L&D) NHS Foundation Trust in the UK? 
 What are the perceptions of the dispensary teams about the contributory 
factors to dispensing errors? 
 What are the best strategies to reduce dispensing errors according to the 
dispensary teams’ perceptions? 
 
1.8.2 Secondary questions 
 What are the types of dispensing errors reported in pharmacies at the KSMC 
Hospital in the KSA, and at the L&D Hospital in the UK? 
 What are the best applied strategies or intervention in KDMC and L&D to 
reduce dispensing? 
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1.9 Aim and Objectives 
1.9.1  Aim 
To determine the nature and severity of dispensing errors reported in the hospital 
pharmacies at the King Saud Medical City (KSMC) Hospital in the KSA, and at the Luton 
and Dunstable Hospital (L&D) NHS Foundation Trust in the UK, and to explore the 
pharmacy staff’s perceptions of the contributory factors to dispensing errors. 
1.9.2 Objectives 
The specific objectives of this study, with regard to pharmacies at the KSMC Hospital in 
the KSA and the L&D Hospital in the UK, are:  
 To identify types of medication errors reported retrospectively.  
 To identify types of dispensing errors reported retrospectively. 
 To assess the dispensing error severity. 
 To ascertain perceptions regarding factors contributing to dispensing errors 
from pharmacy staff. 
 To explore the dispensary teams' perceptions about possible strategies to 
reduce dispensing errors. 
 
To justify the rational for this study, a systematic review of the nature of dispensing 
errors in hospital pharmacies was undertaken and it presented in the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter 2: A systematic review of the nature of dispensing 
errors in hospital pharmacies 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Medication error is one of the most common patient safety incidents reported in 
hospitals (Milch et al., 2006, Cousins et al., 2012). In England and Wales, approximately 
80,000 medication errors were reported to the NRLS by NHS organisations between 1st 
October 2013 and 31st March 2014, (NHS, 2014b). Approximately 17% of these errors 
were the result of dispensing errors. Studies conducted on dispensing errors show a 
high rate of dispensing errors of between 0.04% and 24% in community pharmacies 
(Franklin et al., 2014). 
In a UK hospital pharmacy, about 2% of dispensed items had dispensing errors; these 
errors were identified at the final accuracy checking stage (Beso et al., 2005).  Many 
hospital pharmacies collect data regarding dispensing errors identified in the final 
accuracy checking stage, in order to investigate contributing factors and to develop 
strategies to prevent or reduce these errors (Royal Pharmacetical Society, 2015). 
Despite this, are a lot of errors continue to occur in the dispensing process, some of 
these errors leave the pharmacy without being identified. A total of 1,005 unprevented 
dispensing incidents were reported by 20 hospitals in Wales between January 2003 
and December 2004 (James et al., 2008). 
Despite the frequency of dispensing errors in hospitals, less attention has been paid to 
these in published studies, in comparison to prescription and administrative errors 
(Irwin et al., 2011, James et al., 2011b, Franklin et al., 2009, James et al., 2009).  There 
are a limited number of studies that have reported on dispensing errors in community 
and hospital pharmacies; however, one review study (James et al., 2009) was 
conducted in 2008 to evaluate these studies. The present study focuses on reviewing 
dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies only, as this is a specific interest and does not 
involve working patterns or systems between the community and hospital pharmacies. 
32 
Accordingly, it allows the researcher to focus purely on hospital pharmacies, 
characterised by different dispensing systems across different hospitals. This 
systematic literature review therefore aims to investigate the incidence types and 
factors associated with dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies, as reported in 
published literature.  
 
2.2 Methods 
The PubMed, Scopus, Ovid and Web of Science electronic databases were used to 
identify relevant published articles from January 2000 to January 2015. This study 
considered to review studies published after 1999, while the patient safety gained 
more attention after the publication of the IOM report entitled “To Err is Human”.  The 
keywords used to search for the relevant studies were as follows: Dispensing, Drug(s), 
Medication, Medicine(s), Error(s), Incident(s), Near miss(es), Mistake(s), Hospital, 
Secondary care, Inpatient, Outpatient, Pharmacy, Pharmacist, Dispensary. 
 
 
2.2.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
‘Dispensing error’ for the purpose of this review refers to any error occurring at any 
dispensing stage in a hospital pharmacy, whether discovered in the pharmacy 
department or after the medication has left the department. All studies investigating 
types and/or incidence and/or factors contributing to dispensing errors were included. 
Studies had to have been undertaken in hospital pharmacies and published in the 
English language between January 2000 and January 2015.  
Studies conducted to identify dispensing errors in community pharmacies or ward 
stocks, or automation dispensing errors were excluded. Case reports were not been 
included in this systematic review as they did not reflect the incidence of dispensing 
errors or their nature. Also excluded were all general medication error studies not 
specific to dispensing errors, as well as conference papers, as they did not have 
33 
provide enough data. Furthermore, reviews, opinions and editorial papers were 
excluded, as they did not primary sources.   
 
 
2.2.2 Study selection 
Initially, the literature search was conducted by the researcher; then, titles were 
exported from the databases into Endnote X7. All the titles were screened by the 
researcher to identify relevant studies; abstracts were then examined by the first 
author and Supervisor to determine the relevance of studies in terms of meeting the 
criteria, and to exclude irrelevant titles. The remaining studies were assessed 
independently by the supervisor.  
 
 
2.2.3 Quality assessment 
The quality of all selected studies was assessed using 12 criteria outlined by Allan and 
Barker (Allan and Barker, 1990) and modified by Alsulami et al. and Ghaleb et al. 
(Alsulami et al., 2013, Ghaleb et al., 2006) in order to apply to any type of medication 
error study. These researches conducted to review medication errors studies and this 
review consider about the dispensing errors. So the definition of what constitutes a 
medication error was changed to a definition of what constitutes a dispensing error. 
The selected studies had to satisfy a minimum of 6 criteria from the list below to be 
sure to choose a good studies. 
1. Aims/objectives of the study clearly stated 
2. Definition of what constitutes a dispensing error 
3. Error categories specified 
4. Error categories defined 
5. Presence of a clearly defined denominator 
6. Data collection method described clearly 
7. Setting in which study conducted described 
8. Sampling and calculation of sample size described 
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9. Reliability and validity measures applied 
10. Limitations of study listed 
11. Indication of any assumptions made 
12. Ethical approval obtained 
 
 
2.3 Results 
The keyword search resulted in a total of 3,767 studies across all the databases 
accessed. Duplicate studies were excluded, bringing the total down to 2,929. Following 
this, article titles and abstracts were reviewed and any irrelevant studies were 
excluded, which resulted in 2,908 articles being discarded. Finally, the remaining 21 
articles were assessed for suitability, of which 15 publications fulfilled the inclusion 
criteria (Figure 2.1). All of these 15 studies were conducted in just four countries: the 
UK (6), Brazil (4), USA (3) and France (2).  
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Figure 2.1: Summary of the literature search 
 
 
2.3.1 Quality assessment 
The results of the application of the quality assessment criteria were that one of the 
selected studies fulfilled eleven criteria (James et al., 2011b), one met ten criteria 
(James et al., 2008), four met nine criteria (Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, Bohand et al., 
2009b, Cina et al., 2006, Beso et al., 2005), four met eight criteria (Irwin et al., 2011, 
Bohand et al., 2009a, Costa et al., 2008, Anacleto et al., 2005), three met seven criteria 
(Rissato and Romano-Lieber, 2013, Anto et al., 2011, Seifert and Jacobitz, 2002) and 
two met six criteria (Anto et al., 2010, Rolland, 2004).  Only eight studies had obtained 
ethical approval (Anacleto et al., 2007, Anto et al., 2010, Beso et al., 2005, Bohand et 
al., 2009b, Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, Costa et al., 2008, Irwin et al., 2011, Rissato and 
Romano-Lieber, 2013). Two studies reported that ethical approval was not required 
(James et al., 2008, James et al., 2011b), and five did not clearly state whether ethical 
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approval had been obtained or not (Anto et al., 2011, Bohand et al., 2009a, Cina et al., 
2006, Rolland, 2004, Seifert and Jacobitz, 2002).  However, some of the ethical 
committee duty to assess the quality of the research, which can help to improve the 
study quality (Griffin, 2011) .  
 
 
2.3.2 Research methods used in selected studies. 
Two primary approaches of identifying dispensing errors on the selected studies: 
retrospective studies and prospective studies. Six studies were retrospective, of which 
five studies were conducted by reviewing incident that reported in the hospital (James 
et al., 2011b, Irwin et al., 2011, Anto et al., 2010, James et al., 2008, Rolland, 2004), 
and one was conducted by reviewing patients’ charts in the hospital (Seifert and 
Jacobitz, 2002). By contrast, eight were prospective studies, of which seven used the 
direct observation method for the dispensary team (Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, 
Rissato and Romano-Lieber, 2013, Bohand et al., 2009b, Bohand et al., 2009a, Anacleto 
et al., 2007, Cina et al., 2006, Costa et al., 2008), one was conducted by used face-to-
face interviews with the dispensary team to investigate factors associated with 
labelling errors (Anto et al., 2010).  
One study used a mixed method approach; the first part focused on observation to 
detect dispensing error types, and the second part involved interviewing the 
dispensary team to investigate the causes of dispensing errors (Beso et al., 2005). All 
Brazilian studies employed direct observation to investigate dispensing errors 
(Anacleto et al., 2007, Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, Costa et al., 2008, Rissato and 
Romano-Lieber, 2013). By contrast, the majority (4/6) (Anto et al., 2011, Irwin et al., 
2011, James et al., 2011b, Anto et al., 2010, Costa et al., 2008, James et al., 2008) of UK 
studies relied on retrospectively reviewing incident reports. A brief description of 
these studies is presented in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: Description for the identified published studies 
  
Study Country Type of Study Duration Setting Outcomes Incident Rate 
James et 
al
 
(2011b) 
UK Retrospective, 
analysed prevented 
and unprevented DEs 
reported to UK 
dispensing error 
analysis scheme 
(UKDEAS) 
(Three 
months) 
Sep.-Dec. 
2005 
17 acute hospitals in Wales 334 dispensing errors reported; 35 unprevented DEs and 339 prevented DEs. 54% 
(157) of prevented DEs and 37% (13) of unprevented DEs were labelling errors e.g.  
labelling wrong drug (prevented, n=15; unprevented n=6). Dispensed wrong drug 
strength (prevented, n=46; unprevented n=2). Look-alike/sound-alike, high workload 
and inexperienced staff were the most commonly contributed factors reported. 
Prevented DE 
0.13% 
 
Unprevented DE 
0.016% 
Irwin et 
al
 
(2011) 
UK Retrospective, 
analysed incident 
reports 
(5 years) 
July 2005-
March 2010 
25 Scottish hospitals 
 
573 dispensing errors reported; the most frequent dispensing error types were 
dispensed wrong drug 110 (19.2%) and dispensed strength 96 (16.8%). The most 
frequent distributed factor reported were the medicines’ similarity in name, high 
workload and inexperienced staff. 
NA 
James et 
al
 
(2008) 
UK Retrospective, 
analysed incident 
reports 
(Two years) 
Jan. 2003- 
Dec. 2004 
 
20 Welsh NHS hospital 
pharmacies 
1005 dispensing errors reported to UKDEAS; the most frequent errors were dispensed 
incorrect strength 241 (24%), incorrect drug 168 (17%) and wrong form 134(13%). The 
most common medicine involved in DEs was insulin (n=34). ). Look-alike/sound-alike, 
high workload, low staffing and inexperienced staff were the most commonly 
contributed factors reported. 
NA 
Beso et al 
(2005) 
UK Prospective by 
identified DEs in the 
final check, then 
interview with 
pharmacy staff who 
made the error to 
explore the causes. 
(Two weeks) 
17-28 June 
2002 
Teaching hospital in London 
(450bed) 
130  dispensing errors were observed from 4849 observed dose; dispensed wrong 
quantity was the most common errors (n=38, 29%) then labelling wrong quantity (n= 
18, 13.8%). High workload, low staff, interruptions, look-alike/sound-alike and lack of 
knowledge about the availability of different medicines and formulation were the 
most common reported contribution factors. 
2.7% 
Anto et al 
(2011) 
UK Retrospective, 
analysed incident 
reports  
(4 years) 
Jan. 2005 – 
Dec. 2008 
Two main pharmacies at NHS 
Foundation Hospital Trust in 
London (1200 beds) 
911 prevented and unprevented dispensing errors; the most frequent DEs were 
dispensing wrong strength 13.4% (n=122), dispensing wrong drug 7.13% (n=65) and 
dispensing wrong form 2.6%. 
NA 
Anto et al 
(2010) 
UK Prospective, face-to-
face interviews 
(3 months) 
Sep.-Nov. 
2008 
A 1200 bed NHS Foundation 
Trust 
42 labelling incidents were recorded.  The most common contributed factors were: 
high workload, limited staff, lack of knowledge, lack of concentration, hurrying 
through tasks and illegible handwriting.   
NA 
Neto et al
 
(2013) 
Brazil Prospective, direct 
observation 
(Two 
months) 
July-August 
2011 
Central pharmacy, unit dose for 
cardiovascular and pulmonary 
ward (36 beds) of the 280 bed 
university hospital 
1611 dispensing errors were detected from 4837 dispensed items; dispensed 
medicines without the described pharmaceutical form was the most common error 
(n=1396, 86.6%). 33.3% 
DEs = dispending errors  
NA = number of dispensed items is unknown  
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Table 2.1  (Continued) 
Study Country Type of Study Duration Setting Outcomes Incident Rate 
Anacleto et 
al 
(2005) 
 
Brazil 
Prospective, direct 
observation 
(21 days) 
September 
2002 
Unit dose in Belo Horizonte 
hospital pharmacy 
(286 beds) 
719 dispensing errors were detected from 2143 dispensed items; the most 
frequent DEs were dose omission (n=412, 57.3%) and dispensing wrong quantity 
(n=91, 12.7%).  
33.6% 
Rissato and 
Romano-
Lieber 
(2013) 
Brazil Prospective, direct 
observation 
(16 days) 
4-19 Jan. 2010 
Central pharmacy, unit dose 
for surgical ward (30 beds) of 
university hospital (104 beds) 
61 dispensing errors were observed from 1963 prescribed drug items; the most 
frequent DEs were dose omission 14 (23%) and dispensed non-prescribed 
medication. 
3.1% 
Costa et al 
(2008) 
Brazil Prospective, direct 
observation 
(27 days) 
25 Aug.- 20 
Sep. 
Central pharmacy, unit dose 
at pediatric hospital (96 
beds) 
300  dispensing errors were observed from 2620 observed dose.  43.3% missing 
dose, 25% dose added and 13.3% omission. 11.5% 
Rolland 
(2004) 
USA Retrospective, analysed 
incident reports 
(4 years) 
Oct. 1997- Sep. 
2001 
Eight different sections at 
Central Arkansas Veterans 
System (CAVHS) 
82 dispensing errors were reported; dispensing wrong medicines (n=31, 37.8%), 
dispensing to wrong patient (n=24, 29.2%) and dispensing wrong dose (n=21, 
25.6%) were the most common DEs types.   
NA 
Seifert and 
Jacobitz 
(2002) 
USA Retrospective. Chart 
review 
(35 months) 
Jan. 1999- 
Nov. 2002 
All drug exposures reported 
to Midwest regional poison 
control centres 
40 dispensing errors reported among of 77992 drug exposures reports; 20 DEs 
(50%) were substitution errors and 17 DEs (42.5%) were labelling errors. 0.05% 
Cina et al 
(2006) 
USA Prospective, direct 
observation 
(7 months) 
Feb.- Aug. 
2003 
Central pharmacy, unit dose 
at tertiary academic medical 
centre (725 beds) 
5075 dispensing errors were observed from 140,755 dose; 4016 DEs prevented and 
1059 were unprevented DEs. The most frequent dispensing error types were 
dispensing wrong quantity (n=2978, 59%), wrong strength (n=571, 11%) and wrong 
drug (n=554, 11%). 
3.6% 
Bohand et al
 
(2009b) 
France Prospective, direct 
observation by 
pharmacists and nurses 
to detect unit dose DEs 
(Two months) 
March-April 
2007 
Central pharmacy, unit dose 
for cardiovascular ward (30 
beds) of the 354 bed Percy 
military hospital 
179 dispensing errors were detected from 7249 units dose filled; the most common 
dispensing error types were incorrect dose 57 (31.8%) and omission 54 (30.2%). 
86.6% of the dispensing errors (DEs) detected by pharmacists during final check. 
2.5% 
Bohand et al 
(2009a) 
France Prospective, direct 
observation 
(8 months) 
April- Dec. 
2006 
Central pharmacy, unit dose 
Percy military hospital (354 
beds) 
706 dispensing errors were observed form 88609 doses; the most dispensing error 
types were wrong dose (n=265, 37.5%) and omission dose (n=186, 26.3%).   0.8% 
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2.3.3 Definition of dispensing errors  
Six studies reviewed in this paper did not define the term “dispensing error”. However, 
definitions of dispensing errors were varied in the other published studies (Bohand et 
al., 2009b, James et al., 2011b, Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, Beso et al., 2005, Anacleto 
et al., 2007, Rissato and Romano-Lieber, 2013, Bohand et al., 2009a) (Table 2.2). The 
definitions given in these studies are very similar; for example, basically the definition 
of a dispensing error is described as a discrepancy between the prescribed medication 
and the actual medicine dispensed by the pharmacy. Some studies (James et al., 
2011b, Cina et al., 2006) use other definitions to distinguish between a dispensing 
error that is intercepted before the medicine leaves the pharmacy and after the 
medicine leaves the pharmacy. The errors that are detected after the medicines left 
the pharmacy are defined as unprevented (undetected) dispensing errors, and errors 
that are detected and reported before the medicines leave the pharmacy are defined 
as prevented (detected or near misses) dispensing errors.  
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Table 2.2: Definition of dispensing errors 
Term Definition Reference 
Dispensing error “A discrepancy between the interpretable written prescription, including 
modifications made by a pharmacist following contact with the physician or in 
accordance with pharmacy policy, and the contents of the medication 
cassette”. 
(Bohand et al., 
2009a) 
“Deviation from a written prescription/medication order, including 
pharmacists’ written endorsements, occurring during the dispensing process 
of selecting and assembling medication (drug/content errors), generating and 
affixing dispensing labels (labelling errors) and issue of dispensed products to 
patients (issue errors)”. 
(James et al., 
2011b) 
“Discrepancy between the prescribed medication and the content dispensed 
by the pharmacy”. 
(Bonifacio 
Neto et al., 
2013) 
“A deviation from an interpretable written prescription or medication order, 
including written modifications to the prescription made by a pharmacist 
following contact with the prescriber or in compliance with pharmacy policy”. 
(Beso et al., 
2005) 
Discrepancy between the written instruction found on the prescription order 
form and the accomplishment of this instruction by the pharmacy when the 
drug was dispensed to the wards or hospital services 
(Anacleto et 
al., 2007) 
“Any deviation from the written or oral prescription, including written 
modifications by the pharmacist following contact with the prescriber or in 
compliance with pre-established norms and protocol, and any deviation from 
the stipulations of the appropriate regulatory agencies or norms was 
considered a drug-dispensing error”. 
(Rissato and 
Romano-
Lieber, 2013) 
“Any discrepancy between dispensed medications and physician orders. Any 
deviation from standard pharmacy policies”. 
(Cina et al., 
2006) 
“Any discrepancy between the original or modified approved written 
prescription, and the contents of the medication cassette”. 
(Bohand et al., 
2009b) 
Unprevented 
dispensing 
incidents 
“Dispensing errors detected after the medication has left the pharmacy”. (Cina et al., 
2006, James 
et al., 2011b) 
Prevented 
dispensing 
incidents 
“Dispensing errors detected during the dispensing process before the 
medication had left the pharmacy”. 
(Cina et al., 
2006, James 
et al., 2011b) 
 
2.3.4 Incidence of dispensing errors  
This review identified that there is variation in the rates of dispensing errors reported, 
determined as the number of dispensing errors divided by the number of dispensed 
items. The dispensing error rate detected using the prospective observation method 
(Bohand et al., 2009b, Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, Anacleto et al., 2007, Rissato and 
Romano-Lieber, 2013, Cina et al., 2006, Costa et al., 2008, Bohand et al., 2009a) was 
between 0.79% and 33.5%. By contrast, in just two retrospective studies of incident 
reports (James et al., 2011b, James et al., 2008), the rate of dispensing errors was 
reported as being between 0.0147% and 0.13%, with more prevented dispensing error 
rates than unprevented dispensing error rates. In a study by James et al. (2011b), 
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which reviewed incident report to identify dispensing errors, the rate of prevented 
dispensing errors is reported as 0.13%, and 0.016% for unprevented dispensing errors. 
By contrast, in Cina et al. study (2006), which used the observation method to detect 
dispensing errors, the rate of prevented dispensing errors was found to be 2.9%, and 
0.57% for unprevented dispensing errors.  
 
 
2.3.5 Dispensing error types  
In the identified published studies of dispensing errors, several categories were used to 
classify the different types of errors that occured during the dispensing process. 
Fourteen reviewed studies classified dispensing errors (Anacleto et al., 2005, Anacleto 
et al., 2007, Anto et al., 2011, Beso et al., 2005, Bohand et al., 2009a, Bohand et al., 
2009b, Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, Cina et al., 2006, Costa et al., 2008, Irwin et al., 
2011, James et al., 2008, James et al., 2011b, Rissato and Romano-Lieber, 2013, 
Rolland, 2004, Seifert and Jacobitz, 2002, Roberts et al., 2002). All of the studies that 
identified the types of dispensing errors (14/14) reported that dispensing the wrong 
medicine was one of the most common error types. The rate of that error in reviewed 
studies were from 0.5% to 51%. Other frequent dispensing errors reported in these 
studies include dispensing the wrong drug strength (11/14) (5%-37.5%) and dispensing 
the wrong dosage form (9/14) (1%-26%). Table 2.3 shows the types of dispensing 
errors cited in the identified published studies. 
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Table 2.3: Types of dispensing errors reported 
 
 
(Bohand 
et al., 
2009b) 
(James et 
al., 
2011b) 
(Irwin et 
al., 2011) 
(Bonifacio 
Neto et al., 
2013) 
(James et 
al., 2008) 
(Beso 
et al., 
2005) 
(Anacleto 
et al., 
2007) 
(Rolland, 
2004) 
(Seifert 
and 
Jacobitz, 
2002) 
(Rissato 
and 
Romano-
Lieber, 
2013) 
(Cina et 
al., 
2006) 
(Costa et 
al., 2008) 
(Anto 
et al., 
2010) 
(Bohand 
et al., 
2009a) 
C
o
n
te
n
t 
e
rr
o
rs
 
Wrong medicine 
dispensed 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Wrong Drug strength 
dispensed 
X X X X X X X X  X X  X  
Wrong dosage-form 
dispensed 
X  X  X X    X X X X X 
Expired medicine 
dispensed 
  X           X 
Omission of item X  X X  X X   X  X  X 
Wrong quantity 
dispensed 
 X  X X X     X X   
Other content error X  X X    X  X  X   
La
b
el
lin
g 
e
rr
o
rs
 
Wrong patient name  X X  X X      X   
Wrong medicine name     X    X      
Wrong medicine 
strength 
    X       X   
Wrong frequency               
Wrong dosage-form         X      
Wrong date               
Wrong instructions   X   X   X      
Completely wrong 
label 
              
Incomplete 
information 
              
Other labelling error  X X  X X X     X   
Other error         X   X   
X denotes inclusion in selected studies.  
Reference 
Dispensing 
errors type 
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2.3.6 Potential risk of dispensing errors 
In the reviewed studies, various categories were employed to evaluate the potential 
risks of dispensing errors. Six identified studies (Bohand et al., 2009b, Cina et al., 
2006, Irwin et al., 2011, James et al., 2008, James et al., 2011b, Rolland, 2004) 
assessed the potential risks of dispensing errors. Some of studies (Bohand et al., 
2009b, James et al., 2008, James et al., 2011b) depend on professional healthcare 
worker to assess the severity the dispensing errors for the validity. James et al 
(2011b) and James et al. (2008) studies depended on risk matrix from London 
Specialist Pharmacist Group to assess identified dispensing errors. In Rolland studies 
(2004) dispensing errors assessed by the researcher depend on medication errors 
classification developed by NCCMERP. While Irwin et al. (2011) presented the 
severity of the dispensing errors as it reported the healthcare professionals who fill 
the incident report. 
 The majority of the dispensing errors in reviewed papers were of minor clinical 
significance, or caused no harm. Table 2.4 shows the severity rate in these studies. 
However, some cases were serious and could have caused death; for example, a 
pharmacist dispensed an incorrect dose of verapamil, 240 mg instead 40 mg, to an 
86-year old woman (Bohand et al., 2009b). 
Table 2.4: Severity rate in the reviewed studies  
severity 
(James et al., 
2011b) 
(James et al., 
2008) 
(Rolland, 
2004) 
(Irwin et al., 
2011) 
(Bohand et 
al., 2009b) 
(Cina et al., 
2006) 
No  risk 65% 53% - - - - 
Minor risk 9% 17% 30% 87% 45% 63.8% 
Moderate risk 13% 22% 21% 12.6% 29.2% 33.9% 
Major risk 9% 5% 2% 0.6% 16.6% 2.2% 
Catastrophic 0 1% - - - - 
 
2.3.7 Factors associated with dispensing errors 
Only five identified published studies discuss contributing factors associated with 
dispensing errors (Anto et al., 2010, Beso et al., 2005, Irwin et al., 2011, James et al., 
2008, James et al., 2011b). The three of these studies (Irwin et al., 2011, James et al., 
2008, James et al., 2011b) gathered the contributed factors from the incident 
References 
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reports, while two studies (Anto et al., 2010, Beso et al., 2005) gathered the 
contributed factors through conducted interviews with the dispensary team. The 
contributed factors are associated with four main categories; work environment, 
product, dispensary team and task. The most commonly dispensing errors factors 
that associated with work environment are high workload, low staff numbers and 
distract the staff during the dispensing process. Look-alike/sound-alike drugs names 
and similarity packaging of the medicines are the most common dispensing errors 
that associated with the product (medicines). The most common contributed factors 
that associated with dispensary staff’s are lack of knowledge/experience and 
hurrying through tasks. Finally, the there are several dispensing errors factors 
associated with the task including complex prescription and illegible handwriting. 
More contributing factors are presented in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Dispensing error contributed factors 
(Anto et 
al., 2010) 
(Beso et 
al., 2005) 
(James et 
al., 2008) 
(Irwin et 
al., 2011) 
(James et 
al., 
2011b) 
Reference  
X 22 141 29 70 High workload 
W
o
rk
  e
n
vi
ro
n
m
e
n
t 
X 13 74 14 38 Low staffing 
X 14  11 30 Distraction/interruption 
   2  Noise 
 2  11  Protocols not followed 
 4    Dispensary design 
  10  9 Lone worker 
X    29 Time of day 
 9 233 30 37 Look-alike/sound-alike drug name 
P
ro
d
u
ct
 
   3  Similarity packaging 
   2  Poor labelling by manufactor 
X 7 114 26 73 Inexperienced staff 
Te
am
 
 1 43  6 Communication problem 
 12  2  Loss of concentration/fatigue 
 2    Low moral 
X 12 49 4 22 Urgent deadline/Hurrying through tasks 
  2  6 Complex prescription 
Ta
sk
 
X   4  Illegible handwriting 
   14  Careless checking 
 5  9  Unfamiliarity with task 
   5  Patient demanding/aggression  
The numbers denote how many times these contributing factors had been reported in the study 
X denote an indication of contributing factors but without numbers of reported incidents 
Contributed factors 
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2.4 Discussion 
Identifying types of dispensing errors and factors contributing to these errors are the 
first step in drawing up strategies to reduce such occurrences. The aim of this study 
was to review studies conducted in hospital pharmacies to identify the incidence 
and/or types and/or factors contributing to the occurrence of dispensing errors. To 
the best of the researchers knowledge, no previous systematic review has focused 
on dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies only. This systematic review identified 
fifteen studies carried out in just four different countries. The majority of these 
studies focused on dispensing error types only, and few studies analysed the severity 
of the errors, the contributing factors or the strategies used to reduce dispensing 
errors.   
Retrospective and prospective approaches were used to identify dispensing errors 
on the selected studies. The major difference between the retrospective approach 
and perspective approach is that with the retrospective, the outcome has already 
happened, by the time of study design while, the prospective the outcome has not 
occurred when the study begins (Mangal and Mangal, 2013). Reviewing incident 
reports retrospectively and direct observation methods were the most commonly 
employed methods of investigating dispensing errors. All of the Brazilian and French 
studies used the observational method, while the majority of the UK studies used 
incident reports. This suggests that reporting on medication errors in the UK is a 
more common and organised practice. The National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS) began recording such incidents in 2004 (NPSA, 2005). The NRLS help to 
provide rich data regarding received medication error reports, which it contributes 
to decrease medication errors through identify the nature and cause of medication 
errors. However, reporting dispensing errors and near-miss errors is an important 
strategy to build a safety culture by learning from the errors, so implementing a non-
punitive environment is important to encourage the healthcare worker to report the 
errors (Brady, 2013). 
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In the identified published studies, a multitude of definitions are provided, all of 
which agree that a dispensing error is a ‘discrepancy between the prescription and 
dispensed medicines,’ though some studies add that it can also mean a ‘discrepancy 
between the modification made by a pharmacist to the prescription and dispensed 
medicines’. However, some selected studies do not define the term ‘dispensing 
error’. This raises certain questions for the researcher; for instance, whether the 
errors discussed in those studies include those made by nurses when dispensing 
medicines in a ward environment. The definition of dispensing error is important to 
direct the medication safety interested there the errors occur. However, Franklin and 
O’Grady (2007) have developed a comprehensive and valid definition for a 
dispensing error. They defined dispensing error as "any unintended deviation from 
an interpretable written prescription or medication order including content and 
labelling errors; any unintended deviation from professional or regulatory references, 
or guidelines affecting dispensing procedures, is also considered a dispensing error”. 
It was observed that the rates of dispensing errors are reported in all studies that 
used the observation method, and that the rates of these are relatively high. By 
contrast, just two studies that employed a review of incident reports, report the rate 
of dispensing errors; the rates are not presented in other studies usually because the 
total number of dispensed items is unknown. The rate of dispensing errors reported 
in the selected Brazilian studies (Anacleto et al., 2005, Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, 
Costa et al., 2008) was very high (11.5%–33.5%), compared with other selected 
studies in the UK, the USA and France (3.6%–0.016%). This variation in dispensing 
error rate might be due to differences in the dispensing system, research methods or 
the dispensing error classification used in the Brazilian studies (Rissato and Romano-
Lieber, 2013). For example, in one Brazilian study (Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013) used 
categorise dispensing errors according their classification. As result, approximately 
87% of the dispensing errors were related to dispensed medicine, with no 
description of the dosage form. This type of dispensing error is not present in the 
categories included in other studies. 
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The most common error types reported in the selected studies are: dispensing the 
wrong drug, dispensing the wrong strength, dispensing the wrong quantity and 
omission of items. Omitted dose is the most common dispensing error type in these 
studies focused on identifying error in the dispensed items for in-patients (unit dose) 
(Anacleto et al., 2005, Bohand et al., 2009b, Costa et al., 2008, Rissato and Romano-
Lieber, 2013). However, various categories are employed in the selected studies to 
classify the types of dispensing errors. Beso et al. (2005) have developed the most 
comprehensive classification to categorise dispensing errors, which includes content 
errors and labelling errors. Two reviewed studies (Costa et al., 2008, Irwin et al., 
2011) applied that classification. The others studies (Bohand et al., 2009a, Bohand et 
al., 2009b, Bonifacio Neto et al., 2013, Cina et al., 2006, Rissato and Romano-Lieber, 
2013) focus on content errors and do not consider labelling errors such as incorrect 
medicine name and wrong patient name. This may be because these studies focus 
on identifying dispensing errors in unit dose systems; however, labelling errors can 
have severe risks, for instance, a label with the wrong patient name might cause 
medicine to be given to the wrong patient.   
One of the most effective strategies to improve the patient safety is identifying the 
contributing factors that associated with the errors. The most common contributing 
factors identified in the reviewed studies are: look-alikes/sound-alikes, high 
workloads, low staff numbers, inexperienced staff and rushing to complete tasks. 
These contributing factors had been reported also on the other medication errors 
studies such as prescribing and administration errors studies (Alsulami et al., 2013, 
Ghaleb et al., 2006). However, only five of the selected studies discuss contributing 
factors; three studies (Irwin et al., 2011, James et al., 2008, James et al., 2011b) 
gathered information about contributing factors from incident reports, and two 
studies (Anto et al., 2010, Beso et al., 2005) did the same by interviewing dispensary 
teams to discover the contributing factors. However, none of the selected studies 
relied on observation to uncover contributing factors.  
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These results indicate certain limitations in the methods employed to investigate 
dispensing errors. For example, the incident report approach does not provide a rate 
of incident occurrence, and so the total number of reported dispensing errors is 
uncertain, as some errors were not indicated, or indicated but not reported (James 
et al., 2011b). In addition, some of the incident reports did not indicate contributing 
factors. By contrast, all of the observation studies reported the exact incident rate, 
but no information was given about contributing factors. While qualitative methods, 
such as interviews, provided an insight into contributing factors, these studies failed 
to investigate the types of dispensing errors. In order to resolve these limitations, a 
mixed methods approach is required for use in future studies if they are to 
investigate both the type of error and contributing factors; the existing studies that 
utilised a mixed methods approach provided more and accurate details regarding the 
nature of errors and the contributing factors (Ashcroft et al., 2015, Beso et al., 2005). 
The unique contribution of combination method research is that it allows for the 
integration of results from more than one component of a study (Protheroe et al., 
2007). 
Finally, investigating dispensing error types and contributing factors in the hospital 
pharmacies is very useful to set strategies to improve patient safety. However, the 
Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP)(Practices, 2002) recommend some 
strategies to reduce dispensing errors that are linked to medicines with similar 
names such as storing medicines with similar names in different locations and 
distinguishing the similar medicine names by colouring the font or/and using tall-
man letter. The NPSA published a guideline booklet (NPSA, 2007a) which aims to 
minimise the contributing factors through well-designed pharmacies. Moreover, 
educating the dispensary team about the observed errors in order to avoid future 
errors can be an effective strategy to enhance the patient safety (Bohand et al., 
2009b).  
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2.5 Conclusion 
The published studies that have investigated dispensing errors in the hospital 
pharmacies. This review identified just fifteen studies conducted in hospital 
pharmacies. The majority of these studies focus on investigating the types of 
dispensing errors, and few discussed the factors contributing to these or the 
strategies used to reduce dispensing errors. All these studies were four countries; 
UK, Brazil, France and USA. The majority of these studies were lied on review the 
incident reports retrospectively and observation methods to investigate the 
dispensing errors. The results of this review highlight the rate of dispensing errors in 
the hospital pharmacies was between 0.0147% and 33.5%. The variation in 
dispensing error rate might be due to differences in the dispensing system, research 
methods or the dispensing error classification. For example, the majority of the 
studies that conducted in UK depend on review the incident report that reported in 
the hospital pharmacies and the dispensing errors rate in these studies were low 
(0.0147% to 2.7%). While the dispensing errors rate in studies Brazilian studies were 
high (11.5% to 33.5%), where these studies depend on the observation methods to 
identify the dispensing errors in unit-dose system. Dispensing the wrong medicine 
and dispense the wrong strength are the most common dispensing error types in the 
reviewed studies. Some of these studies raised the contributing factors that 
associated with the dispensing errors and these include high workload, low staff 
numbers, look-alike/sound-alike drugs and dispensary staff’s lack of 
knowledge/experience.  Future studies investigating dispensing errors should use a 
mixed methods approach to investigate the contributing factors associated with 
dispensing errors and to explore the strategies employed to reduce these errors.  
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Chapter 3: Overall Methodology and Theoretical 
Framework   
3.1 Theoretical framework  
Creswell (2009) presented three framework elements involved in research design. 
The first element is the claim to knowledge the researcher is making. The second 
element is the strategies of inquiry that will inform the procedure. The final element 
is the method of data collection and analysis. 
Knowledge claim refers to the theoretical perspectives or beliefs that underlie the 
research and may also be called paradigms or philosophical assumptions. Creswell et 
al. (2009) recognised four main paradigms: postpositivism, social constructivism, 
advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism. The first paradigm, postpositivism, is 
usually associated with quantitative research that is characterised by deductive 
reasoning, careful observation and hypothesis testing. The second paradigm, social 
constructivism, is usually associated with qualitative research, and it relies on the 
participants’ own views and experience to articulate their world (Mackenzie and 
Knipe, 2006). The advocacy/participatory paradigm is driven by a desire to improve 
society and by political concerns; the researcher aims to bring about positive 
changes in the social world. The fourth paradigm, pragmatism, usually focuses on 
actions, situations and consequences by using a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, and the researcher is concerned more with what works and 
what approach will suit the condition or solve the problem. 
The second and the third elements of the research design framework are strategies 
of inquiry and the research methods used to collect and analyse the data. Strategies 
of inquiry are classified into three groups depending on the methodology of the 
approach. The first group is associated with a quantitative approach such as 
experiments and surveys. The second group is associated with a qualitative approach 
and involves case studies, ethnography, phenomenology research and narrative 
study (Creswell, 2003). The third group is associated with the mixed methods 
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approach (quantitative and qualitative methods) and involves four main types of 
design methods: triangulation, embedded, explanatory and exploratory designs 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010, Creswell, 2009). Table 3.1 gives an overview of these 
approaches. 
Table 3.1: Overview of quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods approaches (Creswell, 2013) 
 Quantitative Qualitative Mixed-methods 
Paradigms Postpositivism knowledge 
claims 
Constructivism or participatory 
knowledge claims 
Pragmatic knowledge claims 
Methods Close-ended questions, pre-
determined approaches, 
numeric data 
Open-ended questions, 
emerging approaches, text or 
image data  
Both close- and open-ended 
questions, both pre-
determined  and emerging 
approaches, and both 
quantitative and qualitative 
data analysis 
Research 
practices 
- Tests or verifies theories 
or explanations  
 
- Identifies variables of 
interest  
 
- Related variables  in 
questions or hypothesis 
 
- Uses standards of 
reliability and validity 
 
- Employs statistical 
procedures  
- Discovered the experiences 
and perspectives of 
participants 
 
- Focuses on a single 
concept or phenomenon 
 
 
- Studies the context or 
setting of participants 
 
- Validates the accuracy of 
findings interprets the data 
 
- collects both quantitative 
and qualitative data 
 
- Develops a rational for 
mixing  
 
- Integrates the data at 
various stages of inquiry  
 
- Employs he practices of 
both quantitative and  
qualitative  
 
In triangulation design, the researcher usually utilises qualitative and quantitative 
methods at the same time rather than using the qualitative and then the 
quantitative data to answer the research questions (Matthews and Kostelis, 2011, 
Hanson et al., 2005). In the embedded design, the researcher collects and analyses 
quantitative data within a qualitative research design (or vice versa). In the 
explanatory design, the researcher begins to collect and analyse the quantitative 
data then he/she collects and analyses qualitative data (Matthews and Kostelis, 
2011). While in the exploratory design, the researcher starts to collect and analyse 
the qualitative data then he/she collects and analyses quantitative data. 
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One of the main objectives of this study is to investigate the factors associated with 
dispensing errors in pharmacies and how to reduce these errors. A combination of a 
qualitative and quantitative approach was applied to achieve this aim. These 
methods use generalised and in-depth data about the issue, this type of paradigm 
known as pragmatism framework as described previously (page 49). Explanatory 
mixed design was utilised in this study. The quantitative method used first to identify 
the dispensing errors types. Next, the qualitative approach used to investigate 
perceptions and opinions of the dispensary team about factors associated with 
dispensing errors and ways to reduce these errors. 
The major methods for detecting medication error and ADEs are chart review, 
incident reporting, computerised monitoring, direct observation, questionnaires and 
interviews the healthcare staff (Montesi and Lechi, 2009, Cohen, 2007). Of these 
methods, chart review, incident reporting and direct observation represent some of 
the most common methods of identifying medication errors (Montesi and Lechi, 
2009). However, healthcare manager and researchers most commonly investigate 
dispensing errors by reviewing incident reporting  at hospitals and by observing the 
dispensary team during the dispensing process (James et al., 2009). The previous 
chapter (systematic review) indicated that studies using direct observation (Anacleto 
et al., 2005, Bohand et al., 2009b, Cina et al., 2006, Costa et al., 2008) did not 
provide information about the contributing factors associated with dispensing 
errors. The direct observation method is one of the best methods to investigate 
dispensing errors but it has a number of limitations, notably the influence of the 
observer on the behaviour of the dispensary team (Hawthorne effect) (James et al., 
2009). Direct observation is also costly and time-consuming (Flynn et al., 2002). Thus, 
reviewing the incident reports represents a suitable alternative for investigating 
dispensing errors in a cost-efficient manner (Flynn et al., 2002). However, direct 
observation and incident reports fail to provide in-depth information about the 
contributing factors; they are also unable to provide strategies that reduce 
dispensing errors. As a result, companies need to complement these methods with 
alternatives if they aim to investigate the contributing factors and generate 
strategies to reduce errors.  
53 
 
 
Qualitative methods provide deep, rich information, so they are useful in exploring 
how patient safety incidents occur with healthcare staff (Fein et al., 2005). Focus 
groups, interviews and open-ended questionnaires are the most common qualitative 
methods used in medication errors studies (Al Hamid et al., 2014, Keers et al., 2013). 
Self-administered questionnaires are characterised by their affordability and ability 
to quickly collect a great deal of information anonymously (Mitchell and Jolley, 
2012). Researchers have used self-administered questionnaires to investigate 
healthcare staff perceptions about contributing factors to medication errors and/or 
the strategies to reduce such mistakes (Al-Shara, 2011, Petrova, 2010, Mary Fry and 
Dacey, 2007, Teinilä et al., 2011, Kim et al., 2011, Shahrokhi et al., 2013, Oshikoya et 
al., 2013).  
 
One of the benefits of applying a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods to achieve specific aims and objectives are well recognised (Smith, 2005). 
Quantitative methods are useful mapping devices as they allow the researcher to 
collect a small and definite amount of data from a large sample of the target 
population. On the other hand, qualitative questionnaires are very useful for 
exploratory work, and they can help to determine causal relationships (Kane, 2004). 
When one research approach, either quantitative or qualitative, is inadequate to 
answer research questions, a combined method may be helpful to understand the 
research problems (Creswell, 2013). Table 3.2 shows a summary of the justification 
for using a combination of methods in the context of each research question. 
54 
Table 3.2:  Justification for research methods used 
Questions Methodology Method Rationalisation 
What types of dispensing errors are reported in pharmacies at King 
Saud Medical City (KSMC) hospital in KSA, and at Luton and 
Dunstable University Hospital (L&D) NHS Foundation Trust in the 
UK? 
Quantitative 
Retrospective review of 
incident reports 
A retrospective method such 
as incident reports review can 
be utilised to identify the 
occurrence of errors and to 
facilitate learning (Acton, 
2012). 
What is the severity of the identified and reported dispensing errors 
in pharmacies at Medical City (KSMC) in KSA, and at L&D Hospital in 
the UK? 
Quantitative 
Retrospective review of 
incident reports and expert 
panel assessment by used 
Delphi survey technique 
This method is useful to 
combine different experts' 
opinions in order to obtain a 
consensus assessment for 
such cases. 
What are the perceptions of the dispensary team about the 
contributing factors to dispensing errors? 
Qualitative 
Self-administered 
qualitative questionnaires 
(open-ended questions) 
Qualitative questionnaires are 
very useful for exploratory 
work, and can help to 
determine causal relationships 
(Kane, 2004). 
What are the perceptions of the dispensary team about ways of 
reducing dispensing errors? 
Qualitative 
Self-administered 
qualitative questionnaires 
(open-ended questions) 
Open-ended questions offer a 
means of obtaining detailed 
data from a specific target 
population in a shorter period 
of time and at less cost than 
face-to-face interviews 
(O'Hara, 2011). 
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3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Study sites 
3.2.1.1 King Saud Medical City (KSMC) 
The Ministry of Health is the major provider of healthcare in Saud Arabia, through 
the primary, secondary and tertiary care avenues. King Saud Medical City (KSMC) 
which is located in the capital of KSA (Riyadh) is one of the oldest and largest MOH 
healthcare institutions. The Medical City has 1,200 beds and an additional 140 beds 
in intensive-care units. Moreover, there are also specialist clinics for non-admitted 
patients in out-patients clinics.   
 
3.2.1.2 Luton and Dunstable University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital (L&D) NHS Foundation Trust is a medium-
sized general hospital (600 beds) that is located in Bedfordshire, in the north of 
London. L&D hospital was established in 1939. Currently, L&D hospital is run by the 
NHS and it is provides general healthcare services for over 350,000 people in Luton 
and Dunstable, the south of Bedfordshire, the north of Hertfordshire and parts of 
Buckinghamshire. In 2009, the hospital was awarded ‘Best in Class’ for combating 
healthcare-acquired infections such as C. diff and MRSA. The hospital was nominated 
for the award by the NHS East of England Strategic Health Authority (L&D, 2009). 
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3.2.2 Study Design 
The research consists of three phases (Figure 3.1) as follows: Phase 1: A systematic 
review of published studies exploring the incidence and types of dispensing errors in 
hospital pharmacies. Phase 2: Identification of types of dispensing errors and 
assessing their severity. This phase was undertaken through retrospective review of 
incident reports in the two hospitals and then the identified dispensing errors 
assessed by an expert panel of three clinical pharmacists. Phase 3: Investigation of 
perceived factors contributing to dispensing errors and how to reduce these errors. 
In this phase, self-administered qualitative questionnaires applied to collect more 
detailed data from the dispensary team to obtain their perceptions and opinions 
about dispensing errors and how to reduce these errors.  
 
Figure 3.1: Flowchart of research methods 
 
 
 
Phase 3 (Qualitative) 
Self adminstered questionnaire to ascertain pharmacy staff perception of factors 
contributing  to dispensing  errors and prevention stategies 
Phase 2 (Quantitative) 
Retrospective anaysis of incident report and severity assessment 
Phase 1 (Systematic review) 
A review of published studies exploring the incidence and types of dispensing errors in 
hospital pharmacies 
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3.3  Ethics approval 
Ethical approval required for this study was obtained from the University of 
Hertfordshire Research Ethics Committee (REC) (LMS/PG/UH/00086) (appendix 1) 
and King Saud Medical City hospital Research Ethics Committee (appendix 2). 
Approval was obtained from the pharmacy manager at Luton and Dunstable Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust (appendix 3). Ethical approval was not required by the NHS 
REC. 
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Chapter 4: The nature of dispensing errors in KSMC and 
L&D 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Identifying and understanding the nature of errors is essential strategy to improve 
patient safety (Barton, 2009). Different types of medication errors can occur while 
dispensing medicines in hospital pharmacies, and the nature of these errors may 
vary from hospital to hospital, due to the implemented dispensing system and the 
facilities available. For example, dispensing the wrong medicine has been reported as 
the most common type of dispensing error in some hospital pharmacies (Roberts et 
al., 2002, Cina et al., 2006), while omitting the dose has been reported as a common 
type of dispensing error in other hospital pharmacies that have unit dose system 
(Rissato and Romano-Lieber, 2013, Beso et al., 2005, Anacleto et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, Bonifacio Neto et al. (2013) reported that about 87% of the dispensing 
errors in a Brazilian hospital were related to the dosage form.  
The assessment of medication error severity is an essential concept in patient safety 
(NPSA, 2007b). The aim of assessing dispensing error severity is to help the 
healthcare institution track medication errors in a consistent and systematic manner 
(NCCMERP, 2012). The main objectives of this phase of the research were: 
 To retrospectively identify the types and nature of medication errors 
reported in KSMC and L&D hospitals 
 To retrospectively identify the types and nature of dispensing errors reported 
in KSMC and L&D hospital pharmacies 
 To investigate the severity of unprevented dispensing errors, which are 
detected and reported following the completion of the dispensing process 
(medicines that have left the pharmacy department) 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Definition of dispensing errors 
A multitude of definitions are provided in the published studies. Franklin and 
O’Grady (2007) have the most comprehensive and valid definition for a dispensing 
error. That definition formulated by an expert panel (20 members) through the 
Delphi technique. Franklin and O’Grady defined dispensing error as "any unintended 
deviation from an interpretable written prescription or medication order including 
content and labelling errors; any unintended deviation from professional or 
regulatory references, or guidelines affecting dispensing procedures, is also 
considered a dispensing error”  (Franklin and O'Grady, 2007). This definition applied 
to identify dispensing errors in this study.  
 
4.2.2 Classification of dispensing errors 
Dispensing errors were classified in this study according to the coding framework 
developed by Beso et. al, (2005), as shown in Table 4.1. Various classification are 
employed in the previous studies to classify the types of dispensing errors. Beso et 
al. (2005) have developed the most comprehensive classification to categorise 
dispensing errors in pharmacies. That categories cover all the types of dispensing 
errors. Several researcher depended on this classification to categorise dispensing 
errors in the hospital pharmacies (Costa et al., 2008, Irwin et al., 2011).  
 
Table 4.1: Categories of dispensing error adopted from Beso et al. (2005) 
Content errors Labelling errors 
Dispensing the wrong medicine 
Dispensing the wrong drug strength 
Dispensing the wrong dosage form 
Dispensing an expired medicine 
Omission of item 
Dispensing the wrong quantity 
- Missing doses 
- Adding doses 
 
Wrong patient name 
Wrong medicine name 
Wrong medicine strength 
Wrong frequency 
Wrong dosage form 
Wrong date  
Wrong instructions 
Completely wrong label 
Incomplete information in the label 
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4.2.3 Data collection 
A retrospective review of dispensing error reports for an 18-month period from 
January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013 was conducted. These reports were accessed from 
the Drug and Poison Information Centre in the pharmacy department at KSMC as 
hard copies (the medication error report form is shown in appendix 4). For L&D 
Hospital, the risk management department gave the researcher authority to access 
medication errors reports using the Datix Software (a blank form is shown in 
appendix 5). The medication errors forms in both hospitals have the same 
components, which are as the following: 
- Incident date 
- Incident time 
- Report date 
- The medicine involved in the incident (medicine name, dose, dosage form 
and route of administration)  
- location of incident 
- Type of incident; Prescribing, dispensing …etc. 
- Description of incident   
- Incident severity 
- Action taken  
- Reporter detail 
- Who did the error; physician, pharmacist, nurse...etc. (KSMC only) 
 
For the purposes of collecting the data required to complete this research study, two 
data collection forms were developed. The first form is the Medication Errors Data 
Collection Form (appendix 6) to collect all medication error required data. The 
required data in this form includes; incident date, medicine involved in the incident 
details (name, strength, dose and dosage form), type of errors (prescribing, 
dispensing, administration, transcribing or monitoring) and incident description. The 
incident description section used to write more details about the incident such as if 
the patient had the medicine or not. The second form is Dispensing error Data 
Collection Form (appendix 7). This form is specific to collect the dispensing error 
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detail. This form had an extra requirement detail which is description of the 
dispensing errors such as dispense the wrong medicine or strength and labelling the 
incorrect medicine name.    
 
For data collection validity purposes, a considered percentage (10%) of both 
medication and dispensing errors were selected randomly (computer generated) to 
be checked by expert pharmacists, the KSMC incidents was checked by the 
medication safety officer in KSMC and the L&D incidents was checked by the 
supervisor (Dr. Umaru). Levels of agreement between the researcher and the 
reviews in the classified the errors were assessed by Cohen's Kappa coefficient, 
which is designed to assess the percent-agreement estimate by considering the 
amount of expected agreement that could occur by chance (Bryman and Cramer, 
2005). The Kappa statistic is useful when there is concern about artificially inflated 
percent-agreements. By convention, a Kappa of <0.2 is considered poor agreement, 
0.21-0.4 fair, 0.41-0.6 moderate, 0.61-0.8 good, and 0.8 – 1.0 very good agreement 
(Landis and Koch, 1977a, Landis and Koch, 1977b). 
 
 
4.2.5 Data analysis  
Data was entered into a Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (version 20) 
spreadsheet for analysis, and comparisons were made between the two hospitals. 
Descriptive statistics were applied in order to examine the dispensing error incident 
reports collected from the two hospitals. A Fisher’s exact test (2X2) was used to 
compare the main dispensing error incidents frequency (content and labelling) 
between the two hospitals (two by two crosstable). Fisher’s test is the best choice to 
compare two groups with two outcomes (two by two crosstable) as it gives the exact 
P-value, while the chi-square test calculates the approximate P-value (Jaykaran, 
2011). A P-value of equal or less than to 0.05 was considered statistically significant. 
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4.2.6 Assessment of dispensing errors clinical significance 
This phase of the research involved assessing the clinical significance of unprevented 
dispensing errors that were identified in KSMC and L&D hospitals. Assessment forms 
describing all unprevented dispensing errors were sent to an expert panel consisting 
of three clinical pharmacists (two currently working as the patient safety pharmacist 
in their respective hospitals), to assess the potential risk of patient harm. . The 
expert panel members were asked to rate the unprevented dispensing errors’ 
scenarios, and classify them for potential risk of patient harm, using the classification 
description provided in Table 4.2, which was used in the study by James at el. (2011) 
which adopted from the London Specialist Pharmacist Group.  The mode rate (most 
frequent answer) was taken in case there was variety in the reviewers’ answer. 
However, the levels of agreement were assessed by Cohen's Kappa coefficient. The 
Assessment of Dispensing Error Severity Form contains the dispensing error 
reference number, the prescribed medicine, a description of the error, the level of 
potential risk and a justification for the potential risk level (appendix 8). 
 
Table 4.2: Risk matrix for classifying the clinical significance of dispensing errors 
Potential 
risk level 
Description of dispensing errors 
Catastrophic This could have resulted in death. 
Major These could have caused major permanent harm or an increased length of 
stay in hospital or increased level of care for more than 15 days. 
Moderate These incidents could have caused semi-permanent harm (up to 1 year) or an 
increased length of stay in hospital or increased level of care for up to 15 
days. 
Minor This includes incidents that could have resulted in non-permanent harm (up 
to 1 month) or an increased length of stay in hospital or increased level of 
care for up to 7 days 
None No harm could have resulted. 
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4.3  Results 
This section describes the finding about medication errors and dispensing errors 
reported in KSMC and L&D hospitals. The difference in dispensing errors between 
KSMC and L&D hospitals is also presented. 
 
4.3.1 Medication errors 
4.3.1.1 Medication errors in KSMC 
The total number of reported incidents associated with medication errors in KSMC 
from January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013 was 6,101 incidents of 1,571,975 prescribed 
medicines (rate of medication errors0 0.38%). Results of an analysis of medication 
incident reports by stage of the medication process are shown in Table 4.3. The 
majority of the errors (n= 4,561, 74.8%) occurred during the transcribing stage. 
Incidents associated with prescribing were reported 774 times (12.7%) while 637 
incidents (10.4%) occurred at the dispensing stage. About 2% of medication errors 
were associated with monitoring (1.4%) and administration (0.7%). To validate the 
medication errors classification, 5% (n= 323) of the data were independently 
classified by a qualified pharmacist with experience in medication errors (patient 
safety officer in KSMC). Cohen's Kappa coefficient was 0.82 which is in agreement 
with the decisions made by both the researcher and the pharmacist regarding 
medication error. 
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Table 4.3: Frequency of dispensing errors according to the type of medication errors in KSMC 
Type of 
Medication Error 
Frequency & 
Percent (%) 
Examples 
Transcribing 4561 (74.8%) 
- Transcribed the wrong dose for enoxaparin dose (4 mg instead of 
40 mg)  
- Transcribed Metronidazole 500 mg instead of Metformin 500 mg 
- Transcribed the wrong frequency for Cefuroxime 500 mg ( three 
times daily instead of twice daily) 
- Transcribed the wrong duration for Ciprofloxacin oral (5 months 
instead of 5 days) 
- Dose of Insulin not transcribed   
Prescribing 774 (12.7%) 
-Prescribed the wrong frequency for Amlodipine (twice daily instead 
of one tine daily) 
-Prescribed the wrong duration for Warfarin (7 days), the policy 
duration is one day only for the in-patent  
-Prescribed Esomeprazole and Ranitidine (both have same effect) 
-Prescribed the wrong duration for Cephalexin ( 3 days instead of 10 
days)  
Dispensing 637 (10.4%) 
-Dispensed wrong dosage form for Mesalamine (rectal suppository 
instated of oral tablet) 
-Dispensed and labelled wrong dose for Carvedilol (12.5 mg instead 
of 25 mg) 
-Dispensed wrong medicine (Pregabalin 75 mg instead of Clopidogrel 
75 mg)     
Monitoring 86 (1.4%) 
- The clinical pharmacist recommend to increase the warfarin dose to 
7mg instead of 5mg because the level was below the range  but the 
dose was not changed  
- The patient given Amikacin while the patient was  still on 
Vancomycin 
Administration 43 (0.7%) 
- Omission error (Gentamicin dose was not given to the patient) 
- Unprescribed medicine given to the patient (Vancomycin) 
- Administered Labetalol in the wrong time  
Total 6101 (100%)  
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the frequency of incidents for each month from the period of 
January 2012 to June 2013. There was a significant difference between the rates of 
medication errors that reported in each month. More medication errors were 
reported in 2013 compared to 2012 (4,045 and 2,056 respectively). The smallest 
number of medication errors occurred in March 2012 (73 incidents) while the largest 
number was in April 2013 (1,244 incidents). The number of medication errors in the 
months between June to November 2012 remains relatively small, ranging from 73-
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224 medications errors. However, medications errors rise to 414 in December 2012. 
In January 2013, 322 medication errors were reported and about 600 errors 
occurred in February. In May 2013, 943 errors were reported, yet the number of 
errors decreased significantly to 226 errors in June 2013.  
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of medication errors for each month in KSMC 
 
 
Figure 4.2 outlines the percentage (%) of incidents in KSMC according to the day of 
the week. The percentage of incident reports was lowest during weekend days 
Thursday (13.13%) and Friday (10.03%), while the maximum percentage of 
dispensing errors occurred on Wednesday (18.19%).   
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of medication errors reported for each day of the week in KSMC 
 
Table 4.4 outlines the percentages of medication errors based on the classes of drugs 
(according to BNF V.65 classification). Anti-infective and cardiovascular agents were 
the most common medicines involved in medication errors (1,443; 23.7% and 1,387; 
22.6% respectively), followed by nutritional products (750, 12.3%), gastrointestinal 
agent medications (620, 10.2%), gastrointestinal agents (620, 10.2%) and central 
nervous system agents (604, 9.9%). The most common medicines involved in 
medication errors were Paracetamol (n=284, 4.5%), Omeprazole (n=280, 5.4%), 
Cefuroxime (n=129, 2.1%) and Augmentin (n=199, 3.2%). These medicines are 
common prescribed in the hospital but the prescribed numbers for these medicines 
unavailable.  Medicines with narrow therapeutic index reported several times such 
as Warfarin (n=112) and Gentamicin (n=35).   Also, Amiloride and Aminophylline 
reported several times and these medicines classified by NPSA in the BNF (V.65) as 
high risk medicines. 
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Table 4.4: Medications involved in medication errors reported at KSMC (BNF V.65) 
Medicine class 
Frequency  
Transcribing Prescribing Dispensing Monitoring Administration Total 
Infection  1016 282 120 16 16 1443 (23.7%) 
Cardiovascular system 1049 144 150 35 7 1387 (22.7%) 
Nutritional and blood 604 56 53 16 8 750 (12.3%) 
Gastro-intestinal system 486 86 27 0 3 620 (10.2%) 
Central nervous system  475 44 82 5 4 604 (9.9%) 
Endocrine system  307 53 95 4 3 435 (7.1%) 
Musculoskeletal and joint diseases 257 18 16 2 1 297 (4.9%) 
Respiratory system 195 59 29 0 0 289 (4.7%) 
Skin 57 10 32 0 0 96 (1.6%) 
Eye 46 7 16 1 0 79 (1.3%) 
Malignant disease and 
immunosuppression 
23 2 6 0 0 30 (0.5%) 
Ear, nose and oropharynx 21 4 5 0 0 29 (0.5%) 
Immunology products and vaccines 11 7 6 0 1 24 (0.4%) 
Anaesthesia  6 0 0 0 0 10 (0.2%) 
Emergency treatment of poisoning 
(Antidote) 
5 2 0 1 0 8 (0.1%) 
Total 4561 774 737 86 43 6101 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Medication errors in L&D 
The total number of incidents associated with medication errors at the L&D hospital 
from January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013 was 766 incidents.  Results of an analysis of 
medication incident reports by stage of the medication process are shown in Table 
4.5. The highest incidents (n= 365, 49%) occurred during drug administration. 
Incidents associated with prescribing were reported 295 times (38.5%) followed by 
incidents which occurred in the dispensing stage (n= 49, 6.4%). To validate the 
medication errors classification, 5% (n= 36) of the data was independently classified 
by a qualified pharmacist with experience in medication safety. Cohen's Kappa 
coefficient was 0.81 which indicated very good agreement between the researcher 
and the pharmacist about medication error classification. 
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Table 4.5: Frequency of dispensing errors according to the types of medication errors in L&D 
Type of 
Medication Error 
Frequency & 
Percent (%) 
Examples 
Administration 376 (49%) 
- Omission error (Gentamicin dose did not give to the patient) 
- Administered wrong dosage form (Vancomycin IV instead of oral) 
- Administered wrong frequency (Paracetamol 1 gm IV twice at 
12pm) 
- Administered wrong dose (Bisoprolol 5 mg instead of 1.25 mg) 
Prescribing 295 (38.5%) 
- Prescribed the wrong frequency for Fentanyl patch (every 7 days  
instead of every 3 days) 
- Prescribed the wrong dose for Dexamethasone IV (80 mg twice daily 
instead of 8 mg twice daily)  
- Prescribed wrong medicine (Levothyroxine 125 mcg instead of 
Lamotrigine 150 mg) 
- Prescribed the wrong combination (Clopidrogrl  75 mg + Enoxaparin 
40 mg + Ketorolac 20 mg), all three drugs can increase the risk of 
bleeding)   
Dispensing 49 (6.4%) 
- Dispensed Moxonidine 200mcg instead of Moxifloxacin 400mg 
- Labelling Morphine 5ml instead of Morphine 2.5ml 
- Dispensed  Enoxaparin 40mg instead of Enoxaparin 20mg 
Monitoring 36 (4.7%) 
- Gentamycin given to a baby without levels being taken 
- Patient given Vancomycin 750 mg IV and the level was above the 
normal level 
Dispensing by 
Nurse 
6 (0.8%) 
- Discharge patient given Medicines from the patient cupboard, all 
the medicines did not belong the patient   
Delivery 3 (0.4%) 
- Delay of about one hour to deliver Morphine IV to the emergency 
department 
Counselling 1 (0.1%) 
- Patient being discharged on warfarin for the first time and the 
patient did not receive any counselling 
Total 766 (100%)  
 
Figure 4.3 shows the frequency of medication errors for each month. There was a 
significant difference between the rates of medication errors that reported in each 
month. The fewest number of medication errors was in April and July 2012 (26 
incidents) while the highest number was in March 2013 (64 incidents). 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of medication errors for each month in L&D Hospital 
 
Figure 4.4 outlines the number and the percentage (%) of incidents reported in L&D 
according to the day of the week. There was a significant difference between the 
rates of medication errors that reported in week days. While, the percentage of 
reports is lowest during weekend days (Saturday 10.7% and Sunday 9.9%), while the 
maximum number of medication errors occurred on Wednesday (18.28 %), Friday 
(16.58%) and Monday (16.32%).  The most common medicines involved in 
medication errors were Insulin (n=64), Enoxaparin (n=38), Paracetamol (n=31) and 
Warfarin (n=28).  
 
Figure 4.4: Percentage of medication errors reported for each day of the week in L&D 
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Table 4.6 outlines the frequency of medication errors based on the classes of drugs 
(according to BNF V.65 classification). Central nervous system agents and 
cardiovascular agents were the most common medicines involved in medication 
errors (187 incidents and 152incidents, respectively), followed by anti-infective 
agents (135 incidents), endocrine system agents (90 incidents) and nutritional 
products (72 incidents). There are 44 incident did not report the medicines involved 
in medication errors. 
 
Table 4.6: Medications involved in medication errors in L&D (BNF V.65) 
Medicine class 
Frequency  
Prescribing Dispensing Administration Monitoring Others Total 
Central nervous system  84 14 79 7 3 187 
Cardiovascular system 66 4 65 14 3 152 
Infection  41 3 82 8 1 135 
Endocrine system  33 2 52 2 1 90 
Nutritional and blood 21 5 43 1 2 72 
Skin 8 4 10 1 0 23 
Malignant disease and 
immunosuppression 
4 8 2 0 0 14 
Respiratory system 6 2 5 0 0 13 
Gastro-intestinal system 5 3 4 0 0 12 
Immunology products and vaccines 4 0 4 0 0 8 
Musculoskeletal and joint diseases 7 0 0 0 0 7 
Anaesthesia  2 0 4 0 0 6 
Eye 1 2 0 0 0 3 
Missing 23 2 16 3 0 44 
Total 295 49 376 36 10 766 
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4.3.1 Dispensing errors 
4.3.1.2 Dispensing errors in KSMC 
A total of 617 cases (96.9%) of dispensing errors were intercepted before the 
medicines left the pharmacy department. However, 20 cases (3.1%) of dispensing 
errors went undetected before the medicines left the pharmacy. Nurses identified 
eight incidents of dispensing errors while six incidents were identified by patients 
and three incidents by physicians. Three errors identified by pharmacists when the 
patient came to the pharmacy to ask about the medicines.   In eight of these cases, 
the patient had already taken the medicine. Table 4.7 shows the dispensary team 
staff who were involved in dispensing errors. Of those dispensing errors that were 
prevented, 74% (n = 473) involved pharmacy technicians. Fourteen cases of 
dispensing errors were detected outside the pharmacy department while 
pharmacists identified 459 cases prior to leaving the pharmacy department at the 
final accuracy check. Overall, 26% of the incidents (n = 164) occurred with 
pharmacists. Of these, six cases of dispensing errors were detected outside the 
pharmacy department while 158 cases were prevented before the medicines left the 
pharmacy department.  
 
Table 4.7:  Numbers and rates of prevented dispensing errors and undetected dispensing errors  
Dispensary team 
Prevented dispensing errors 
(n) 
Undetected dispensing 
errors (n) 
Total (n) 
Technician pharmacist 459 (74.4%) 14 (70%) 473 (75.3%) 
Pharmacist 158 (25.6%) 6 (30%) 164 (25.7%) 
Total 617  20 637 
 
 
The number of incidents reported associated with dispensing errors at KSMC from 
January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013 was 609 incidents. Twenty-five reports had two 
incidents and one report had four incidents. The total number of dispensing errors 
was 637. Table 4.8 shows the frequency of incidents for each month. The smallest 
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number of all dispensing errors was in May 2012 (6 incidents) while the largest 
number was in April 2013 (102 incidents).   
  Table 4.8:  Frequency of the dispensing errors for each month at KSMC 
Months 
Dispensing Errors 
Prevented Unprevented Total 
January 2012 19 2 20 
February 2012 14 2 16 
March 2012 9 0 9 
April 2012 19 0 19 
May 2012 6 0 6 
June 2012 21 0 21 
July 2012 27 1 28 
August 2012 5 4 9 
September 2012 33 1 34 
October 2012 19 0 19 
November 2012 27 0 27 
December 2012 55 0 55 
January 2013 24 2 26 
February 2013 85 3 88 
March 2013 71 1 72 
April 2013 102 0 102 
May 2013 61 0 61 
June 2013 22 4 26 
Total 617 20 637 
 
 
 
Table 4.9 shows the frequency and the percentage (%) of dispensing errors according 
to the day of the week. The lowest percentage of reported incidents is on weekend 
days in KSA (Friday) while the highest percent of dispensing errors occurred on the 
first day after the weekend (Saturday).  High number of unprevented dispensing 
errors occurred in Saturday, while no unprevented dispensing errors in Sunday.  
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Table 4.9: Frequency and percentage of dispensing errors reported for each day of the week in KSMC 
Weekday 
Dispensing Errors 
Prevented Unprevented Total 
Saturday 110 (17.8%) 7 (35%) 117 (18.4%) 
Sunday 89 (14.4%) 0 89 (14%) 
Monday 86 (13.9%) 3 (15%) 89 (14%) 
Tuesday 105 (17%) 2 (10%) 107 (16.8%) 
Wednesday 81 (13.2%) 2 (10%) 83 (13%) 
Thursday 85 (13.8%) 1 (5%) 86 (13.5%) 
Friday 63 (10.2%) 3 (15%) 66 (10.3%) 
Total 617 (100%) 20 (100%) 637 (100%) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10 shows the frequency of dispensing errors according to the type of 
dispensing error. Most of the errors (n = 323, 50.7%) included dispensing the 
incorrect medicines followed by dispensing the incorrect strength/concentration (n = 
128, 20.1%). Other commonly occurring errors included medicine labels with an 
incorrect strength/concentration (n = 89, 14%) and dispensing the wrong 
formulation (n = 68, 10.7%). To validate the dispensing errors classification, 5% (n= 
35) of the data was independently classified by the pharmacist. The level of 
agreement between the researcher and the pharmacist was 1 which means there 
was total agreement on the dispensing error classification.     
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Table 4.10: Types of dispensing errors reported in KSMC Pharmacy 
Type of dispensing error 
Prevented 
dispensing errors 
Unprevented 
dispensing error 
All dispensing 
errors 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Dispensing the wrong medicine 313 (50.7%) 10 (50%) 323 (50.7%) 
Dispensing the wrong drug strength 125 (20.3%) 3 (15%) 128 (20.1%) 
Labelling the wrong medicine strength 87 (14.1%) 2 (10%) 89 (14%) 
Dispensing the wrong formulation 66 (10.7%) 2 (10%) 68 (10.7%) 
Dispensing the wrong quantity -adding dose 9 (1.5%) 1 (5%) 10 (1.6%) 
Dispensing an expired medicine 6 (0.9%) 1 (5%) 7 (1.1%) 
Dispensing the wrong quantity -missing dose 4 (0.6 %) 0 4 (0.6%) 
Incomplete information in the label 3 (0.5%) 0 3 (0.5%) 
Labelling the wrong instructions 3 (0.5%) 0 3 (0.5%) 
Omission of an item 1 (0.16%) 1 (5%) 2 (0.3%) 
Total 617 (100%) 20 (100%) 637 (100%) 
 
 
 
Table 4.11 shows the class of medicines most commonly involved in dispensing 
errors were cardiovascular agent drugs (n = 150, 23.5%), followed by anti-infective 
agent drugs ( n = 120, 18.8%), endocrine system agents (n = 95, 14.9%) and central 
nervous system medications ( n = 82, 12.9%).  The cardiovascular agent medicine 
mostly reported with dispensing errors was Furosemide (n= 15).  Truvada® 
(emtricitabine and tenofovir) was the most common anti-infection medicine involved 
in dispensing errors (n=32). While, Insulin was the endocrine system agent mostly 
involved in dispensing errors. Insulin on of the medicine that classified as high-alert 
medicine (ISMp, 2016).  
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Table 4.11: Medications involved in dispensing errors (BNF V.65) 
Medicine class 
Prevented 
dispensing errors 
Unprevented 
dispensing error 
All dispensing 
errors 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Cardiovascular system 145 5 (25%) 150 (23.5%) 
Infection 119 1 (5%) 120 (18.8%) 
Endocrine system  91 4 (20%) 95 (14.9%) 
Central nervous system  80 2 (10%) 82 (12.9%) 
Nutritional and blood  50 3 (15%) 53 (8.3%) 
Skin  32 0 32 (5%) 
Respiratory system 28 1 (5%) 29 (4.6%) 
Gastro-intestinal system 25 3 (15%) 27 (4.2%) 
Musculoskeletal and joint diseases 16 0 16 (2.5%) 
Eye  16 0 16 (2.5%) 
Malignant disease and immunosuppression 5 1 (5%) 6 (0.9%) 
Immunology products and vaccines 6 0 6 (0.9%) 
Ear, nose and oropharynx  5 0 5 (0.8%) 
Total 317 (100%) 20 (100%) 637 (100%) 
 
 
 
Table 4.12 describes all the unprevented dispensing errors reported in KSMC 
pharmacy.  
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Table 4.12: Unprevented dispensing errors reported in KSMC 
ID Dispensing errors 
Dispensing the wrong medicine 
1330113 
Dispensed Methyldopa 250mg instead of Dexamethasone 0.5mg 1610213 
1700213 
1960613 
Dispensed Vitalipid instead of Fat emulsion 
1970613 
510112 Dispensed fluticasone+salmeterol inhaler instead of Fluticasone 
200212 Dispensed Cefuroxime 750mg vial instead of Vancomycin 500mg vial 
1500712 Dispensed Sodium bicarbonate 375mg instead of Calcium carbonate 500mg 
620812 Dispensed Perindopril 5mg instead of Prednisolone 5mg 
1540112 Dispensed Calcium carbonate 500mg instead of Paracetamol 500mg 
  
   
Dispensing the wrong drug strength 
430812 Dispensed Nifedipine 10mg instead of Nifedipine 20mg  
340812 Dispensed Mesalazine 1gm suppository instead of 500mg for in-patient 
270912 Dispensed Simvastatin 10mg instead of Simvastatin 40mg 
   
   
Dispensing the wrong formulation 
3140113 Dispensed Mesalazine rectal suppository instead of Mesalazine tablet  
840613 Dispensed Paracetamol vial instead Paracetamol tablet 
   
Dispensing the wrong quantity 
4420213 Dispensed wrong quantity of Omeprazole (20 vials instead 2 vials) 
  
Labelling wrong medicine strength 
330313 Dispensed Amlodipine with wrong labelling dose (10mg instead 5mg) 
430812 Labelled  Nifedipine 10mg instead of Nifedipine 20mg  
  
Omission of an item 
170613 Omission of Epinephrine dose, while the prescribed medicine did not dispensed  
 
Dispensing an expired medicine 
760212 Dispensed expired Cyclosporine capsule for in-patient  
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4.3.2.2 Dispensing errors in L&D hospital 
All of the dispending errors that occurred in L&D pharmacy were considered as 
unpreventable dispensing errors. Any dispensing errors identify in the accuracy 
check stage in L&D hospital pharmacy (prevented dispensing errors) usually 
reporting in especial form call “in-house incident forms”. The in-house incident 
forms were inaccessible for the purpose of this study due to ethical reasons because 
these reports include the name of the staff who did the errors. The total number of 
unpreventable dispensing reports in L&D hospital pharmacy was 49 incidents for the 
period from January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013. Figure 4.5 shows the frequency of 
incidents for each month for the period from January 2012 to June 2013. An average 
of 4 dispensing errors occurred from January 2012 to October 2012 and then errors 
declined to one incident per month until March 2013. After that, the number of 
incidents increased to 5 in June 2013. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Distribution of unprevented dispensing errors for each month in L&D hospital pharmacy 
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Figure 4.6 shows the percentage (%) of dispensing errors in L&D according to the day 
of the week. The lowest percentage of incident reports occurred during weekend 
days (Saturday, 4% and Sunday 8.16%), while the maximum number of dispensing 
errors occurred on Friday (22.45%), Wednesday (18.37%) and Thursday (18.37%).   
 
 
Figure 4.6: Percentage of dispensing errors reported for each day of the week in L&D hospital 
pharmacy 
 
 
Table 4.13 shows the frequency of dispensing errors according to the type of 
dispensing error in L&D hospital pharmacy. Most of the errors (n = 9, 18.4%) were 
related to dispensing the wrong medicine. The next most common error was 
labelling the wrong strength (n = 8, 16.3%), followed by dispensing the wrong 
strength (n = 7, 14.4%) and labelling the wrong patient details (n = 6, 12.2%). To 
validate the dispensing errors classification, 5% (n= 5) of the data were 
independently classified by a clinical pharmacist. The level of agreement between 
the researcher and the pharmacist was 1 which means they were totally agreed on 
dispensing error classification.     
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Table 4.13: Frequency of dispensing errors according to the types of dispensing errors in L&D. 
Type of dispensing error Frequency (n) Percent (%) 
Dispensing the wrong medicine 9 18.4 
Labelling the wrong medicine strength  8 16.3 
Dispensing the wrong drug strength  7 14.3 
Labelling the wrong patient name and detail  6 12.2 
Labelling the wrong medicine name 4 8.2 
Dispensing the wrong quantity -missing dose 3 6.1 
Incomplete information in the label 3 6.1 
Dispensing the wrong formulation 3 6.1 
Completely wrong label 1 2 
Dispensing an expired medicine 1 2 
Omission of an item 1 2 
Labelling the wrong instructions 1 2 
Labelling the wrong expired medicine date 1 2 
Total 49 100 
 
Table 4.14 outlines the frequency of dispensing errors in L&D based on the classes of 
drugs (according to BNF classification). Central nervous system agents were most 
commonly involved in dispensing errors (29.8%), followed by malignant disease, 
immunosuppression agents (17%) and nutritional products (10.6%). Table 4.15 
describes all the unprevented dispensing errors in L&D hospital pharmacy. 
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Table 4.14: Medications involved in dispensing errors (BNF V.65) 
Medicine class 
Frequency 
(n) 
Percent 
(%) 
Valid 
Percent (%) 
Central nervous system  14 28.6 29.8 
Malignant disease and immunosuppression 8 16.3 17 
Nutritional and blood 5 10.2 10.6 
Skin 4 8.2 8.5 
Cardiovascular system 4 8.2 8.5 
Infection 3 6.1 6.4 
Gastro-intestinal system 3 6.1 6.4 
Eye 2 4.1 4.3 
Endocrine system 2 4.1 4.3 
Respiratory system 2 4.1 4.3 
Total 47 95.9 100.0 
missing 2 4.1  
Total 49 100.0  
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Table 4.15: Unprevented dispensing errors in L&D 
ID Dispensing error  
Dispensing the wrong medicine 
78974 Dispensed Sodium chloride 600mg tablet instead of N-acetylcysteine  1.2g 
78764 Dispensed Moxonidine 200mcg instead of Moxifloxacin 400mg 
81164 Dispensed Dermovate cream instead Eumovate cream 
82495 Dispensed Clonidine 25mcg instead of Clonazepam 0.25mg 
82282 Dispensed Ceforoxime instead of Ceftriaxone 
85390 Dispensed wrong drug Pentasa® instead of Asacil®  
85498 Dispensed Hydralazine 25mg instead of Hydroxyzine 25mg 
94806 Dispensed the wrong medicine 
94698 Dispensed Aquacel Ribbon instead of Aquacel AG Ribbon 
   
   
Labelling the wrong medicine strength/dose 
78973 Labelled Peginterferon alfa 150mcg instead of Peginterferon alfa 120mcg 
79442 Labelled Morphine 5ml instead of Morphine 2.5ml 
83227 Labelled  Sotalol 80mg instead of Sotalol 40mg 
85399 Labelled  Dexamethasone 1.2ml instead of Dexamethasone 1ml 
81677 Labelled  Midazolam Buccal 10mg instead of Midazolam Buccal 5mg  
80731 Labelled  Bimatoprost 0.03% eye drops instead of  Bimatoprost 0.01%  
87266 Labelled wrong medicine dose, 6.2mls instead of 0.62mls  
94697 Labelled Morphine 100mg instead of Morphine 10mg 
   
Dispensing the wrong drug strength 
78973 Dispensed Peginterferon alfa 150mcg instead of Peginterferon alfa 120mcg 
85395 Dispensed  Enoxaparin 40mg instead of Enoxaparin 20mg 
83227 Dispensed Sotalol 80mg instead of Sotalol 40mg 
92720 Dispensed Mycophenolate 500mg instead of Mycophenolate 250mg 
92048 Dispensed Methotrexate 5mg instead of Methotrexate 15mg  
92901 Dispensed wrong concentration of Sodium chloride eye drops 5% instead of 9% 
94502 Dispensed Epoetin alfa 6000 units instead of Epoetin alfa 10000 units  
   
Labelling the wrong medicine name 
78974 Labelled Sodium chloride 600mg tablet instead of N-acetylcysteine  1.2g 
82495 Labelled Clonidine 25mcg instead of clonazepam 0.25mg 
85498 Labelled and dispensed Hydralazine 25mg instead of Hydroxyzine 25mg 
94698 Labelled and dispensed Aquacel Ribbon instead of Aquacel AG Ribbon 
   
Completely wrong label (wrong label for the correct medicine) 
81636 Completely wrong label for insulin  
82805 Completely wrong label for Flucloxacillin (IV) 
   
Incomplete information in the label 
83023 Ward and drug names were messed for Carbocisteine capsule  
85748 Patient name & hospital number were missed in the label for TPN preparation 
85781 Patient name & hospital number were missed in the label for TPN preparation 
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ID Dispensing error  
Labelling the wrong patient name and detail 
83226 All the information were correct in the label for Candesartan 16mg tablet except the 
patient name 
85606 All the information were correct on the TPN bag label except the ward name 
86056 All the information were correct in the label except the ward name (Ward 30 instead 
of Ward 20) 
91717 All the information were correct in the label for Cetuximab except the patient name 
91714 All the information were correct in the label for Cetuximab except the patient name 
94652 All the information were correct in the label for Lamotrigine except the patient name 
   
Labelling the wrong instructions 
85674 Labelled the wrong instructions, Paracetamol ( two 5ml) instead of (5ml) 
  
Dispensing the wrong formulation 
86555 Dispensed Cyclizine 50mg oral tablet instead of Cyclizine 50mg  injection 
90974 Dispensed Ranitidine tablet instead of Ranitidine injection  
94375 Dispensed Haloperidol tablet instead of Haloperidol ampoules  
  
Labelling the wrong expired medicine date 
86640 Labelling the wrong expiry date of Methotrexate 21/12/2012 instead of 
28/9/2012 
  
Dispensing the wrong quantity 
89827 Dispensed the wrong quantity of Buprenorphine patch 4 instead of 5 patches 
91054 Dispensed the wrong quantity of Fentanyl 10 ampoules instead of 20 ampoules  
94362 Dispensed the wrong quantity of Morphine 100mls instead of 500mls 
  
Omission of item 
92121 Omission of Etoposide capsules (did not dispense the medicine for the patient) 
  
Dispensing an expired medicine 
93389 Dispensed an expired Sodium bicarbonate injection for in-patient  
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4.3.3 Differences in unprevented dispensing errors reported at KSMC and 
L&D hospitals 
This section describes the differences in the types of unprevented dispensing errors 
that occurred in KSMC and L&D hospitals only because the prevented dispensing 
errors were inaccessible related to ethics reason. While there were 20 unprevented 
dispensing errors found in KSMC, 49 unprevented dispensing errors were reported in 
L&D hospital. Table 4.16 outlines the number of unpreventable dispensing errors in 
both hospitals according to the types of dispensing errors. 
 
Table 4.16: Frequency of unpreventable dispensing error in KSMC and L&D 
Type of dispensing error L&D KSMC 
Dispensing the wrong medicine 9 10 
Labelling the wrong medicine strength  8 2 
Dispensing the wrong drug strength  7 3 
Labelling the wrong patient name and detail  6 - 
Labelling the wrong medicine name 4 - 
Dispensing the wrong quantity  3 1 
Incomplete information in the label 3 - 
Dispensing the wrong formulation 3 2 
Completely wrong label 1 - 
Dispensing an expired medicine 1 1 
Omission of an item 1 1 
Labelling the wrong instructions 1 - 
Labelling the wrong expired medicine date 1 - 
Total 49 (6.4%) 20 (0.33%) 
Total of medication error 766 6101 
 
All of the types of dispensing errors can be grouped into two main categories (I) 
content errors and (ii) labelling errors. The data contained many error types whose 
frequencies were not sufficient for statistical analysis. Breaking the types into 
content errors and labelling errors groups allowed for fisher’s analyses. Figure 4.7 
shows the numbers and the percentages of unprevented dispensing errors in the 
two hospitals according to content errors and labelling errors.  
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Figure 4.7: Number percentages of content and labelling errors in L&D and KSMC 
 
 
  
The majority (90%) of errors at KSMC are related to content, whereas the errors at 
L&D are evenly split between content (49%) and labelling (51%). There are significant 
different between the two site, while the Fisher’s test exact was applied to check 
whether there was a significant association between hospital site and error type 
(F=0.002234, p < 0.05).   
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4.3.4 Unprevented dispensing errors severity  
Clinical pharmacists with experience in medication safety assessed the potential risk 
of the unprevented dispensing errors in KSMC and L&D pharmacies. The pharmacists 
were asked to classify the errors using five categories; catastrophic, major, 
moderate, minor and none risk (according to classification adopted from James et al. 
(2011). Figure 4.8 indicates the potential clinical significance of unprevented 
dispensing errors in KSMC and L&D pharmacies. The agreement among the 
reviewers’ rating was a substantial agreement (0.66). About  73.6% (n=14) of the 
dispensing errors in KSMC and 66.6% (n=26) of the dispensing errors in L&D were 
classified as minor potential  to harm the patient,  if the error had not been 
intercepted and the patient took the medicine. Nearly 10% (n=2) of the unprevented 
dispensing errors in KSMC and 20.5% (n=8) in L&D were assessed as moderate 
potential risk. One dispensing error case was assessed as major potential risk in 
KSMC as the dispensary team dispensed Cefuroxime 750 mg vial instead of 
Vancomycin 500 mg for an in-patient. Dispensing errors that assessed as moderate 
risk are; 
- Dispensed Sodium bicarbonate 375mg instead of Calcium carbonate 
500mg(KSMC) 
- Dispensed Perindopril 5mg instead of Prednisolone 5mg (KSMC) 
- Labelling the wrong instructions for Morphine, two 5ml instead of 5ml (L&D)  
- Labelling the wrong patient name for Lamotrigine (L&D)  
- Labelling the wrong patient name for Cetuximab (L&D) 
- Dispensed Mycophenolate 500mg instead of Mycophenolate 250mg (L&D) 
- Dispensed Methotrexate 5mg instead of Methotrexate 15mg (L&D) 
- Dispensed Sotalol 80mg instead of Sotalol 40mg (L&D) 
- Dispensed an expired Sodium bicarbonate injection for in-patient (L&D) 
- Omission of Etoposide capsules (did not dispense the medicine for the 
patient) (L&D) 
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Figure 4.8: Potential clinical significance of dispensing errors in KSMC and L&D 
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4.4 Discussion 
This study reviewed all medication errors reported in KSMC pharmacies in KSA and 
L&D (reported on Datix) in the UK over a period of 18 months to identify the nature 
of medication errors and dispensing errors. A comparison of the types of medication 
errors in the KSMC and L&D hospitals shows clear variations in the prevalence rate of 
these errors. In the L&D hospital, administration errors were the most common 
(49%), followed by prescribing errors (38.5%) and dispensing errors (6.4%). This 
distribution is nearly the same as those reported in England and Wales (NPSA, 
2007d) and in the northeast of Scotland (NHS Grampian) (Alrwisan et al., 2011). In 
England and Wales, the most common medication errors reported to NRLS in 2007 
were administration errors (59.3%), dispensing errors (17.8%) and prescribing errors 
(15.7%) (NPSA, 2007d). The most commonly reported errors in the northeast 
Scotland hospitals were administration errors (59%), prescribing errors (11%) and 
dispensing errors (10%) (Alrwisan et al., 2011). 
 
In KSMC, the majority of reported medication errors occurred in the transcription 
stage (74.8%). The medicine safety officer of the KSMC hospital explained that 
transcribing errors were common in the hospital because the physicians gave verbal 
prescriptions to the nursing staff and asked the nurses to order the medicines using 
the physician’s computer access (Al-Zaagi, 2015). Since September 2013, the hospital 
management has prohibited the nursing staff from ordering medicines on behalf of 
the physicians, a decision that led to a reduction of these errors in the KSMC hospital 
in the following months (Al-Dossari et al., 2014). Interestingly, administration errors 
in KSMC were very low (0.7%) compared with errors in other stages. This is because 
physicians and nurses were not reporting the incidents; rather, the majority of 
medication errors (97%) were reported by pharmacists (Al-Zaagi et al., 2013). Thus, 
the variation between KSMC and L&D in the prevalence rates of different types of 
medication errors may be related to the non-reporting of some incidents by 
physicians and nurses in KSMC. The variation in the rate of medication errors may 
also be related to the differences in the healthcare systems. For instance, a study 
conducted in US hospitals showed that the most common types of errors in the USA 
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differed from those in the UK and KSA.  The study conducted showed differences in 
the prevalence rates of the types of medication errors in USA hospitals: Prescribing 
errors were the most common error (77%) reported in the hospitals, followed by 
administration errors (12.8%), transcribing errors (5.8%) and dispensing errors (1%) 
(Fortescue et al., 2003). The high rate of prescribing errors in this study may be 
related to the new clinical decision support systems that implemented in the 
hospital.  
 
At the L&D hospital, the incidence rate of medication errors was nearly constant 
over the period studied. KSMC formally started reporting medication errors in 
January 2012 (Al-Dossari et al., 2014). Figure 4.1 and Table 4.8 show that the 
reporting rates for medication errors and dispensing errors were relatively constant 
from January to November 2012. After November 2012, the reporting rate increased 
until April 2013. The increase in the reporting rate is related to the fact that the 
hospital staff were encouraged to report incidents through the adoption of a blame-
free culture in reporting medication errors; in addition, the staff were educated 
about the importance of reporting errors to improve patient safety (Al-Dossari et al., 
2014).  
The medication and dispensing error rates during the weekends in both hospitals 
were low. The rates ranged between 10% and 13.5% on weekends at KSMC, while on 
weekdays, they ranged from 13% to 18%. At L&D, the rates ranged between 4% and 
10.5% on weekends and between 12% and 22.5% on weekdays. This could be 
attributed to the lower number of prescriptions dispensed during weekends. 
However, it is difficult to confirm whether the error rates were lower during 
weekends than during weekdays, because the number of dispensed items during 
weekdays was not available. 
The study found 637 dispensing errors in KSMC. About 75% of these errors were 
committed by the pharmacy technicians, primarily because of two reasons. First, one 
of the main duties of pharmacy technicians is assembling the medicines. Second, the 
number of pharmacy technicians is higher the pharmacies in KSMC compared with 
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the pharmacists. However, the majority of dispensing errors (96.9%) were 
prevented, which means that they were detected during the dispensing process 
before the drug had left the pharmacy department. Twenty cases (3%) were 
unprevented dispensing errors, which means they were identified after the 
medication had left the pharmacy department. A similar rate was reported in a study 
by James et al. (2011). This is a strong indicator of the importance of the accuracy 
check stage for decreasing dispensing errors. In the present study, the most common 
category of dispensing errors in KSMC and L&D involved dispensing incorrect 
medicines and incorrect medicine strengths, which is consistent with previous 
findings in the UK (Irwin, 2011; James, 2011). The medicine that was most frequently 
dispensed incorrectly in KSMC was tenofovir/emtricitabine (Truvada®). Tenofovir was 
dispensed rather than Truvada® because the two have look-alike and sound-alike 
names, as shown in Figure 4.9. The drug that was most frequently dispensed in the 
wrong strength was cinacalcet, which has two strengths: 30 mg and 60 mg. This error 
is due to the similar packaging of the two strengths, as shown in Figure 4.10. 
Truvada® is recommened as initiating treatment for the HIV infection (Gazzard, 
2008). However, there significant risk of dispensed Truvada® instead of Tenofovir but 
that can cost the hospital more. 
 
 
Figure 4.9:  The packaging of Emtriva® and Truvada® 
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Figure 4.10: The packaging of cinacalcet 60mg and cinacalcet 30mg 
 
All the dispensing errors reported in L&D were unprevented errors. One of this 
study’s limitations is that it did not have access to the in-house reports. The in-house 
reporting system encourages the pharmacy department staff to report prevented 
dispensing errors, which are errors that were detected before the drug had left the 
pharmacy department. The prevalence rate of prevented dispensing errors in the 
hospital pharmacies in previous published studies was about 97% of the identified 
dispensing errors, while the unprevented dispensing error rate was about 3% (Cina 
et al., 2006, James et al., 2011b). Reporting unprevented dispensing errors is an 
important tool to improve patient safety because it allows staff to learn from their 
mistakes (Crane et al., 2015). 
Table 4.14 shows that the number of unprevented dispensing errors in L&D was 
higher than that of the unprevented dispensing errors in KSMC; however, the 
number of medication errors was higher in KSMC than in L&D. This does not mean 
that the L&D hospital is a poorly performing hospital. The actual total number of 
dispensing errors is uncertain, as some errors were not identified or were identified 
but not reported. For example, the number of dispensing errors reported in eight 
different sections at Central Arkansas in the USA was only 82 over four years 
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(Rolland, 2004). This is another limitation of the incident report method (James et 
al., 2011b). The number of labelling errors, especially labelling incorrect drug names, 
drug strengths and patients’ names, was high in L&D. Labelling errors may be related 
to the lack of electronic prescribing; the pharmacy staff in L&D have to enter the 
prescription details, which could cause labelling errors. These results are similar to 
those of a study conducted in hospital pharmacies in the UK (James et al., 2011b).  
The use of technology clearly has an impact on reducing dispensing errors (Nakajima 
et al., 2005). For example, using a computerised physician order entry (CPOE) system 
in KSMC helps reduce the number of dispensing errors associated with labelling. The 
percentage of dispensing errors associated with labelling in KSMC was 10% (n=2) for 
the unprevented dispensing errors and 14% (n=87) for the prevented dispensing 
errors. That is much lower than the percentage of labelling errors in L&D (49%, 
n=25). All the labelling errors in KSMC were related to labelling the incorrect 
medicine strength in situations where the pharmacy staff had to change the 
medicine strength in the CPOE according to its availability. However, several 
published studies have shown the role of CPOE in reducing dispensing errors 
(Nuckols et al., 2014, Moniz et al., 2011). Meanwhile, using pharmacy automation 
systems in L&D may have reduced the errors in assembling the medicines. In KSMC, 
50% of the unprevented dispensing errors were a result of assembling the wrong 
medicines. Oswald and Caldwell (2007) conducted a study to compare the dispensing 
error rate before and after an automation system was implemented in a tertiary 
hospital in Canada. They observed that the dispensing error rate declined from 2.1% 
to 1.8% after the automation system was implemented.  
Some of the prevented dispensing errors were repeated twice on the same day. For 
example, methyldopa was dispensed instead of dexamethasone, and fat emulsion 
was dispensed instead of Vitalipid. The same person made both of these errors. This 
indicates planning action errors (mistakes) rather than a lack of knowledge or a slip 
or lapse of concentration. Beso et al. (2005) applied mixed methods to investigate 
the dispensing errors in hospital pharmacy and found that the most common 
reasons for active failure were slips (52%) and mistakes (44%). 
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In the present study, the most common reasons for dispensing the wrong medicines 
in both hospitals were look-alike or sound-alike names; these were also the most 
common factors in previous studies (Beso et al., 2005, Irwin et al., 2011, James et al., 
2008, James et al., 2011b). For example, moxonidine was dispensed instead of 
moxifloxacin in L&D and perindopril was dispensed instead of prednisolone in KSMC 
because of the look-alike names. Similar packaging is another reason for dispensing 
the wrong drug or wrong strength. For instance, nifedipine 10 mg was dispensed 
instead of nifedipine 20 mg in KSMC, and sotalol 80 mg was dispensed instead of 
sotalol 40 mg in L&D, as was Dermovate cream instead of Eumovate cream. All these 
medicines are reported as having confusing names in a list provided by the Institute 
for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) (ISMP, 2015).  
Labelling errors were high in L&D, especially labelling incorrect drug names, drug 
strengths and patient names. These results are similar to those of a study conducted 
in a community pharmacy in the UK, where the rate of dispensing errors associated 
with labelling errors was high at 36% (Ashcroft et al., 2005). The high rate of labelling 
errors may be related to a slip or lapse of concentration of the dispensary team 
member while selecting the medicine name or dose from the medicine list in the 
computer.  
The most common medicines involved in dispensing errors in KSMC were 
cardiovascular agents and anti-infective agents. This is consistent with the fact that a 
high percentage of hospital patients in 2012 complained of cardiovascular disease or 
infectious disease (MOH, 2013). 
The majority of unprevented dispensing errors identified in the KSMC and L&D 
pharmacies had minor or potential moderate clinical significance. This is consistent 
with the findings of previous studies (Bohand et al., 2009b, Cina et al., 2006, Irwin et 
al., 2011, James et al., 2008, James et al., 2011b, Rolland, 2004), where the majority 
of identified dispensing errors were of minor clinical significance or caused no harm. 
One dispensing error in KSMC had major potential risk, which means that it might 
have caused serious harm or death to the patient. In previous published studies, 
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some cases were serious and could have caused death; for example, a pharmacist 
dispensed an incorrect dose of verapamil (240 mg instead 40 mg) to an 86-year-old 
woman (Bohand et al., 2009b). Assessing the severity of the identified dispensing 
errors is helpful in raising the dispensary teams’ awareness of the seriousness of 
dispensing errors and the importance of adhering to pharmacy policies and 
procedures (Barton, 2009). Some dispensers, especially those who do not have 
enough experience, may trivialise the omission of a dose, thinking that it does not 
cause any harm to the patient; in reality, the omission may cause serious harm or 
death, as is the case with etoposide. The omission of etoposide for a short period (a 
few days) may cause serious harm or death. 
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4.5 Conclusion  
This section aimed to investigate the nature of dispensing errors reported in KSMC 
and L&D. A retrospective review of dispensing error reports for an 18-month period 
from January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013 was conducted. The data was entered into a 
computer and analysed using SPSS. Descriptive statistics were used to calculate 
frequencies and percentages and Fisher’s test was used to compare the unprevented 
dispensing errors in KSMC and L&D. 
A total of 6,101 medication error reports in KSMC and 766 medication error reports 
in L&D were documented. About 10.3% (n=637) of the medication errors in KSMC 
were dispensary errors, and the majority (96.9%) were detected in the final check 
stage. Nearly 6.4% (n=49) of the medication errors in L&D were unprevented 
dispensing errors. The most frequently reported dispensing errors in KSMC were: 
dispensing the wrong medicine (n = 323, 50.7%), dispensing the wrong strength (n = 
128, 20.1%) and labelling the wrong strength (n = 89, 14.0%). The most frequently 
reported dispensing errors in L&D were: dispensing the wrong medicine (n = 9, 
18.4%), labelling the wrong strength (n = 8, 16.3%) and dispensing the wrong 
strength (n = 7, 14.3%).  
 
 Cardiovascular and anti-infective agents were the most common medicines involved 
in dispensing errors in KSMC, while in L&D central nervous system, malignant disease 
and immunosuppression agents were most commonly involved in dispensing errors. 
Pharmacy technicians committed the most dispensing errors in KSMC. The majority 
of the unprevented dispensing errors in both hospitals had minor or moderate 
potential clinical significance.  
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Chapter 5: Contributing factors leading to dispensing 
errors 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Merely identifying the various types of medication errors may not help to reduce 
such errors in the future. Contributory factors associated with medication errors 
need to be investigated, in order to enhance medication safety (Tang et al., 2007). 
Dispensing errors can be occur at any stage of the dispensing process but the 
majority occurred during preparing the labels and assembling of the medicines 
(NPSA, 2007a). Limited of studies researched the contributing factors that associated 
with dispensing errors. These studies investigated the dispensing errors contributing 
factors relied on the subjective reporting of perceived contributory factors by 
pharmacy staff in and incident reports (Irwin et al., 2011, James et al., 2011b, James 
et al., 2008), interviews (Anto et al., 2010, Beso et al., 2005) and survey (Peterson et 
al., 1999).  
 
Dispensing error factors may vary from pharmacy to pharmacy. In previous studies of 
dispensing errors, several common factors have been reported to contribute to the 
errors, such as sound-alike and look-alike names of medicines, high workload, low 
staffing and interruptions during dispensing (Beso et al., 2005, James et al., 2008, 
James et al., 2011b). More contributory factors may be present in some hospitals—
for instance, James et al. (2011) reported extra contributory factors in Welsh hospital 
pharmacies including; inexperienced staff, complex prescriptions and bad 
communication. The main objectives of this phase are: 
 To investigate factors contributing to dispensing errors in KSMC and L&D 
pharmacies. 
 To investigate the dispensary teams’ perceptions of strategies to reduce 
dispensing errors. 
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5.2 Method 
There are several different ways to collect qualitative data; however, the four 
primary methods include observation, interviews, focus groups and questionnaires 
(Trochim et al., 2015, Arhinful et al., 1996). As shown in Table 5.1, Arhinful et al. 
(1996) have summarised the main advantages and disadvantages for the different 
methods of obtaining responses. The questionnaire method is less expensive than 
other methods and can be distributed to large numbers of participants at different 
sites (Arhinful et al., 1996). Moreover, it can preserve anonymity, allowing the 
participants to feel freer to provide honest responses about workplace issues 
(Constantinos et al., 2011). Because no interviewer is available to help the 
participants, questionnaires must be well-designed and clear to participants; the 
questions need to be simple and written in an easy-to-understand manner (Phellas 
et al., 2011). Questionnaires involve three types of questions: closed-ended 
questions, open-ended questions and a mixture of closed-ended and open-ended 
questions (Kane and ScienceDirect, 2004). 
 
Table 5.1: Advantages and disadvantages of the different methods of qualitative data collection 
Method  Observation 
 
Interview 
(Open-ended) 
Focus groups 
(Open-ended) 
Questionnaire 
(Open-ended) 
Main  
advantage  
-Permit evaluator to 
enter into and 
understand 
situation/context 
-Provide good 
opportunities for 
identifying 
unanticipated 
outcomes  
-Provide direct 
information about 
behaviour of 
individuals and 
group. 
-Provide opportunity 
to explore topics in 
depth 
 
-Allow interviewer 
to explain or help 
clarify questions, 
increasing the 
likelihood of useful 
responses 
 
 
-Focus groups can be 
relatively low cost 
and provide quick. 
 
-Participants may be 
more comfortable 
talking in a group 
than in an individual 
interview.  
 
-Fast and cheap 
-Suitable for large 
size and 
geographically 
spread population.  
-Samples are 
relatively large, so 
results may be more 
generalizable.  
 
-Anonymous; getting 
honest and insightful 
feedback 
Main 
disadvantages  
-May affect 
behaviour of 
participants. 
 
-Expensive and time 
consuming. 
 
-Need well-qualified, 
highly trained 
observers. 
- High setup costs. 
 
-Not suitable for long 
or complex 
questions.  
- Volume of 
information too 
large; difficult to 
generalise results. 
- Groups can be 
difficult to assemble. 
 
- The small numbers 
in focus groups can 
limit; difficult to 
generalise results. 
-Low response rate. 
 
- No control over 
how the 
questionnaire is 
answered. 
- Number of topics 
that can be explored 
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5.2.1 Participants 
All pharmacists, pharmacy technicians and pharmacy assistants who are responsible 
for preparing and dispensing medicines at KSMC and L&D Hospital were invited to 
participate in this study. Qualitative research studies generally use small samples, 
since they are designed to extract detailed data. Qualitative research studies usually 
take time and do not need large samples (Richards, 2009). Therefore, the target 
population for this kind of study is less than the quantitative methods, in order to 
create rich data concerning the study questions and to generate a deep and detailed 
study (Tuckett, 2004). Depending on the research questions, it is generally accepted 
that around 60 to 100 participants are enough for this method (Wilmot, 2005), and 
pragmatically, it is estimated that no less than 30 and up to 60 participants (at least 
15 participants from each hospital) would be sufficient for this qualitative 
investigation. 
 
5.2.2 Questionnaire design 
Designing the questionnaire is very important part of the research study. Meaningful 
responses from the participants can be obtained only if the questionnaire is 
structured efficiently, taking into consideration important aspects like reliability and 
validity of the information requested. Guidelines outlining the seven steps of the 
process of questionnaire design have been provided by Hague (2006) and these 
steps as the following; 
1. Decide what data is required  
2. Make a rough listing of the questions  
3. Refine the question phrasing  
4. Develop the response format  
5. Put the questions into an appropriate sequence 
6. Finalise the layout of the questionnaire 
7. Pre-test and revise 
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For this study, self-administered questionnaires was designed to meet the project’s 
objectives (appendix 9). All items were formulated after considering the results 
obtained from the quantitative aspect of this project conducted in KSMC and L&D. In 
addition,   previously published paper (Peterson et al., 1999) used to formulate the 
questions. Base on that, the focus in the questions involved in the questionnaire 
were formulated to explore the dispensary teams’ perceptions about the factors that 
contribute to dispensing errors and how to prevent these errors. Completing the 
questionnaire required about 20 minutes. The questionnaire contains two main 
sections, as follows: 
Section One: Questions about participants: Job role and ask if the participant is 
involve in preparing/dispensing medicines. This section aimed to make sure the 
questionnaire completed the dispensary staff only. 
Section Two: Questions about the contributing factors that associated with 
dispensing errors and how to reduce these errors. Also, this section has some 
questions about satisfied the participants about some strategies that implemented 
in their hospital.   
Reliability and Validity: The concepts of validity and reliability must be applied to 
the investigation to enable the data, and thus the research findings, to be 
meaningful. Reliability refers to the degree to which measures, data and procedures 
are internally consistent or replicable. In this study, the questions received internal 
review by the supervisory team to ensure the reasonability and feasibility of the 
nature of the questionnaire items. For the reliability, the questionnaire was 
distributed to six pharmacists. This pilot study of this research, participants showed a 
good understanding of the questions.  
 
 
5.2.3 Recruitment process 
The local collaborators at KSMC and L&D Hospital distributed the online self-
administered questionnaire form by email to all the dispensary team member in 
each respective hospital. A cover letter attached to the questionnaire explained the 
objective of the project and emphasised that participation in the questionnaire was 
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voluntary responses would remain confidential with anonymous representation. In 
the study, informed consent was not formally obtained from the participants; 
however, the act of sending a filled questionnaire was considered as consent to 
participate in the study. This information was provided to potential participants. 
 
After 3 weeks a reminder email was sent to the dispensary teams by the local 
collaborators to encourage them to participate. To enhance the response rate, six 
weeks after the distribution of the questionnaire the researcher conducted a 
presentation in both hospitals about the study objectives and distributed hardcopies 
of the questionnaire for those in the dispensary teams who had not completed it yet. 
A presentation was conducted prior to distributing the questionnaires about the 
research objectives and the types of dispensing errors in the hospital. This was to 
stimulate the dispensary team to complete the questionnaires.  
The completed online questionnaires were received by the researcher directly via 
Google documents. The completed hardcopy questionnaires were collected from the 
pharmacy department in KSMC, while the forms from L&D were sent back to the 
project team directly through the pre-paid envelopes supplied. Online questionnaire 
provides the highest level of convenience for the respondents because they can 
answer the questionnaire according to their own pace and chosen time (McDowell, 
2006). The hardcopy questionnaire provided for how not has computer access in the 
hospital and may not have time to complete the questionnaire at home.  
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5.2.4 Data analysis: 
Open-end questions usually provide qualitative data and there are several methods 
used to analyse qualitative data. Dawson (2002) presented four methods. The first is 
thematic analysis: themes usually emerge from the data and are not imposed by the 
researcher. Also, in this type of analysis, the researcher does not need to wait until 
he or she completes the data collection, so analysis can start once any part of the 
data is available. The second method is comparative analysis, which involves 
comparing and contrasting information that is obtained from the different 
participants, until the researcher is sure no more issues are identified. The third 
method is discourse or conversational analysis, which focuses on speech patterns, 
the frequencies of these patterns and their implications. The fourth method is 
content analysis, which is defined as ‘any technique for making inferences by 
systematically and objectively identifying special characteristics of messages’ (Berg, 
2009).  
The content analysis approach is one of the most popular approaches to analyse 
open-ended questions answers (Scobie et al., 2005, Krippendorff, 2012, von Kardorff 
et al., 2015). It is commonly utilised in health research to improve interpretation of 
data (Ahman et al., 2015, Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). Content analysis may be 
undertaken in an inductive or deductive way (Elo and Kyngas, 2008). There are three 
types of content analysis: conventional, directed and summative (Berg, 2009, Hsieh 
and Shannon, 2005). In the conventional content analysis, the coding categories are 
derived from the data directly. In the directed approach, initial codes obtained from 
a theory or relevant research are used as guidance to start the analysis. A summative 
content analysis involves counting and comparing words or content, followed by the 
interpretation of the underlying context (Berg, 2009, Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
Content analysis is an extremely useful method for analysing data that has clear 
research questions (Ezzy, 2002). The type of approach used here is directed content 
analysis because related research was undertaken in a literature review.  
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The data analysis began by organising and preparing the data for analysis, then 
reading all the data several times to gain a sense of it. After that, the data was read 
word by word to generate initial codes. In directed content analysis the initial codes 
such as sound-alike/look-alike names and inexperience staff obtained from relevant 
research. The next step was using the codes to generate the codes. Finally, a 
meaning or interpretation of the data was produced (Moretti et al., 2011, Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005, Braun and Clarke, 2006, Creswell, 2013). In this study, the 
questionnaires’ answers were entered into NVivo 10 qualitative analysis software for 
directed content analysis. Identified codes were grouped into categories, vetted by a 
member of the research team. 
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5.3 Result 
This section describes the findings obtained from the response of participants from 
KSMC and L&D hospitals. A total of forty four responses were received from the 
hospitals. Twenty four members of the dispensary team in KSMC sent the 
questionnaire back: seventeen pharmacists (Ph) and seven pharmacy technicians 
(PT) (one questionnaire was not completed). Twenty responses were received from 
L&D: thirteen from pharmacists, six from pharmacy technicians and one from a 
pharmacy assistant. Four pharmacists did not complete the questionnaire, because 
they were not involved in preparing or dispensing of medicines 
 
Labels were assigned to participants in order to their responses. The KSMC 
pharmacists were labelled as KSMC/Ph1 to KSMC/Ph17 and the pharmacy 
technicians were labelled as KSMC/PT1 to KSMC/Ph6. The L&D pharmacists were 
labelled as L&D/Ph1 to L&D/Ph9, the pharmacy technicians were labelled as 
L&D/PT1 to L&D/Ph6 and pharmacy assistant was labelled as L&D/PA1. A content 
analysis was applied to analyse the dispensary teams’ answers about their 
experiences with dispensing errors. This is because these were reported as stated 
written. The codes and categories that emerged from the dispensary teams’ answers 
are shown in Table 5.2.   
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Table 5.2:  Summary of the main themes, sub-themes and categories that emerged from the 
participants’ answers 
categories Codes 
Task related error-provoking factors  
Sound-alike drug names 
Similarity of packaging 
Complex prescriptions  
Illegible handwriting 
Similar patient names 
Personnel related error-provoking factors 
Communication and relationship problems 
Inexperienced staff  
Loss of concentration and fatigue 
Careless checking and low morale 
Urgent deadlines or hurrying through tasks 
Demanding patients 
Protocols not followed 
Work environment error-provoking 
factors 
Inadequate education  
Pharmacy logistics 
Distractions and interruptions 
High workload 
Low staffing 
Unsuitable computer system 
Personal improvement strategies 
Education & training  
Balancing heavy workload 
Reducing staff stress 
Communication and relationships 
Policy adherence 
Work system improvement strategies 
Reporting errors 
Auditing of errors 
Reflection on errors 
Stock management  
Pharmacy design   
Reduction of distraction 
Clear assignment of responsibility 
Structural improvement strategies 
Automation system 
Electronic prescribing system 
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Several factors contribute to the dispensing errors in both hospitals. These error-
provoking factors were classified under three categories: task-related, Personnel-
related and work environment–related.  
 
5.3.1 Task related error-provoking factors 
Look-alike and sound-alike drug names and similarity of packaging were the most 
reported dispensing error factors in both hospitals. The participants assembled the 
wrong medicines due to the similarity of the medicines’ names or packaging. Some 
of the new staff did not recognise that similar medicines were present in the 
pharmacy. Also, in KSMC there are annual contracts with medicine suppliers that 
lead to frequent changes in the medicines’ packaging and brand names; some of 
these medicines have similar names or packaging shapes. However, some L&D 
dispensers mentioned that implementing the automation system in the pharmacy 
helped to reduce assembling errors, but some errors still occurred, relating to similar 
names of medicines or strength during the selection of the medicine from the 
medicine list on the computer system in the L&D hospital (JAC system).  
“There are very similar medicine in regard of shape and names.” (KSMC/Ph6) 
“The hospital has a yearly treading with suppliers and contractors to provide medicine. 
Sometime, with new contract comes a whole different list of medicines which also very 
similar to medicine produce from diffident brand medicine.” (KSMC/Ph6) 
“The wrong strength could just be down to operator error where it is selected from a list of 
medication.” (L&D/PT6) 
 “Drugs with similar names are either filed next to one another on the shelves or are above 
one another on the JAC system when labelling and/or picking items form the robot.” 
(L&D/Ph7) 
 
 
105 
The ambiguity of the prescriptions, caused by factors such as illegible handwriting 
and complex prescriptions, were reported as factors associated with dispensing 
errors in L&D only. Some of the participants in L&D reported poor handwriting on 
the prescriptions as a contributory factor for dispensing errors, along with the 
complex prescriptions of Electronic Prescribing and Medicines Administration 
(EPMA) for the discharge patients’ prescriptions (TTA’s), while the dose set out in 
two different lines in some prescriptions. The dispensary team in KSMC did not 
comment about the prescriptions. A participant from KSMC reported the similarity in 
names of the patients as a dispensing error factor. 
 
“Confusion from hand writing on hand written requests. Poorly written hand-written 
requests.” (L&D/PT4) 
“EPMA TTA's are not very easy to read and easy to get dosing wrong. EPMA TTA's are not 
always set out logically (dose for some medication may be set out on 2 different lines).” 
(L&D/PT6) 
“Similar name of patient” (KSMC/PT1) 
 
5.3.2 Personnel related error-provoking factors 
Pharmacy staff, physicians, nurses and patients are involved in that factor but the 
majority factors are related the pharmacy staff.  Lack of communication and poor 
relationships among the dispensary team, or between the dispensary team and 
other healthcare professionals in the hospital, have been reported as a dispensing 
error contributory factor. Lack of senior support, and the lack of professionalism of 
some pharmacists when dealing with the other dispensary team members, can affect 
some staff, which may lead to dispensing errors.  
 “Lack of effective communication between pharmacist and physicians”  (KSMC/Ph17) 
“Lack of professional skills and interest among pharmacy technician due to the down look 
from their pharmacist colleagues.” (KSMC/Ph9) 
 “Lack of senior support” (L&D/P3) 
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Lack of experience of new staff has been reported as a contributory factor to the 
dispensing errors in both hospitals. The dispensary team in KSMC reported that 
sometimes inexperienced staff worked on the night shift alone, or carried out the 
final accuracy check, which led to a lot of errors.  
“Lacking experience for some of new employee in the pharmacy department” 
(KSMC/Ph1014) 
“Inexperienced members of staff.” (L&D/Ph5) 
 “Sometimes no qualified pharmacist in the night shift” (KSMC/PT3) 
  
 
 
A large number of participants in both hospitals reported fatigue and loss of 
concentration as dispensing errors contributing factors. Some of the dispensers 
mentioned some factors that may cause fatigue and loss of concentration, such as 
life stress, talking on phone or in person to another member of staff during 
dispensing, doing multiple tasks at once, doing the same work for long periods 
without any break or work rotation, noises in the pharmacy and empty the delivery 
boxes and put the stock on the pharmacy shelves in the busiest hours. Also, the 
dispensers lost concentration at the end of the day.  
“Less concentration during work due to personal issue or talking to colleagues.” (KSMC/PT1) 
“Supply the pharmacy by the medicines in the busy hours which may lead to less of 
concentration during prepare the prescriptions” (KSMC/PT4)  
“Tiredness/lack of breaks for repetitive tasks.” (L&D/Ph7) 
 
Careless checking and low morale have been reported as contributing factors 
associated with dispensing errors in both hospitals. Some of the dispensers were 
careless about checking their own dispensing and depended on the last check (final 
accuracy check). 
“Some employees are carless in work” (KSMC/Ph11) 
“Low morale → people don’t care. People not taking responsibility for own dispensing – they 
think it’s being double checked so ok to make mistakes” (L&D/PT3) 
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Hurrying through tasks may increase the possibility of errors occurring during 
dispensing.  The participants reported that they hurried up when there were a high 
number of prescriptions that needed to be dispensed, or if the prescriptions came to 
the pharmacy at the end of the day.  
“Rush hours when you have to work faster.” (KSMC/Ph1) 
“Pressure to dispense quickly e.g. to finish a late night quicker, when more outpatients 
prescriptions are waiting.” (L&D/PA1) 
 
 Participants reported some contributory factors associated with the patients. For 
example, the participants from KSMC and L&D reported that some patients 
demanding their medicines from the dispensary team may cause errors.  
 
“Also, sometimes the patients are rushing the pharmacy staff and asking them about their 
medications several times.” (KSMC/PT3) 
“People rushing...” (L&D/Ph2) 
 
A lot of the participants in KSMC pointed out that not following protocols and policy 
may lead to a failure to identify the dispensing errors in the pharmacy. For example, 
some participants mention that the final check is sometimes not implemented or 
some tasks are performed by an unqualified dispenser.   
 “Sometimes the cleaners arrange the medications without supervision” (KSMC/Ph9) 
 “Technicians dispense medication alone without double check.” (KSMC/Ph11) 
“Most the policies and decisions on the papers not performed and if it performed with no 
quality” (KSMC/Ph12) 
“Double checking Rx is not done properly, e.g., looking to the label only but not to medication 
inside it.” (KSMC/Ph1) 
“Sometimes no double check especial in the night shift” (KSMC/Ph2) 
 
5.3.3 Work environment error-provoking factors 
The dispensary teams in KSMC and L&D reported that the inadequate education of 
the staff was one of the causes of errors occurring in the dispensing process. The 
participants mentioned that lack of education about previous errors may lead to the 
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same errors being repeated. A large number of participants in KSMC complained of 
the lack of education in their pharmacy. For example, they mentioned that there 
were no regular meetings or lectures for the pharmacy staff to educate them about 
the previous errors, the newly available medicines in the pharmacy or about any role 
changes. Also, they mentioned that there was not any effective training for new 
staff.  
“No continues education about our errors” (KSMC/PT1) 
“Lack of training. Lack of appreciation how serious errors are.” (L&D/Ph2) 
 
In KSMC, participants reported contributory factors associated with the pharmacies 
logistics of arranging the medicines alphabetically on the pharmacy shelves, which 
may lead staff to put medicines with similar names together.  Also, the medicines in 
the pharmacy were sometimes arranged by unqualified people, which may lead to 
the medicines being put in the wrong positions. Some of dispensary staff complained 
about the pharmacy’s design in general as a contributing factor, and two participants 
added that, to them, the pharmacy’s size is small and not comfortable to work in, 
considering the workload that they carry out in there. Another contributory factors 
that emerged from the participants’ answers was the patients congregating at the 
pharmacy windows, because there is no waiting area for them, and the number of 
pharmacy windows not suitable for the pharmacy’s workload. In addition, the 
dispensers complained about the lack of a rest room for the pharmacy staff. On the 
other site (L&D), a dispenser complained about the lack of chairs in their pharmacy 
as illustrated in the excerpts below:  
 “Sometimes the wrong medication or wrong strength arranged in the wrong shelf by the 
servant in the pharmacy without anybody of the staff or the person responsible to arrange 
the correct drug in the shelf” (KSMC/Ph10) 
“Patients have no waiting area and consulting room” (KSMC/Ph6) 
Sometime the place of dispensing area outpatient is not suitable or comfortable for the 
pharmacist (KSMC/Ph17) 
No space between some medicines which lead to mix these medicines together. (KSMC/PT4) 
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No chairs in dispensary on your feet all the time body aching (neck, feet & back, legs) 
(L&D/PT1) 
Working in an untidy environment (L&D/PT1) 
 
Distraction and interruptions were reported by the dispensary teams in KSMC and 
L&D as contributing factors to errors occurring during dispensing of the medicines in 
the pharmacy. Some of the participants in KSMC mention in their answers; 
distraction and interruptions caused by chatting, high workload, empty the delivery 
boxes and put the stock on the pharmacy shelves in the busiest hours and 
unauthorised persons entering the pharmacy to enquire about some medicines. The 
dispensary staff in L&D also point to distraction and interruption in their dispensary 
as causes, such as chatting during dispensing, high workload, phone calls and being 
interrupted by patients.  
 
“…accumulation of patients at the pharmacy windows. Also, sometimes the patients are 
rushing the pharmacy staff and they asking the pharmacy staff about their medications 
several times.” (KSMC/PT3)  
 “… the entering of unauthorized people to the pharmacy such as physicist and nurses’ cause 
disturbing the pharmacist.” (KSMC/Ph6) 
“Distraction from your task from phones, others staff and patients.” (L&D/PT4) 
 
Many of the pharmacy staff in both hospitals complained in their answers about the 
high workload.  They also pointed out that a high workload results in errors 
occurring, as it leads to loss of concentration, speeding up the task, not taking a rest 
break and not implementing the final accuracy check. The pharmacy staff also 
mentioned low staffing levels as one of the contributory factors involved in 
dispensing errors, and this is a common factor that leads to an increase in the 
workload. 
“Lacking of staff, this lead to too much workload on the staff” (KSMC/Ph11) 
 “In the rash hour miss double check” (KSMC/Ph7) 
“Staff pressures (shortage and sickness)” (L&D/PT6) 
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Some of the dispensers in KSMC hospitals reported some issues with the computer 
system which may lead to errors, and that the current method of listing the 
medicines in the software leads to the selection of the wrong medicine or strength.  
“Poor computer system” (KSMC/Ph12) 
“Down level of system during work time” (KSMC/Ph13) 
 
 
After the participants listed the contributory factors associated with the dispensing 
errors, they reported some solutions and strategies to reduce these errors in their 
dispensary. These strategies gathered in three categories; personnel improvement 
strategies, work system improvement strategies and structural improvement 
strategies.    
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5.3.4 Personnel improvement strategies 
The participants listed strategies to improve patient safety and decrease errors while 
dispensing medicines. Educating and training the dispensary team was the most 
reported strategy to decrease dispensing errors. Several topics for education have 
emerged from the participants’ answers; these include educating the pharmacy staff 
about previous dispensing errors, and educating them about the look-alike and 
sound-alike medicine names and similar packaging for the medicines available in the 
pharmacy. Also, the dispensary team in L&D recommended specific education for 
new staff and trainees, such as reading the Policy Operative System (P.O.S) and 
doing the dispensing logs 100 times before working without supervision. The 
dispensary team in KSMC recommended educating the pharmacy staff through 
weekly meetings with all pharmacy staff and regular lectures and presentations, or 
individual feedback to the dispenser who made the error and asking the dispenser to 
correct his/ her mistake.  
“Train the staff and trainers about similar names, packages and different strength available. 
Also, after the updating the medicine from the contractor, there should be a training session 
to updating the red tags and the sound alike medicine.” (KSMC/Ph7) 
“Always asking the dispenser to correct their own discrepancies to allow them to learn from 
their mistakes, and getting dispensers to double check their work against the prescription.” 
(L&D/Ph7) 
 
The participants from L&D mentioned that they have already implemented weekly 
meetings in their pharmacy for all the pharmacy staff to discuss dispensing errors or 
any updates concerning the pharmacy or hospital. Also, there is a training 
programme for new staff, and new dispensers have to complete dispensing logs 
before they are allowed to carry out unsupervised dispensing. However, they 
recommended regular feedback about dispensing errors.  In contrast, the dispensers 
in KSMC complained about the inadequacy of education in their pharmacy; there 
was only limited education on making the pharmacy staff aware about the serious 
errors caused by look-alike and sound-alike medicine names using posters, which 
needed updating. 
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 “Posters about the look-like and sound-like medicine in the pharmacy but need to update 
because medications may be change every year depend on supply companies.” (KSMC/PT4) 
“Feedback on performance, training & awareness raising of the importance of reducing 
errors.” (L&D/Ph5) 
 
The participants in both hospitals suggested employing more staff to balance heavy 
workloads in the pharmacy, and sending the discharge prescriptions in early in the 
morning to avoid accumulating the prescriptions at the end of the day. Moreover, 
organising the workflow can help to avoid high workloads. A KSMC dispenser 
recommended setting up a satellite pharmacy in emergency pharmacy, and an L&D 
dispenser recommended dispensing the out-patients’ prescriptions in the 
community pharmacies. 
“Complex TTAs should be done in the morning when it is less busy.” (L&D/Ph8) 
“Open pharmacy in the emergency department to cover discharge patient prescriptions, 
this lead to decrease the load of work in the inpatient pharmacy working 24 hours” 
(KSMC/Ph8) 
“Move all Out-Patient prescriptions to community chemist which will support a calmer 
environment” (L&D/PT5) 
 
Reducing staff stress, through frequent and compulsory breaks in both hospitals and 
providing a quiet room in KSMC for relaxing during the breaks were suggested to 
help keep the dispensers’ concentration high during the day. 
“Breaks and rest room needed for the pharmacy staff.” (KSMC/Ph3) 
“Quite room for relaxing during the breaks” (KSMC/Ph4) 
 “Frequent and compulsory breaks.” (L&D/Ph7) 
 
The participants in both hospitals believe that improving the communication and 
relationship between the staff in the pharmacy will improve the environment in the 
dispensary, which should lead to reduced errors during dispensing. 
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“Good relationship between the pharmacy staff and supervisors are needed” (KSMC/PT4) 
“More support from management” (L&D/PT1) 
 
Policy adherence was strongly recommended by participants to reduce dispensing 
errors. These policies include doing self-checks, having a final accuracy check by a 
qualified pharmacist and avoiding using abbreviations. Enhancing the 
implementation of the policy can be done by the direct supervision and the support 
of the dispensary team. Also, the participants recommended regular policy updates.  
 “Double check should be done by pharmacist only.” (KSMC/Ph35) 
 “Inforce the staff to follow the policy and procedure” (KSMC/Ph4) 
“Ensure procedures are followed. Encourage dispensers to check their work before 
passing on” (L&D/Ph1) 
 
5.3.5 Working system improvement strategies 
The participants reported several procedures to enhance patient safety though 
understanding the causes and contributing factors associated with dispensing errors 
that had occurred, including reporting identified errors, auditing and analysing the 
reported errors and reflecting on the error. The KSMC pharmacy staff mention that 
reporting errors and auditing the errors were implemented in their practice, but 
needed improvement; the current reporting is manual, which consumes time and 
effort filling in the form and carrying out analysis. They therefore recommended 
implementing an electronic reporting system to avoid time-consuming processes and 
to improve data access. The L&D participants recommended daily monitoring of the 
prevented dispensing errors to raise the dispensers’ awareness.  
 
Several improvement strategies associated with stock management emerged from 
the participants’ answers. These strategies included arrangement of the medication 
in the pharmacy alphabetically, separating look-alike/sound-alike medicines in the 
shelves, colouring the font of the medicine’s name in the pharmacy shelves and 
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using caution red tags note on shelves to alert the dispenser that this medicine has 
look-alike and sound-alike medicines. Keeping the high alert medicines separated in 
a special cabinet to avoid serious errors, high alert medicines are the medicines that 
have heightened risk of causing significant patient harm such as anticoagulants. 
Using tall-man lettering, where part of a medicine's name is written in upper case 
letters on the pharmacy’s shelves, to help distinguish sound-alike, look-alike drugs 
from one another in order to avoid dispensing errors, was suggested. Most of these 
strategies need to be applied in KSMC, while at the L&D hospital some of these 
strategies need to be implemented for medicines that are not stored in the robot.  
“Separated between medications that are similar in shape and color of name by using sound-
alike/look-alike sticker on container” (KSMC/Ph17) 
“Arrangement the medication in the pharmacy by using alphabetical” (KSMC/PT3) 
“Shelving clearly make for items that are not in the robot.” (L&D/Ph2) 
 
    
The participants in KSMC thought that the pharmacy management needed to re-
design their pharmacies in KSMC, in order to reduce dispensing errors. Other 
suggestions included improving the pharmacy design by having a waiting area for 
patients, a counselling room and a rest room for the pharmacy staff.   
 
“Re-design the pharmacy to improve workflow” (KSMC/Ph7)  
 “Large and quite waiting area are needed for the patient who's waiting their medication.” 
(KSMC/PT3)  
“Quite room for relaxing during the breaks” (KSMC/Ph3) 
 
The participants in both hospitals believe that reducing distractions in the pharmacy 
will improve the environment in the dispensary, which should lead to reduced errors 
during dispensing. Distractions can be reduced through avoiding chatting and 
personal phone calls in the dispensary, avoiding pharmacy cleanness during the 
busiest hours, preventing unauthorised people entering the pharmacy and educating 
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the patients about the dispensing process and the usual time taken for dispensing. 
Also, avoid empty the delivery boxes and put the stock on the pharmacy shelves 
during the busiest hours. Some of these strategies are already implemented in L&D, 
where phone calls and chatting are not allowed in the dispensary area, and there is a 
poster explaining the dispensing process for the patients in the waiting area, to make 
them aware that they may need to wait for a long time during the dispensing 
process.    
 “Decrease distracting factor to improve concentration” (KSMC/Ph1) 
“Educate the patients about the dispensing process and the times needs for preparing their 
medications.” (KSMC/PT3) 
“Avoid distribution factors during prepare the medicines such as taking with another staff” 
(KSMC/PT3) 
 
The dispensary team recommended some strategies to improve dispensing 
operations in their dispensary.  The pharmacy staff in KSMC requested clear 
assignment of responsibility to each member of staff in the pharmacy to reduce 
errors during dispensing.   
“In general arrange of job description for employees. Pharmacists check the medication 
& technician for preparation & pharmacist for dispense the medications” (KSMC/Ph11) 
“Identify the tasks between the pharmacy staff and organize the tasks (who is receiving 
the prescriptions, print the labels, collect the medicines, double check hand the medicines 
to the patients)” (KSMC/Ph2) 
 
 
5.3.6 Structural improvement strategies 
The dispensary teams suggested using tools such as automated systems and 
electronic prescribing. The KSMC participants recommended implementing 
automated systems in their pharmacy to reduce assembling errors, while electronic 
prescribing is already applied in KSMC. The automated system is already 
implemented in L&D, but the dispensers suggested the implementation of electronic 
prescribing to avoid errors associated with illegible handwriting.  
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5.4 Discussion  
In this phase of the study, an open-ended questionnaire was sent to the dispensary 
teams in KSMC and L&D to obtain their views on two areas: the contributory factors 
associated with dispensing errors in the hospital and the strategies to reduce errors 
during dispensing. A total of 44 responses were received from the hospitals: 24 from 
the KSMC team and 20 from the L&D team.  
 
5.4.1 Contributory factors associated with dispensing errors in the 
hospital 
Some contributory factors that were mentioned were associated with the product 
itself, such as look-alike and sound-alike medicine names, similar packaging and 
several strengths and forms available for a particular medicine. These factors were 
reported more often by the KSMC participants, who assemble the medicines 
manually. However, these factors were also reported by the L&D participants, who 
select the medicine name from the computer list or assemble medicines that are not 
in the automation system. These factors are also commonly associated with 
dispensing errors in other hospital pharmacies (Irwin et al., 2011, James et al., 
2011b, Anto et al., 2010, James et al., 2008, Beso et al., 2005). These contributing 
factors have been identified in community pharmacies as well (Emmerton and Rizk, 
2012, Nordén-Hägg et al., 2012). 
The L&D team reported the ambiguity of prescriptions as a dispensing error factor, 
as some prescriptions were written manually and some were written in illegible 
handwriting or were complex. Since electronic prescribing is implemented in KSMC, 
none of the pharmacy staff in the KSMC team complained about that issue. 
However, L&D is currently progressing towards implementing an electronic 
prescribing system in the hospital, which will help prevent dispensing errors 
associated with the ambiguity of prescriptions. It was also noted that doing more 
than one task at the same time, such as answering the phone or counselling patients 
during dispensing duties, or doing the same tasks for a long period can confuse the 
dispensary team staff.  
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One of the dispensing error factors reported by the KSMC team was the similarity of 
patients’ names. The Saudi community consists of big families, which leads to several 
patients in the hospital having the same first and family names. There are some 
barriers to checking that the right patient is given the medicine in question, 
especially for the outpatient prescriptions, which do not contain the patient’s 
address or date of birth. Therefore, it is important to find a method to identify the 
right patient to avoid dispensing medicines to the wrong patients. For instance, 
pharmacies in the UK usually identify the right patients through their address and 
date of birth. 
Life stress, lack of experienced staff, carelessness of staff and hurrying through tasks 
have also been reported as contributory factors associated with dispensing errors in 
both hospitals. These factors have been reported in other studies as well (Irwin et al., 
2011, James et al., 2011b, Anto et al., 2010, James et al., 2008, Beso et al., 2005). 
The KSMC participants frequently reported not implementing the final accuracy 
check. The reasons mentioned for not following this procedure include working 
alone, a high workload and the lack of a qualified person to do this task. Most of 
these issues occur because of the lack of direct monitoring and appraisal of the 
dispensary team. The pharmacy administration team needs to investigate whether 
errors occurred because of the dispenser’s lack of experience, in which case he/she 
needs to undergo re-training, or because of the dispenser’s negligence, in which case 
he/she needs to be accountable. 
Several participants in both hospitals mentioned a loss of concentration as a factor in 
dispensing errors. The participants from both hospitals agreed that the causes of 
losing concentration are as follows: high workload, chatting while assembling 
medicines, lack of rest breaks, working the night shift, and emptying the delivery 
boxes and putting the stock on the pharmacy shelves during the busiest hours. The 
KSMC staff also identified important issues in their dispensary that distract the 
pharmacy staff, such as unauthorised staff (nurses and physicians) entering the 
pharmacy and patients congregating around the pharmacy windows. Distraction and 
interruption have also been noted in previous studies as contributory factors to 
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dispensing errors (Beso et al., 2005, Irwin et al., 2011, James et al., 2011b). Hence, 
these contributing factors must be considered to reduce the dispensing errors.  
Keeping the dispensers’ concentration high during working hours is important to 
avoid errors while dispensing medicines. Thus, the pharmacy administration team 
should make the pharmacy quieter by preventing distractions and interruptions 
during the dispensing of prescriptions. Chatting or phone calls should be prohibited 
in the dispensary area. Pharmacy deliveries should be received and stock should be 
put on the shelves early in the morning before the busiest hours (11 am to 3 pm). In 
addition, the pharmacy administration team in KSMC needs to prohibit unauthorised 
staff from entering the dispensary area to avoid distracting the dispensary team. 
The pharmacy staff in the KSMC team also mentioned the dispensary design as a 
contributory factor to dispensing errors. Pharmacy size, limited dispensing windows 
and the lack of a patient waiting area and staff rest room were reported as factors 
contributing to errors in KSMC. Other issues reported in KSMC were related to the 
arrangement of medications in the pharmacy, such as the lack of barriers or enough 
space between the medicines, which led to staff mixing the medicines together. 
Another reported factor was that unauthorised persons (cleaners) empty the 
delivery boxes and put the stock on the pharmacy shelves, which may lead to the 
medicines being put in the wrong place. In Al-Arifi’s (2014) study on dispensing 
errors in community pharmacies in KSA, 440 of the 800 dispensers reported 
dispensary design as the main factor contributing to errors. In the present study, the 
L&D team’s use of an automation system solved the issues associated with selecting 
medicines from the shelves. Only one pharmacy technician in the L&D team 
complained about the lack of chairs in the pharmacy. 
KSMC is currently undergoing development; new tower blocks are replacing the old 
buildings. According to the medication safety officer of KSMC, all the previous 
contributory factors associated with the pharmacy design of KSMC will be considered 
in the new buildings (Al-Zaagi, 2015). SpaceMed (2013) suggested that the size of the 
outpatient pharmacy depends on the number of prescriptions (Table 5.3). The 
suitable pharmacy size, number of windows, patient waiting areas, staff rest rooms 
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and patient counselling rooms should be taken into account in the design of the new 
pharmacies. The task of emptying the delivery boxes and putting the stock on the 
pharmacy shelves should be carried out by a qualified person who has good 
knowledge of the medicines.  
 
Table 5.3: Estimating the Size of an Outpatient Pharmacy 
Number of daily prescription Pharmacy size (feet square) 
Less than 100 The minimal size 500 ft² 
100 to 300 900 to 1,500 ft² 
300 to 500 1600 to 2200 ft² 
More than 500 More than 2300 ft² 
 
 
The KSMC dispensers added two more points when they were asked about the 
reported errors: lack of root cause analysis of the reported errors, and inadequate 
education about these errors. They noted that the identification of how errors occur 
is the first step to improving patient safety. So, the hospital needs an expert on root 
cause analysis to identify all possible errors causes in KSMC. The L&D participants 
were satisfied about current error monitoring and the audits for the unprevented 
dispensing errors, but some of the participants recommended monitoring the 
prevented dispensing errors in order to enhance the dispensary team’s knowledge 
about the contributory factors.  
The majority of the contributing factors that reported in the two hospitals are similar 
to the findings of previous research that conducted in the other hospital pharmacy 
or community pharmacy. These factors include look-alike/sound-alike medicines, 
staff inexperience, high workload and low staffing (Szeinbach et al., 2007, Ashcroft et 
al., 2005, Beso et al., 2005, Costa et al., 2008, James et al., 2008). However, the most 
common contributed factors that reported in the community factors were the 
illegible handwriting and the poor communication with the physicians (Ashcroft et 
al., 2005, Szeinbach et al., 2007).  
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5.4.2 Strategies to reduce dispensing errors  
The participants highlighted the education of the dispensary team as an important 
step to improve the staff’s abilities and therefore minimise their errors. The 
participants in both hospitals reported that new staff and trainees must read and 
understand the P.O.S first and work under supervision until they perfect their work. 
Moreover, all the dispensers need to raise awareness about the observed dispensing 
errors to avoid them. They also need to communicate any new pharmacy procedures 
through frequent meetings to increase the dispensing quality. The teaching and 
training of dispensary teams is recognised as an important tool to enhance patient 
safety and mitigate dispensing errors (Desselle, 2005).  
 
The majority of dispensing errors may be caused by new staff members’ lack of 
knowledge/experience. Thus, the pharmacy administration team needs to create a 
training programme to educate new staff about the pharmacy and the hospital’s 
policies and procedures. The new staff members need to be rotated in the pharmacy 
department for training purposes under senior supervisors and to be made aware of 
the contributory factors associated with dispensing errors. The L&D pharmacy 
department has already implemented a training programme for new staff, and new 
dispensers have to complete dispensing logs before they are allowed to carry out 
unsupervised dispensing. The pharmacy department administrator in KSMC needs to 
organise a weekly meeting to make all the pharmacy staff aware of dispensing errors 
and policy updates; this is already being done in L&D. However, the KSMC hospital 
needs to organise a wide variety of training such as packages and development 
programmes for the pharmacists, pharmacy technicians and pharmacy assistants to 
ensure continuous staff development. 
Some recommendations were reported concerning balancing heavy workloads in the 
pharmacy. Employing more staff is one of the recommendations in both hospitals to 
avoid an excessively high workload. But employing more staff may not be a suitable 
solution because it requires extra funding. Other recommendations to reduce the 
workload in L&D include dispensing outpatient prescriptions in the community 
pharmacies and sending the discharge prescriptions to the pharmacy early in the 
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morning before the busiest hours. Some hospital pharmacies in the UK have adopted 
these measures; the patients can take their prescriptions to the community 
pharmacies near or in the hospital, such as the Royal Liverpool University Hospital, 
Royal Blackburn Hospital and East Lancashire Hospitals (Wright, 2010). Terry et al. 
(2011) reported some problems with dispensing hospital prescriptions in community 
pharmacies. Commonly  reported  problems  include:  illegible  prescriptions,  
unfamiliar  drug  and  missing  information  on  the prescription, for example, 
quantity. They recommended printed prescriptions and the inclusion of the 
prescriber’s contact details to resolve these problems. The KSMC participants believe 
that opening a new pharmacy in the emergency department and implementing an 
automation system can help reduce the workload in their dispensary. Some studies 
conducted in hospital pharmacies (James et al., 2011a, James et al., 2013) have 
found that automation helps reduce the dispensers’ workload, improves dispensing 
efficiency and reduces the rate of dispensing incidents. 
Maintaining a high number of dispensers on duty during dispensing is important to 
avoid errors. Taking frequent breaks and providing a quiet room for relaxing during 
breaks were recommended to avoid errors, since staff need to have regular rest 
breaks and meal breaks for at least half an hour daily to improve their performance 
and their ability to organise workflow efficiently and safely (Cohen, 2007). The UK 
has a law that gives workers the right to take breaks if they work for six or more 
hours. Saudi hospitals also give their staff the right to take rest breaks and meal 
breaks. Neglecting to take structured meal breaks and rest breaks for any reason 
may contribute to an increase in errors during dispensing.  
A pharmacy technician reported the poor relationship between the pharmacy 
technicians and pharmacist as a factor contributing to errors. Some pharmacy 
technicians did not ask the pharmacist about any ambiguity in the task; this was 
related to the lack of friendship between them. The relationships among the 
pharmacy staff can be developed by understanding pharmacist and pharmacy 
collaboration (McDonough and Doucette, 2001).  
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Monitoring and reporting errors are among the most effective strategies to reduce 
dispensing errors and other patient safety incidents. Reporting the identified errors 
can help by making the dispensers and pharmacy team aware of their errors (Barton, 
2009). Auditing and analysing the reported errors helps investigate the contributory 
factors associated with dispensing errors. The reporting system in KSMC is currently 
done manually by completing medication error forms; hence, a participant 
recommended implementing an electronic reporting system in their practice. 
Nakajima et al. (2005) listed some benefits of implementing an electronic incident 
reporting system, such as easier access to the reports, shorter time to complete 
them, legibility of reports, easier and faster monitoring, and sharing of information 
and security of access by responsible persons only. However, there are several 
barriers to reporting incidents, including the lack of feedback on previous reported 
incidents, the lack of time to complete long forms and the lack of knowledge about 
how to report incidents (Elder et al., 2007). 
Reflection on errors is also recommended to enhance patient safety. In this process, 
the dispensary staff member describes the causes of the errors and lists some 
recommendations to avoid the errors in the future. Reflective practice is known as 
one of the most useful procedures in improving patient safety by minimising the 
individual factors that lead to medication errors (Pezzolesi et al., 2013). Reflecting on 
errors is an effective strategy to investigate the errors’ sources from the dispensary 
team’s point of view. Unfortunately, the majority of Saudi hospitals, including KSMC, 
do not have reflection polices or practise the concept of reflection, as they depend 
on the quality department to assess and formulate their safety policies.   
Good design, good work flow during the dispensing process and the clear assignment 
of responsibility for each pharmacy staff member are important to enhance safety 
during dispensing. The KSMC pharmacy administration team needs to consider how 
to improve the pharmacy design and work flow during the dispensing process, since 
bad dispensary design and poor work flow are reported as contributory factors to 
dispensing errors in the KSMC pharmacy. The NHS has published a booklet called 
Design for Patient Safety: A Guide to the Design of the Dispensing Environment. This 
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booklet shows how the pharmacy design can make the dispensing process safer. The 
L&D has a good pharmacy design similar to that described in the booklet, which 
leads to a good dispensing process flow. The L&D pharmacy design and dispensing 
flow are demonstrated in Figure 5.2. A participant from L&D complained of a lack of 
chairs in the dispensary area, which can lead to body aches. Having contacted the 
National Pharmacy Association, Royal Pharmaceutical Society and NHS there is no 
evidence to suggest they avoid providing chairs in the pharmacy. However, the 
nature of the dispensers work usually requires standing all the time in the 
dispensary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The KSMC participants reported that several patients demand their medicines from 
the pharmacy staff, which may cause errors. Educating the patients about the 
dispensing process can help address this problem. The L&D hospital pharmacy has a 
poster explaining the dispensing process and its estimated required time, which 
 
 
 
 
 
① Receiving the prescriptions    ② Clinical check  
③ Labelling      ④ Assembling area 
⑤ Final accuracy check    ⑥ Hand over the medicines’  
 
Figure 5.2: Pharmacy design and dispensing flow in L&D 
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helps reduce the patients’ demands. Figure 5.3 shows the L&D hospital pharmacy 
poster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology is also used to reduce dispensing errors. When asked about the current 
procedures applied to reduce dispensing errors in their hospital, the KSMC 
participants cited the electronic prescribing system (CPOE), while the L&D 
participants mentioned the automation system (robot). Electronic prescribing and 
automation systems are important technologies for enhancing dispensing accuracy. 
Numerous published studies have discussed the role of electronic prescribing in 
reducing medication errors (Cunningham et al., 2008, Eslami et al., 2008, Gandhi et 
al., 2005). Moniz et al. (2011) highlighted the impact of using electronic prescribing 
to reduce dispensing errors by avoiding the ambiguity of prescriptions. The 
automation system has also been proven as a means to reduce dispensing errors 
(Carmenates and Keith, 2001, Teagarden et al., 2005). These studies recommended 
implementing electronic prescribing and automated systems to improve patient 
safety. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: L&D hospital pharmacy poster to educate the patients about the dispensing process  
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter identified contributory factors associated with dispensing errors in 
KSMC and L&D hospitals, and investigated the dispensary teams’ perceptions with 
regard to potential improvement strategies to reduce the dispensing errors in their 
dispensaries. A total of forty four dispensers from both hospitals participated in this 
study. Several factors led to dispensing errors in the hospital pharmacies; some of 
these factors are common to both hospitals, while some of the factors were 
reported in either hospital. 
Similar medicine names or packaging was one of the common factors in both 
hospitals. Using the automation system helped to reduce the assembling of wrong 
medicines, but some of the errors occurred because of the similarity of some of the 
medicines’ names and the method for their display in the automated system. Other 
common factors were associated with the pharmacy teams, and included poor 
relationships and communication between the pharmacy staff, lack of the staff 
experience, fatigue and loss of concentration during work, low morale and hurrying 
through tasks. Moreover, common dispensing error factors associated with the work 
environment were noted, such as distraction and interruptions in the dispensary, not 
following the pharmacy policy procedures and high workloads. 
Ambiguity of the prescriptions is a contributory factor reported in L&D, where the 
majority of the prescriptions are written manually. Thus factor was not reported in 
KSMC, where the hospital has used electronic prescribing since 2006. In contract, 
there are some factors that may enhance the occurring of dispensing errors in KSMC, 
such as inadequate staff education, the pharmacy design and the similarity of the 
patients’ names. 
Several strategies are recommended by the participants to enhance safety during 
dispensing tasks, for instance, focusing on the development of the dispensary staff 
will help to reduce the dispensing errors through their education and training, 
especially that of new members; and reducing staff stress by ensuring that the staff 
get enough breaks and providing a quiet room for relaxing during breaks. Reporting 
identified errors and root analysis of these errors are important methods for 
126 
reducing dispensing errors. Furthermore, improving the work environment helps to 
increase patient safety in the pharmacy, through changes such as good design for 
the pharmacy, improving the communication between the staff and avoiding 
distraction and interruptions for the dispensary team. Also, policy adherence and 
clear assignment of responsibility for each member of the pharmacy staff are further 
important factors. Using electronic systems, such as the automation system, 
electronic prescribing and electronic reports, are useful technical solutions for 
reducing dispensing errors. 
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Chapter 6: Summary and conclusion     
 
6.1 Summary 
Medication errors are common and can occur in any healthcare setting. According to 
an IOM report (2006), medication errors harm 1.5 million Americans every year and 
cost $3.5 billion (Partin, 2006). Medication errors mainly occur during the 
prescription, administration and dispensing stages (NPSA, 2007c, Lisby et al., 2005, 
Alakhali et al., 2014, Karthikeyan and Lalitha, 2013, Kirke, 2009). The majority of 
medication error studies have investigated errors in the prescribing and 
administration stages; very few have explored them in the dispensing stage at 
hospital pharmacies. Nonetheless, dispensing errors are common in healthcare 
institutions: approximately 11,000 dispensing errors were reported to the NPSA in 
2006 (NPSA, 2007c). This research therefore has focused on dispensing errors in 
hospital pharmacies. 
 
 
The types of dispensing errors vary from hospital to hospital and depend on the 
dispensing process and facilities available. As described in Chapter 1, the KSA has a 
different healthcare system, and, to our knowledge, there have been no studies 
conducted to investigate dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies in SA or any other 
Arab country.  
 
A systematic review was undertaken to identify the best available evidence 
concerning the nature and contributory factors associated with dispensing errors in 
hospital pharmacies. Researchers have studied dispensing errors extensively in 
community pharmacies, but few studies have investigated this phenomenon in a 
hospital pharmacy environment. Our systematic review confirmed this observation 
as only 15 studies were conducted in hospital settings in four countries: the UK (6), 
Brazil (4), the USA (3) and France (2).  
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The majority of the reviewed studies identified only the nature of the dispensing 
error. Only five studies reported on the contributing factors associated with 
dispensing errors. The review studies noted that the most common type of 
dispensing errors were providing the wrong medicines or the wrong strength of the 
medicines. An omitted dose was the most common dispensing error type in studies 
focused on identifying errors in the unit dose system (Anacleto et al., 2005, Bohand 
et al., 2009b, Costa et al., 2008, Rissato and Romano-Lieber, 2013). The reviewed 
studies reported the following common contributing factors: look-alike/sound-alike 
medicines, inexperience staff and high workload.  
 
Direct observation and reviewing incidents reports were common methods of 
investigating dispensing errors in the reviewed studies. Some studies applied 
incident reports or interview methods only (Anto et al., 2010, Beso et al., 2005, Irwin 
et al., 2011, James et al., 2008, James et al., 2011b). Meanwhile, the dispensing 
errors rate identified in these studies relied on observation methods (Bonifacio Neto 
et al., 2013). One study reported on the contributing factors and rate of dispensing 
errors (Beso et al., 2005). This study used a combination of methods: observations 
and interviews. Using a mixed methods approach is recommended for studying the 
nature and contributory factors of dispensing errors; for instance, one might use an 
incident report review with interviews or questionnaires (Michel, 2003, Lisby et al., 
2005).  
 
This study employed a quantitative and qualitative approach to gain valuable 
information related to the nature and factors associated with dispensing errors in 
two different hospital settings. Four main types exist to mix quantitative and 
qualitative methods, including triangulation, embedded research, and explanatory 
and exploratory designs (Creswell, 2009). In this study, explanatory design was 
applied to answer the research questions. It should be noted that the quantitative 
method preceded the qualitative method.  
 
This research consisted of three phases. First, in phase 1, published studies were 
systematically reviewed to evaluate the scope of the literature on errors that 
occurred during the dispensing process in hospital pharmacies. Phase 2 involved the 
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identification of dispensing errors through a retrospective review of medication 
incidents reported at KSMC and L&D; in this way, the nature of dispensing errors was 
identified. Phase 3 included a qualitative exploration of factors perceived to 
contribute to dispensing errors and strategies for reducing these errors. 
 
Research findings indicated that dispensing errors were the third most common type 
of medication errors at both hospitals. After transcribing errors and prescribing 
errors, dispensing errors were more common at KSMC. Administration errors and 
prescribing errors preceded them at L&D hospital. Dispensing the wrong medicine 
and dispensing the wrong strength were the most common types of dispensing error 
for both hospitals. Labelling errors, such as labelling the wrong strength and labelling 
the wrong medicine, was reported more commonly at L&D compared to KSMC. This 
difference could be attributed to the fact that L&D has implemented an electronic 
prescription system.  
 
Reviewing incident reports alone may not provide enough evidence regarding 
contributory factors associated with dispensing errors. Therefore, self-administered 
qualitative questionnaires were distributed to the dispensary teams at KSMC and 
L&D. The questionnaire was formulated after considering previously published 
papers and the findings obtained from the quantitative component of this research. 
The questionnaire sought to investigate the perceived factors contributing to 
dispensing errors as well as strategies to reduce these errors. 
 
After receiving the prescription, clinical screening is usually the first step in the 
dispensing process, and it is an important one—it has the capacity to improve 
patient safety. A qualified pharmacist screens the prescriptions to check the dose 
and other related issues, such as drug-drug or drug-disease interactions (Alakhali et 
al., 2014). In a study by Fernández-Llamazares et al. (2012), the clinical pharmacist in 
a Spanish paediatric hospital avoided 1,475 prescribing errors in 61,458 electronic 
prescriptions by carrying out the clinical check for prescriptions discharged at the 
pharmacy. L&D has implemented the clinical screen step, but the absence of clinical 
pharmacists at KSMC made it difficult to practice such a process for dispensing 
medicines. Due to the shortage of clinical pharmacists at KSMC, the current role of 
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the hospital’s clinical pharmacist includes reviewing the prescribed medicines in the 
in-patient chart as well as counselling the in-patients about their medicines and 
therapeutic drug monitoring. However, clinical screening of the received 
prescriptions remains an important intervention to reduce prescribing errors and 
ADEs, but not dispensing errors. 
 
 
Preparing and printing labels is usually the second step in the dispensing process. In 
some hospital pharmacies, errors are common during this step. For instance, the 
majority (51%) of the dispensing errors detected at L&D were labelling errors, 
especially labelling with incorrect drug names, drug strengths and patient names. 
Labelling errors were also common in 20 hospital pharmacies in Wales (James et al., 
2011b). There are several contributory factors associated with labelling errors, such 
as similarities in medicine names and the different strengths or forms available for 
certain drugs. The influence of these factors was stronger for inexperienced staff, as 
some new staff members did not recognise the different strengths and dosage forms 
available for certain medicines.  
 
Hastily selecting medicines from the medicine list on the computer also leads to an 
increase in labelling errors: for example, selecting clonidine 25mcg instead of 
clonazepam 0.25mg, or selecting hydralazine 25mg instead of hydroxyzine 25mg, 
both of which occurred at L&D. Some of the dispensers checked the first letters of 
the medicine name, then selected the wrong medicines from the list without 
checking the whole name, strength and form. Moreover, the ambiguity of 
prescriptions was reported as a factor associated with dispensing errors at L&D. For 
instances, some errors were caused by illegible handwriting or by complex printed 
prescriptions; meanwhile, medication dosage was sometimes written on two 
different lines. 
 
To reduce labelling errors, it is recommended that dispensers conduct self-checks 
before generating the label. In addition, administrators should educate new staff 
members about medicines that have sound-alike and look-alike names or different 
strengths and forms. Some researchers have also suggested the use of an alerts 
program for medicines with similar names on the computer (James et al, 2008). 
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However, using electronic prescription has contributed to decreasing labelling errors 
at KSMC, where the pharmacy staff not required to enter the prescriptions in the 
computed system. Many published studies present the role of electronic 
prescriptions in reducing dispensing errors (Moniz et al., 2011, Agrawal, 2009, Forni 
et al., 2010).  
 
 
At the majority of hospitals, dispensing errors occur mainly when assembling the 
medicines. For example, the majority of the dispensing errors at the KSMC pharmacy 
happened while assembling the medicine from the pharmacy shelves. Errors 
included selecting the wrong medicine, the wrong strength or the wrong form. Look-
alike/sound-alike medicine names and inexperienced staff members were reported 
as contributory factors to dispensing the wrong medicines. These factors clearly 
appeared in this study’s cases of dispensing errors: for example, the dispensers at 
KSMC discharged tenofovir instead of tenofovir/emtricitabine (Truvada®) 32 times. 
Furthermore, similar packaging sometimes causes the discharge of the wrong drug 
or strength. For instance, nifedipine 10 mg was dispensed instead of nifedipine 20 
mg.  
 
A final accuracy check is the last step in the dispensing process before handing the 
medicine to the patient. It is an important stage of the dispensing process, and it is a 
key strategy in perceiving and preventing dispensing errors. Traditionally, the final 
accuracy check should be done by a qualified person. For instance, only pharmacists 
can carry out the final accuracy check at KSMC, while at L&D, it is done by a 
pharmacist or an accuracy checking technician (ACT). One study indicates that 
approximately 97% of dispensing errors were detected in the final accuracy check 
(James et al., 2011b). The importance of the final check was obvious in KSMC data, 
where 96.9% of the dispensing errors were prevented.  
 
KSMC and L&D reported several factors that contribute to the occurrence of errors 
during the dispensing process: high workload, inexperienced staff, phone calls, 
fatigue, hurrying through the task and carelessness about conducting the double 
check. KSMC participants reported more contributing factors at their pharmacy: 
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inadequate education, poor pharmacy design, not performing the final check, 
chatting during dispensing, poor communication, relationships between staff 
members and interruptions from patients and hospital staff. The KSMC participants 
also reported that medicine delivery and stocking the shelves often occurred during 
the busiest hours. 
 
 
The participants reported several strategies for reducing dispensing errors. 
Participants at both hospitals agreed on the importance of education and training 
programs for reducing dispensing errors. KSMC participants recommended re-
designing the pharmacy and the dispensing process workflow. Moreover, they 
suggested the implementation of an electronic reporting system and RCA technique 
to analyse such incidents. 
 
 
These research findings show the dispensing error types and contributing factors 
that differ between countries. The majority of dispensing errors at the L&D hospital 
pharmacy were labelling problems, while KSMC had more content errors. The 
participants at KSMC reported some contributing factors unique to their pharmacy, 
such as the entrance of an unauthorised person in the pharmacy and a lack of 
frequent meetings for the pharmacy staff. However, such findings indicate the need 
to conduct more research to investigate dispensing errors in various countries due to 
the variety of healthcare systems and cultures. This research identified the 
contributing factors associated with dispensing errors at KSMC and L&D. However, 
further exploration is needed to investigate some of the contributing factors, such as 
the causes of the high workload and not following the policy. For such research focus 
groups or interviews (qualitative) could be used.  
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6.2 Conclusion 
Dispensing errors are a common concern to the pharmacy profession. This study 
aimed to identify avoidable errors so to reduce patient harm and improve safety. 
This research has used a mixed methods approach to investigate and identify the 
nature of dispensing errors at KSMC and L&D pharmacies. The study also explored 
contributory factors associated with dispensing errors and strategies for reducing 
these errors. Dispensing the wrong medicine or the wrong strength were the most 
common dispensing error types for both hospitals. Labelling errors were also 
common at L&D. The most common contributory factors were the following: look-
alike/sound-alike medicines, high workload, lack of staff experience, fatigue and loss 
of concentration during work, low morale, hurrying through tasks and distraction 
during the dispensing process. Other contributory factors included prescription 
ambiguity for L&D, and pharmacy design and dispensing work flow at KSMC.  
 
Safety during dispensing tasks could be increased by focusing on staff development, 
which will help to reduce dispensing errors through education and training, 
especially for new staff members. In addition, safety can be enhanced by reducing 
staff stress, ensuring that they have enough breaks and a quiet room for relaxing 
during such breaks. Important methods for reducing dispensing errors include 
reporting identified errors and undertaking root cause analysis of these errors. 
Furthermore, improving the work environment can help to increase patient safety in 
the pharmacy; these changes could include implementing a good design for the 
pharmacy, improving the communication between staff members, and avoiding 
distractions and interruptions for the dispensary team. Further important factors 
include policy adherence and clear assignment of responsibility for each member of 
the pharmacy staff. Using electronic systems, such as automation systems, electronic 
prescriptions and electronic reports system, are useful technical solutions for 
reducing dispensing errors.   
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6.3 What this study adds 
By integrating the findings of this study, KSMC and L&D hospitals can gain a fuller 
picture of the occurrence of dispensing errors. We have demonstrated the types of 
dispensing errors, factors associated with these dispensing errors, and the 
experiences and perceptions of the dispensary team about dispensing errors. Most 
importantly, we were able to form preliminary conclusions regarding the extent to 
which dispensing errors are a real problem at these hospitals. Data obtained from 
this study will certainly help develop, or even implement, procedures to reduce 
dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies. In addition, the comparison between KSMC 
and L&D hospitals in terms of incidence, types, factors and staff perceptions of 
dispensing errors could help both hospitals to develop strategies to reduce these 
errors. This thesis proposes several ideas, factors and recommendations surrounding 
dispensing errors occurring in hospital pharmacies. Further exploration could 
confirm findings and identify more factors causing dispensing errors. 
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6.4 Strengths and limitations of the research 
 
Strengths 
 This research was supported by the use of a comprehensive literature review 
in order to identify the extent of the problem and the appropriate method for 
future research. 
 A mixed method approach was adopted, which enhanced the capability to 
answer the research questions. 
 The L&D Hospital in the UK and KSMC in KSA were selected on the basis to 
learn from the advantages of each healthcare system. 
 
Limitations 
 The examined dispensing incidents were too few in KSMC and L&D, because 
the analysed medication error reports don’t provide the actual number of the 
dispensing errors that occurred within the study period. This is because some 
errors were not detected, or detected but not reported. 
 Data on prevented dispensing errors in L&D (in-house report) were not 
included in this study due to limited access. 
 Lack of information about the dispensing errors’ outcomes and the patients 
involved in the errors in the incident reports. These data would have been 
helpful to determine the clinical significance of unprevented dispensing 
errors.   
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 Lack of details about the dispensed item numbers, which will help to confirm 
some findings; for example, to check if dispensing errors at the weekend have 
a lower frequency compared with other days. 
 The sample size of dispensary team included in the study could affect the 
generalizability of the study. 
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6.5 Recommendations 
Some specific recommendation that may help to reduce the dispending errors in 
KSMC and L&D: 
KSMC 
 A comprehensive training program is needed for the new staff and trainees. They 
must understand the P.O.S first, and they should then have to work under 
supervision until they perfect their work; implementing the dispensing logs at least 
100 times before working without supervision will assess if they can do their work. 
 Continuing education for all the dispensary team, updates on dispensing issues and 
policy through weekly meetings with all pharmacy staff and regular lectures and 
presentations, and individual feedback to the dispenser who made the error, asking 
the dispenser to correct his/ her mistake.  
 Commitment to a final accuracy check by a qualified person, before handing over the 
medicine to the patient or the patient's representative. 
 Improve the environment in the dispensary through reducing distractions in the 
pharmacy, which will help to reduce errors during dispensing. Distractions can be 
reduced through avoiding chatting and unnecessary phone calls in the dispensary, 
avoiding supplying the pharmacy in the busiest hours, preventing unauthorised 
people entering the pharmacy, and educating the patients about the dispensing 
process and the usual time taken for dispensing through posters in the patients’ 
waiting area. 
 Reducing staff stress, through frequent and compulsory breaks and providing a quiet 
room for relaxing during the breaks, which will help to keep the dispensers’ 
concentration high during the day. 
 Balancing of the high workload in the pharmacy by dispensing the discharge 
prescriptions earlier in the day, and arranging breaks and annual leave among the 
dispensary team so as to avoid staff shortages. 
 Implementing an electronic reporting system in the hospitals may help to reduce the 
dispensing errors and patient safety incidents, so long as the electronic reporting 
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system has easy access for all the hospital staff, in order to avoid time-consuming 
processes and to improve data access. 
 Regularly auditing the incident reports, and using a root cause analysis method to 
determine the multiple, underlying contributory factors. 
 Formulating an error reflection form, and encouraging the consider team to describe 
the causes of errors and to list some recommendations to avoid these errors in the 
future. 
 Good design, a good flow of work during the dispensing process and the clear 
assignment of responsibility for each member of the pharmacy staff are important to 
enhance safety during dispensing. 
 Implementing an automation system (robot) may help to decrease dispensing errors, 
especially when there is a high workload in the pharmacy. 
 
 
L&D 
 Balancing the high workload in the pharmacy by dispensing the discharge 
prescriptions earlier in the day. 
 Implementing electronic prescribing for all the prescription types may help to reduce 
dispensing errors that occur because of the ambiguity of the prescriptions, and the 
subsequent selection of the wrong medicine, strength or form from the computer 
list. 
 Distinguish similar medicines that are not in the robot. Several strategies can help to 
distinguish similar medicines, such as separating the similar medicines on the 
shelves, using tall-man lettering, colouring the font of the medicine’s name on the 
pharmacy shelves and using caution red tag notes on shelves, in order to alert the 
dispenser that a medicine has look-alike and sound-alike medicines. 
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6.6 Reflections during the research process 
Choosing the research topic idea started from the first month of my job as a 
pharmacist in a hospital pharmacy. One of my colleagues dispensed digoxin 0.25mg 
instead of 0.125mg, which almost led to the death of a patient. With time, I 
recognised that dispensing errors are common, so I began to search for information 
about the contributory factors associated with dispensing errors. During this time I 
was lacking the basics of research, as I depended on the Google search engine. 
  
Looking back, I realise just how much I have learnt throughout this research process. 
Learning the research skills has had a strong personal impact, and I realise how much 
that has affected my personal character. I have improved my research skills and 
learnt to utilise the most suitable methodologies for answering research questions 
and addressing the required objectives. 
 
Furthermore, throughout the quantitative and qualitative methods conducted in the 
study, I have learnt how to implement healthcare research procedure and make use 
of the available policies and facilities. The process of ethics application has provided 
me with an insight into the significance of ethical issues surrounding the research. 
Although I was familiar with the KSA hospital policies, I was introduced to UK 
hospital policies and procedures at the L&D Hospital. While working there, I also 
learnt how to access their databases, obtain dispensing error records and extract the 
relevant information required for the research. I believe that I have gained 
collaboration and team-working skills while working with the hospital staff (including 
the pharmacy), who supported me throughout the whole research process. I have 
received professional training at the hospital, which has helped me to acquire 
knowledge in the clinical aspect of my project. In addition, UH offered me generic 
research training which enhanced both my theoretical and practical research skills. 
For instance, the SPSS statistics courses have enabled me to choose the right tests 
for data obtained from the quantitative approach. In addition, I have learnt how to 
choose the most suitable method to analyse qualitative data. Moreover, with the 
help of my supervisors, I have learnt at the University of Hertfordshire how to 
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communicate with experts and involve them in the research process. My supervisors 
helped me to develop my problem-solving skills through addressing the many 
challenges that were encountered during data collection in both the UK and the KSA. 
Overall, I have learnt many transferable skills in the quantitative study, including 
designing research, ethical procedures, undertaking research with collaborators, 
data extraction and data analysis. 
 
I found conducting my research towards achieving a PhD a very enjoyable process, 
during which I have gained crucial knowledge about my research and appreciated 
the application of the most appropriate methods to achieve the research objectives. 
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6.7 Research Output 
 
 ALDHWAIHI, K., UMARU, N., PEZZOLESI, C. & SCHIFANO, F. 2016. A systematic 
review of the nature of dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies. Integrated 
Pharmacy Research and Practice, 5, 1-10. 
 
 Aldhwaihi K, Umaru N, Schifano F, Pezzolesi C. An evaluation of dispensing 
errors at King Saud Medical City pharmacies. Poster presented at 4th 
International Conference on Healthcare Systems Ergonomics and Patient 
Safety, Taiwan, 23-26 June 2014. 
 
 Aldhwaihi, Pezzolesi, Schifano, Umaru. An evaluation of dispensing errors at 
King Saud Medical City pharmacies. Poster presented at the University of 
Hertfordshire Research Conference, Hatfield (UK), April 9-10, 2014. 
 
 Aldhwaihi, Pezzolesi, Umaru, Schifano. An evaluation of the types and 
contributing factors of dispensing errors in Luton and Dunstable hospital 
pharmacy. 21st Congress of the EAHP 'Hospital pharmacists taking the lead - 
partnerships and technologies'', Vienna (Austria), 16-18th March 2016. 
 
 
 MSc Pharmacy Practise Research Presentation Evening; University of 
Hertfordshire. Wednesday, June 17th 2015: The nature of dispensing errors 
in hospital pharmacies (Presentations) 
 
 Pharmacy Practice Presentation and Research Showcase Evening; University 
of Hertfordshire. Wednesday, 30 April 2014: The nature of dispensing errors 
in hospital pharmacies (Presentations) 
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From: Randell William (RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR [mailto:William.Randell@ldh.nhs.uk] 
Sent: 16 October 2013 13:13 
To: Pezzolesi, Cinzia 
Subject: RE: Khaled 
 
Hi, 
When I came back from AL I had over 2000 emails to look at, this will be why something's got missed. 
 
However: 
 
I am happy with Khaled Aldhwaihi to conduct his research project at the L&D hospital 
 
Any queries please call 
 
William 
 
William Randell 
Head of Risk and Governance 
Luton and Dunstable NHS Foundation Trust Hospital 
(: 01582 718015 
Mob: 07786110137 
9: William.randell@ldh.nhs.uk 
william.randell@nhs.net (secure) 
https://www.ldh.nhs.uk/default.htm 
 
From: Pezzolesi, Cinzia [mailto:c.pezzolesi@herts.ac.uk] 
Sent: 16 October 2013 12:30 
To: Randell William (RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR 
Subject: FW: Khaled 
Thank you!! 
From: Pezzolesi, Cinzia 
Sent: 03 October 2013 09:42 
To: 'Randell William (RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR' 
Cc: Schifano, Fabrizio; Umaru, Nkiruka; Aldhwaihi, Khaled Abdulrahman A 
Subject: Khaled 
 
Dear William, 
 
I hope you are well. I am very sorry to disturb you again but Khaled (our PhD student) will start his data 
collection at the L&D soon and we are working on his ethics application. 
Would you mind sending us a line in which you say that you are happy with Khaled to do his project at 
the L&D. I think you have done this before but somehow we cannot find the email. It could be something 
like ‘I am happy with Khaled Aldhwaihi to conduct his research project at the L&D hospital’. 
 
Many thanks for your help 
 
Regards 
Cinzia  
160 
From: Hardy Diana (RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR 
To: Umaru, Nkiruka 
Cc: Aldhwaihi, Khaled Abdulrahman A; Geeson Cathy (RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR; Edwards Patricia 
(RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR 
Subject: RE: Ethics approval 
Date: 05 December 2013 15:42:56 
Attachments: 1. Defining Research Leaflet[1].December 2009.pdf 
 
Dear Nikkie, 
Thank you for your email and since UH Research Sponsorship has advised that you do not require NHS ethics 
approval you do not require R & D approval. If the study does not require Research Ethics Committee approval by 
definition the study cannot be defined as research - that is a contradiction in terms. Please see attached. I would 
think the study should be classed as Service Evaluation. If the study were to be defined as 'research' it would 
need Research Ethics Committee approval (plus R & D approval). 
 
However, if Pharmacy agree to this project taking place in their Department then they will arrangefor the 
Honorary Contract. 
 
Kind regards. 
Diana 
Diana Hardy 
Research & Development Manager 
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
Lewsey Road 
Luton LU4 0DZ 
Tel: 01582 718243 
Fax: 01582 718244 
Email: diana.hardy@ldh.nhs.uk 
----Original Message----- 
 
From: Umaru, Nkiruka [mailto:n.e.umaru@herts.ac.uk] 
Sent: 05 December 2013 14:40 
To: Hardy Diana (RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR; Geeson Cathy (RC9) Luton & Dunstable 
Hospital TR 
Cc: Aldhwaihi, Khaled Abdulrahman A 
Subject: RE: Ethics approval 
 
Dear Diana, 
 
Many thanks for your reply to my PhD student's query. We intend to arrange a meeting with Cathy and/or Mary 
to obtian their support to undertake the study. The study will retrospectively review the Datix database mainly 
for errors related to medication and also conduct a qualitative survey online with those invovled with 
disppensing within the pharmacy team. We have the support of William Rendall which was a requisite to obtain 
UH ethics approval. This study is classified as research not audit and in addition we do not need NHS approval 
because it does not involve patients, just NHS staff as confirmed by NHS REC office. 
Khaled will require authorisation and an Honorary contract in order to review the database and conduct his 
survey, however, please let us know if we still need to apply for R&D approval. 
Kind regards 
Nikkie  
 
Please see excerpt below  
Dear Khaled, 
We have been advised by UH Research Sponsorship that your study entitled 'An evaluation of the types and 
contributing factors of dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies: a comparative study' does not require NHS 
ethics approval.  
 
If you still intend to conduct this study you are required to obtain UH ethics approval. The protocol number 
issued has not been validated and you must not commence participant recruitment or data collection for this 
study until UH ethics approval is granted. 
Please discuss this with your supervisor and, should you wish to continue with this study, please arrange for your 
supervisor to resubmit your completed EC1 application form and any relevant appendices to 
hhsecda@herts.ac.uk . Your application will be considered by the UH ethics reviewers and their response will be 
sent to you in due course. Here is the link to all the relevant paperwork 
http://sitem.herts.ac.uk/secreg/EthicsFormsGuidanceNotes.htm. I have attached your original partcompleted 
EC1 for reference for you. 
 
If you require further clarification regarding this matter, please contact us. 
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Kind regards, 
Lesley Powell 
Ethics Clerk 
Academic Services 
MacLaurin Building 
de Havilland Campus 
University of Hertfordshire 
Ext - 1254 
ECDA email addresses: 
Health & Human Sciences - hhsecda@herts.ac.uk Science & Technology - stecda@herts.ac.uk Social 
Sciences, Arts & Humanities - ssahecda@herts.ac.uk 
-----Original Message----- 
 
From: Aldhwaihi, Khaled Abdulrahman A 
Sent: 26 June 2013 09:06 
To: hhsecda, uh 
Subject: FW: internal protocol number 
 
Hi Dear, 
Can I have a internal protocol number. I have attached all required document. 
 
Best regards 
Khaled 
________________________________________ 
From: Aldhwaihi, Khaled Abdulrahman A 
Sent: 24 June 2013 08:01 
To: hhsecda, uh 
Subject: internal protocol number 
 
Hi Dear, 
I am a PhD student and I am in the ethics approval process. I am wondering if I can have a internal protocol 
number. 
 
Please find all required document attached. 
 
Best regards, 
Khaled Aldhwaihi 
Dr Nkiruka Umaru (Nikkie) 
Department of Pharmacy, School of Life and Medical Sciences University of Hertfordshire, College 
Lane, Hatfield, Herts AL10 9AB 
Tel: 01707 286519 (Int: 3519); E-mail : n.e.umaru@herts.ac.uk 
________________________________________ 
From: Hardy Diana (RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR [Diana.Hardy@ldh.nhs.uk] 
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2013 10:55 AM 
To: Geeson Cathy (RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR 
Cc: Aldhwaihi, Khaled Abdulrahman A; Umaru, Nkiruka 
Subject: FW: Ethics approval 
 
Dear Cathy, 
 
Are you aware of this request from Khaled Aldhwaihi? I'm sure he hasn't got Research Ethics Committee (REC) 
approval since the University of Hertfordshire is not a REC approved site. However, I believe he means he has his 
University's ethical approval which is quite different. It would also appear, although I have very little information 
other than that written below, that this project is not research i.e. he states that this is an 'evaluation'. If it is not 
research he will not require REC or R & D approval to undertake the study on site. He would require your 
authorisation and an Honorary Contract to come on site. I believe you deal with many students from the 
University of Hertfordshire wishing to undertake such projects in your Department. 
 
However, if the study is indeed defined as research, I can send Khaled all the information on how to define his 
study and how to apply for both Research Ethics Committee and R & D approvals. However, it would still need 
authorisation from the Pharmacy Department. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you please. 
 
Many thanks. 
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Best wishes. 
 
Diana 
-----Original Message----- 
 
From: Aldhwaihi, Khaled Abdulrahman A [mailto:k.aldhwaihi@herts.ac.uk] 
Sent: 05 December 2013 10:41 
To: Hardy Diana (RC9) Luton & Dunstable Hospital TR 
Cc: Umaru, Nkiruka 
Subject: Ethics approval 
 
Dear Diana, 
 
Hope you are well. 
 
I am Khaled Aldhwaihi, a PhD student at the Pharmacy Department, University of Hertfordshire. My research 
project is about (An evaluation of the types and contributing factors of dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies). 
To conduct my study, I am planning to review retrospectively the dispensing errors reports at L&D Hospital. Also, 
I will distribute Questionnaire to be completed by the pharmacists in the hospital. The ethical approval has been 
obtained from REC at the University of Hertfordshire. Based on an advice from the REC at NHS I need to have the 
R&D approval from L&D Hospital to commence my study. 
 
I would be grateful if you let me know how to apply for the R&D approval and what documents are required. 
 
Thanks & Regards, 
 
Khaled  
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Appendix 4: KSMC Medication Errors Form 
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Appendix 5: Incident Report Form (Datix) 
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(Appendix 6) Form 1 - Medication Errors Data Collection Form 
No. 
Date of 
incident 
Drug 
Description of error Type of M.E 
Name Strength Route Form 
       □Prescribing           □Dispensing 
□Administration    □Monitoring 
□Transcribing       Other…………… 
       □Prescribing           □Dispensing 
□Administration    □Monitoring 
□Transcribing       Other…………… 
       □Prescribing           □Dispensing 
□Administration    □Monitoring 
□Transcribing       Other…………… 
       □Prescribing           □Dispensing 
□Administration    □Monitoring 
□Transcribing       Other…………… 
       □Prescribing           □Dispensing 
□Administration    □Monitoring 
□Transcribing       Other…………… 
       □Prescribing           □Dispensing 
□Administration    □Monitoring 
□Transcribing       Other…………… 
       □Prescribing           □Dispensing 
□Administration    □Monitoring 
□Transcribing       Other…………… 
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(Appendix 7) Form 2 – Dispensing error Data Collection form 
No 
Date of 
incident 
Drug 
Description of dispensing error 
Type of D.E 
(code) Name Strength Route Form 
        
        
        
        
        
        
  
170 
Appendix 8: Assessment of Dispensing Error Severity Form 
Assessment of Dispensing Error Severity 
Thank you for your agreement to be a member of our expert panel to assess dispensing errors detected in 
hospital pharmacies. Assessment the severity of dispensing errors is a part of my (Khaled Aldhwaihi) PhD 
work under the supervision of Dr Nkiruka Umaru, Professor Fabrizio Schifano and Dr Cinzia Pezzolesi at the 
Department of Pharmacy, University of Hertfordshire. 
The PhD study aims to determine the nature and severity of dispensing errors reported in the hospital 
pharmacies at King Saud Medical City (KSMC) hospital in Saudi Arabia, and at Luton and Dunstable Hospital 
(L&D) NHS Foundation Trust in the UK. The research consists of two phases; Phase 1 involves identifying 
types of dispensing errors and assessing their severity. This phase had been done through retrospective 
review of incident reports in the two hospitals and then using an expert panel to assess the severity of 
dispensing errors. Phase 2 investigates factors contributing to dispensing errors and how to reduce these 
errors throw quantitative questionnaires.  
The study used the following definition of a dispensing error "any unintended deviation from an 
interpretable written prescription or medication order including content and labelling errors; any 
unintended deviation from professional or regulatory references, or guidelines affecting dispensing 
procedures, is also considered a dispensing error”  (Franklin and O'Grady, 2007) in the pharmacy 
departments. There are two dispensing errors types, prevented dispensing error and unprevented 
dispensing error. 
Prevented dispensing error:  the errors identified before the medication has left the pharmacy 
department.  
Unprevented dispensing error: the error detected after the medication has left the pharmacy department 
 
You have been chosen as member of expert panel to assess the severity of the identified unprevented 
dispensing errors. The expert panel comprises three judges with previous experience in dispensing errors. 
Each member will be asked to use this form to classify the potential risk of patient harm from the identified 
unprevented dispensing errors.  
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Please rate the following error scenarios and classify for potential risk of patient harm using the classification 
description provided below (James, 2011). The errors presented have all been considered as unprevented 
dispensing errors. 
 
Catastrophic This could have resulted in death. 
Major These could have caused major permanent harm or an increased length of stay in hospital or 
increased level of care for more than 15 days. 
Moderate These incidents could have caused semi-permanent harm (up to 1 year) or an increased length 
of stay in hospital or increased level of care for up to 15 days. 
Minor This includes incidents that could have resulted in non-permanent harm (up to 1 month) or an 
increased length of stay in hospital or increased level of care for up to 7 days 
None No harm could have resulted. 
 
Please note that although these dispensing errors were identified retrospectively, there is limited information on 
patient details, potential influencing factors which may have contributed to the error and patient outcome 
following the error due to the limitations of the error reporting database used. However, all errors occurred in 
the pharmacy dispensary. We ask that you classify the following errors for potential severity level. You can 
provide a note as to why you have chosen the option you have given the particular error in the assessment 
justification box. An example is provided below as a guide. 
 
DE Ref Dispensed Medicine Type of Dispensing errors 
00001 Lamotrigine 100mg 
tablet 
Dispensed Lamotrigine 100mg tablet instead of Labetalol 100mg tablet 
More 
information 
None available 
Severity of 
incident 
None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment 
justification 
Moderate harm assigned due to the effects of Lamotrigine (starting dose usually 25-50mg Daily). Severity rating could be raised to 
Major given certain contexts e.g. more than a few doses and/or if patient was pregnant / breastfeeding.   
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DE Ref Dispensed Medicine Type of Dispensing errors 
78764 Moxifloxacin 400mg tablet Dispensed Moxonidine 200mg instead of Moxifloxacin 400mg 
More information  None available  
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
78973 PEG interferon alfa 120mcg (IV) Dispensed and labelled as PEG interferon alfa 150mcg 
More information Out-patient prescription 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
78974 N-acetylcysteine 1.2gm tablet Dispensed and labelled as Sodium Chloride 1.2gm 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
81164 Clobetasone skin ointment Dispensed as Dermovate instead of Clobetasone 
More information Children’s out-patient prescription 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
81677 Midazolam Buccal 5mg (IV) Labelled as Midazolam Buccal 1ml (10mg) instead 0.5ml (5 mg) 
More information Child 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
82495 Clonazepam 0.25mg tablet Dispensed and labelled as Clonidine 25mcg 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
More information Patient had taken 4 doses of incorrect medication 
Assessment justification  
85395 Enoxaparin 20mg (SC) Dispensed as Enoxaparin 40mg 
More information In-patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
82282 Ceftriaxone IV Dispensed as Ceforoxime IV (wrong drug) 
More information The first dose administrated to the child by community nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
85390 Mesalamin (Asacol®) Dispensed  as Mesalazine (Pentasa®)  
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
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DE Ref Dispensed Medicine Type of Dispensing errors 
85498 Hydroxyzine 25mg Dispensed and labelled as Hydralazine 25mg 
More information In-patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
94698 Aquacel AG Ribbon Dispensed and labelled as Aquacel Ribbon 
More information Ward used the plain Aquacel Ribbons over the weekend 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
79442 Morphine 2.5ml Labelling wrong dose as Morphine 5ml 
More information The error identified by nursing home 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
85399 Dexamethasone 1ml amp. Labelling wrong dose as Dexamethasone 1.2ml 
More information Child patient (In-patient) 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
94697 Morphine Sulphate SR 10mg Dispensed as Morphine Sulphate SR 100mg 
More information Discharge patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
92720 Mycophenolate 250mg Dispensed Mycophenolate 500mg 
More information Discharge patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
80731 Bimatoprost 0.01% Labelled wrong concentration as Bimatoprost 0.03% 
More information In-patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
90974 Ranitidine injection Dispensed Ranitidine oral instead of Ranitidine injection 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
86640 Methotrexate Labelling the wrong expiry date of Methotrexate 21/12/2012 instead of 28/9/2012 
More information Outpatient prescription- the error discovered by the patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
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DE Ref Dispensed Medicine Type of Dispensing errors 
91054 Fentanyl Dispensed the wrong quantity of Fentanyl 10 ampoules instead of 20 ampoules 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
94362 Morphine Dispensing the wrong quantity of Morphine 100mls instead of 500mls 
More information The error identified by nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
92121 Etoposide Omission of Etoposide capsules (did not dispensed for the patient) 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
92048 Methotrexate 15mg Dispensed wrong dose as Methotrexate 5mg 
More information The error identified by nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
92901 Sodium chloride 9% eye drop Dispensed wrong concentration as Sodium chloride 5% eye drops 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
94502 Epoetin alfa 10000 units Dispensed wrong concentration as Epoetin alfa 6000 units 
More information The error identified by nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
81636 insulin Insulin baggage labeled  by a complete wrong label 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
82805 Flucloxacilline  Flucloxacilline vial labeled  by a complete wrong label 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
83023 Carbocisteine capsul Incomplete information in the label 
More information No clinical directions on how to take the medicine 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
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DE Ref Dispensed Medicine Type of Dispensing errors 
85606 TPN preparation Labelling the wrong patient name 
More information In-patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
91717-91714 Cetuximab Labelling the wrong patient name for Cetuximab 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
94652 Lamotrigine Labelling the wrong patient name for Lamotrigine 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
85674 Paracetamol 250mg/5ml Labelling the wrong instructions, two 5ml instead of 5ml 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
86555 Cyclizine 50mg/1ml inj. Dispensed wrong formulation as Cyclizine 50mg tablets 
More information The error identified by a nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
83226 Candesartan 16mg Dispensed and labelled for wrong patient 
More information In-patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
83227 Sotalol 40mg Dispensed and labelled as Sotalol 80mg 
More information In-patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
85748-85781 TPN preparation Incomplete information in the label (no patient name) 
More information In-patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
89827 Buprenorphine 52.5 patch Dispensing the wrong quantity 4 patch instead 5 patch 
More information None available 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
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DE Ref Dispensed Medicine Type of Dispensing errors 
93389 Sodium bicarbonate 1.26% IV Dispensing an expired medicine 
More information The medicine was not administrated to the patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
1330113-1610213 
1700213 
Dexamethasone 0.5mg tablet Dispensed as Methyldopa 250mg (the patient took the medicine) 
More information Out-patient, the error identified by the patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
3140113 Mesalazine 400mg tablet Dispensed as Mesalazine suppository instead tablet 
More information The error identified by a nurse before administering the dose to the patient 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
4420213 Omeprazole 40 mg vial Dispensed wrong quantity, 20 vials for inpatient instead 2 vials 
More information The error identified by a nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
330313 Amlodipine 5mg Dispensed and labelled as Amlodipine 10mg instead 5mg  
 
More information The error identified by the patient; the patient took the medicine 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
170613 Epinephrine injection Did not dispensed the dose for the in-patent (omission dose)  
More information The error identified by a nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
1960613-1970612 Fat emulsion injection Dispensed as Vitalipid injection 
More information The error identified by a nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
510112 Fluticasone inhaler Dispensed fluticasone+salmeterol inhaler instead of Fluticasone 
More information The medicine was taken by the patient and the physician discovered the error in the next appointment 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
200212 Vancomycin 500mg vial Dispensed Cefuroxime 750mg vial instead of Vancomycin 500mg  
More information The error identified by a nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
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DE Ref Dispensed Medicine Type of Dispensing errors 
1500712 Calcium carbonate 500mg Dispensed Sodium bicarbonate 375mg instead of Calcium carbonate 500mg 
More information The error identified by the patient and he did not take the medicine 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
620812 Prednisolone 5mg tablets Dispensed Perindopril 5mg instead of Prednisolone 5mg 
More information The error identified by the patient and he took the medicine 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
1540112 Paracetamol 500mg Dispensed Calcium carbonate 500mg instead of Paracetamol  
More information The patient took  two doses of the medicine (in-patient) 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
430812 Nifedipine 20mg tablets Dispensed and labeled Nifedipine 10mg instead of Nifedipine 20mg 
More information The patient took the medicine and the error identified by a pharmacist when the patient returned for a repeat  
prescription (refill) 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
340812 Mesalazine 500mg Dispensed Mesalazine 1gm suppository instead of Mesalazine 500mg for in-patient 
More information The error identified by the patient and he took the medicine 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
270912 Simvastatin 40mg Dispensed Simvastatin 10mg instead of Simvastatin 40mg 
More information The patient took the medicine and the error identified by a pharmacist when the patient returned for a repeat  
prescription (refill) 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
840613 Paracetamol 500mg tablet Dispensed Paracetamol vial instead Paracetamol tablet 
More information The error identified by a nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
760212 Cyclosporine 100mg capsule Dispensed expired Cyclosporine capsule for in-patient 
More information The error identified by a nurse 
Severity of incident None              Minor                Moderate                Major                Catastrophic  
Assessment justification  
 
 
  
Expert Panel name:  
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An Exploration of the Factors Associated with Dispensing Errors and Strategies for Reducing Them 
(Information Sheet) 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you decide whether to do so, 
we would like you to understand why the research is being carried out and what it would involve for 
you.  
This research will form the basis of Mr Khaled Aldhwaihi’s doctoral degree. Its purpose is to identify 
the nature of dispensing errors in hospital pharmacies at King Saud Medical City (KSMC) in Saudi 
Arabia and at the Luton and Dunstable Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (L&D) in the UK. As such it 
seeks to explore the factors associated with dispensing errors and recommendations to reduce 
occurrence of these errors. 
Dispensing errors can occur at any stage of the dispensing process, which starts from receipt of the 
prescription from a patient and ends with the distribution of the medicine to the patient or the 
patient's representative. The study has adopted the following definition of a dispensing error: ‘any 
unintended deviation from an interpretable written prescription or medication order including 
content and labelling errors; any unintended deviation from professional or regulatory references, or 
guidelines affecting dispensing procedures, is also considered a dispensing error’  (Franklin and 
O'Grady, 2007). 
The project consists of two phases, each of which uses a different methodological approach. In phase 
one the quantitative approach has been conducted to investigate the factors associated with 
dispensing errors. In phase two a qualitative approach will be used.  The quantitative phase has 
already been completed through a retrospective review of incident reports at KSMC and L&D for an 
18-month period that ranged from 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2013. However, the qualitative phase 
needs the kind cooperation of participants who are being asked to complete a qualitative 
questionnaire. That process will take around 15-20 minutes. Your participation is very important for 
this research, as it will provide the researcher with more details about dispensing error issues; it will 
also enable you to share your views and your experience as well as your ideas for reducing 
dispensing errors. 
 
Confidentiality will be guaranteed to all participants and maintained throughout the project. All 
participants’ personal data and comments will be treated confidentially and will be anonymised in 
any future publications. There will be no further obligation on your part. Completing the 
questionnaire will be considered as your implied consent to participate in the study.  
 
This research is closely supervised by Dr Nkiruka Umaru, Prof. Fabrizio Schifano and Dr Cinzia 
Pezzolesi at the Department of Pharmacy, University of Hertfordshire. If you have any concerns 
about the questionnaire, or want further information about the study, please contact one of the 
research team: 
- Dr Nkiruka Umaru, Department of Pharmacy, University of Hertfordshire, College Lane, Hatfield, 
AL10 9NL   E-mail: n.e.umaru@herts.ac.uk   Tel:+441707286519  
- Khaled Aldhwaihi, Department of Pharmacy, University of Hertfordshire, College Lane, Hatfield, 
AL10 9NL  E-mail: k.aldhwaihi@herts.ac.uk   Tel:+447751464846, +966505454945  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9: Questionnaires Forms 
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Summary of  retrospective study on dispensing error incidents reported at KSMC: 
A total of 637 dispensing error incidents were reported at KSMC from January 2012 to June 
2013. Of these 637 incidents, 617 dispensing error cases (96.9%) were intercepted before 
the medicine left the pharmacy department. However, the remaining 20 dispensing error 
cases (3.1%) went undetected before the medicine left the pharmacy. The most frequently 
reported dispensing errors were: dispensing the wrong medicine (n = 323/637, 50.7%), 
dispensing the wrong strength (n = 128/637, 20.1%) and incorrectly labelling the medicine 
strength (n = 89/637, 14%). For example, some of the most frequently reported errors were: 
dispensing Tenofovir instead of Truvada® (n=30) and dispensing Cinacalcet 30 mg instead of 
Cinacalcet 60 mg (n=24), or vice-versa. 
   
(Questionnaire) 
 
Please complete the following questions: 
 
Section One: Questions About Yourself  
1.1    What is your current job role? 
□ Pharmacist                       □ Pharmacy Technician              
□ Other, please specify ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
  
1.2   Are you involved in preparing/dispensing medicines in the pharmacy department?  
□ Yes                           □ No  
If NO, thank you for completing this questionnaire and sending it back, your response is 
very important to us. 
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Section Two: Dispensing Errors. 
 
2.1 What are the current procedures followed in your pharmacy department to reduce 
dispensing errors? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Our quantitative study findings indicate that the most common dispensing error 
types were ‘dispensing the wrong medicine’ and ‘dispensing the wrong strength’. In 
your opinion, why are these dispensing errors common in your hospital? 
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2.3 From your experience, can you list any contributing factors associated with these 
errors in your hospital? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 What procedures do you think should be followed to reduce these errors? 
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2.5 Please list the main contributing factors that are involved in causing any types of 
dispensing errors in general during the dispensing process in your hospital? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6 What recommendations would you suggest to reduce dispensing errors in general in 
your hospital? 
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2.7 Are you satisfied with the medication error reporting system in your hospital? Why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8 What actions are usually taken to learn from reported dispensing errors to prevent 
them happening again? 
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2.9    Do you have any further comments or suggestions on any issues related to 
dispensing errors? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
 
